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

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A

FREE DISCUSSION

OF THE DOCTRINES OF

MATERIALISM,

AND

PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY,

IN A CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN DR. PRICE,

AND DR. PRIESTLEY.

* 7601.50

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

BY DR. PRIESTLEY,

An INTRODUCTION,

Explaining the Nature of the CONTROVERSY, and LETTERS to several Writers who have animadverted on his DISQUISITIONS RELATING TO MATTER AND SPIRIT, or his TREATISE ON NECESSITY.

Together let us beat this ample Field.
——————Be candid where we can,
But vindicate the Ways of God to Man.

POPE.

LONDON:
Printed for J. JOHNSON, No. 72, St. PAUL'S CHURCH-YARD,
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Mrs. J. D. W. Williams.

337,316
Nov. 6. 1883

THE

DEDICATION.

To JOHN LEE, Esq.

OF

LINCOLN'S-INN.

DEAR SIR,

I TAKE the liberty to present to you, not in the character of an *advocate*, but in that of a *friend*, and a *judge*, a production that is in part my own, and in part that of our common and excellent friend Dr. Price. Though you are employed in the practice of a particular profession, your education, and studies, have by no means been con-

fined to it, but you have extended your inquiries to all ſubjects that are intereſting to *men*, to *citizens*, and to *chriſtians*.

My object in the preſent publication, as well as in thoſe which have preceded it, is to overturn, as far as my endeavours can effect it, what I deem to be a prejudice of the greateſt antiquity, and the deepeſt rooted, of any that have contributed to debaſe chriſtianity, and a corruption which, in this philoſophical age, calls the loudeſt for reformation. And though this will neceſſarily deſtroy ſome flattering hopes reſpecting our proſpects after death, they are ſuch as are ill founded; and it will draw our attention more ſtrongly to thoſe *more certain*, though *more diſtant* proſpects, that chriſtianity holds out to us.

Our

Our friend, however, conſiders my endeavours in a light unfavourable and hoſtile to chriſtianity, and overturning not ſuppoſed, but real foundations. As truth will finally prevail over all oppoſition, time (though we may not live to ſee the iſſue) will diſcover whether my zeal in attacking, or his in defending, is better founded; and as our intentions, I believe, are equally upright, our diſcuſſion truly amicable, and conſequently *truth*, not *victory*, our object, it will be equally (or, to make allowance for a little human frailty, it will, I hope, be as near as poſſible equally) acceptable to us both, on which ſide ſoever it be found. You, who have an equal friendſhip for us both, will not, on this account, be biaſſed on one ſide more than on the other; and whichever way any of our friends incline, as we are confident we ſhall not

loſe

loſe their eſteem, ſo, we can aſſure them, they will not loſe ours.

Intricate as the diſcuſſion of ſuch queſtions as theſe is, there is a peculiar pleaſure attending the ſpeculations; and from the relation they bear to the greateſt of all objects, they have a dignity and ſublimity in them, and eminently contribute to inſpire a *ſerenity* and *elevation of mind*, which both improves and enlarges it, and thereby enables us to look down upon the trifling but tormenting purſuits of a buſtling world.

I have no occaſion to deſcribe to you the ſatisfaction that ariſes from the rational uſe of the human faculties, a freedom from vulgar and debaſing prejudices, and the habitual contemplation of great and important ſubjects; and alſo from ſuch a courſe of reading, and ſuch a choice of

of company, as tends to keep up that *right bent*, and *firmneſs* of mind, which a neceſſary intercourſe with the world would otherwiſe *warp* and *relax*. He who can have, and truly *enjoy*, the ſociety of ſuch men as Dr. Price, Mr. Lindſey, and Dr. Jebb, cannot envy the condition of princes. Such fellowſhip is the true balſam of life; its cement is infinitely more durable than that of the friendſhips of the world, and it looks for its proper *fruit*, and complete *gratification*, to the life beyond the grave.

I think myſelf happy in being able to call myſelf one of ſuch a fraternity; and wiſhing to perpetuate, as far as may be in my power, the memory of ſuch friendſhips, and eſpecially that with yourſelf, which is now of long ſtanding, and has

has been ſtrengthened by a variety of ties, I ſubſcribe myſelf,

Dear Sir,

Your countryman,

friend, and

fellow chriſtian,

J. PRIESTLEY.

CALNE, Aug. 24, 1778.

ERRATA.

Introduction, p. vi. l. 2, for *capable*, read *as capable.*
——— xxxiii. l. 16, for *retraction*, r. *retractation.*

P. 39. l. 4, for *a* force of bodies, r. *or* force of bodies.
51. l. 7, for *and juſt*, r. *juſt.*
59. l. 16, for *writings*, r. *other writings.*
113. l. 16, for *man*, r. *men.*
143. l. 1, for *caſuality*, r. *cauſality.*
160. l. 2, dele *and.*
226. l. 18, for *theſe*, r. *thoſe.*
274. l. 16, for *tolerable*, r. *tolerably.*
284. l. 14, for *and if*, r. *if.*
401. l. 3, from the bottom, dele *that of.*

THE

INTRODUCTION.

THIS work, it will be owned, exhibits an uncommon, if not a ſingular ſpectacle, viz. that of two perſons diſcuſſing, with the moſt perfect freedom and candour, queſtions which are generally deemed of the greateſt conſequence in practice, and which are certainly ſo in theory. The occaſion of it was as follows.

When my *Diſquiſitions*, &c. was printed off, I put it, as I have obſerved, into the hands of ſeveral of my friends, both well and ill affected

to my general hypotheſis, that I might take the advantage of their remarks, in an additional ſheet of *Illuſtrations*, which is accordingly annexed to the firſt volume. Among others, Dr. Price was ſo obliging as to enter into a more particular diſcuſſion of ſeveral of the ſubjects of the work; and afterwards, imagining that I meant to write a direct anſwer to his remarks, he expreſſed a wiſh that I would print them at large, together with any notice that I ſhould think proper to take of them.

This, I told him, did not fall within my views with reſpect to that particular publication, but that I would take the liberty to propoſe another ſcheme, which I thought would correſpond with both our views, and be uſeful to others who might wiſh to ſee the arguments on both ſides freely canvaſſed, without the

the mixture of any thing perſonal, or foreign to the ſubject, which often conſtitutes a great part of the bulk of controverſial writings, and tends to divert the mind from an attention to the real merits of the queſtion in debate. It was, that he ſhould re-write his remarks, after ſeeing what uſe I had already made of them in my ſheet of *Illuſtrations*; that I would then reply to them diſtinctly, article by article, that he ſhould remark, and I reply again, &c. till we ſhould both be ſatisfied that we had done as much juſtice as we could to our ſeveral arguments, frankly acknowledging any miſtakes we might be convinced of, and then publiſh the whole jointly.

To this propoſal he chearfully acceded, chuſing only that the remarks he had already ſent ſhould ſerve as a baſis, and that, to avoid repetitions,

I might refer to my *Illuſtrations* in my firſt reply. He added, however, certain *Queries*, that by my anſwers to them he might perceive more diſtinctly in what reſpects my ideas really differed from his. Accordingly I replied to his remarks, and anſwered his queries, with as much explicitneſs as I poſſibly could; and in the courſe of the correſpondence propoſed others to him, with the ſame view, and likewiſe, in order to bring into a ſmall compaſs, my objections to the commonly received hypotheſis. In this manner, at our leiſure, and without communicating with any third perſon, we exchanged our *remarks* and *replies*, till it appeared to us needleſs to advance any thing farther. In this ſtate we ſubmit the reſult of our diſcuſſion to the judgment of the public, wiſhing that they may attend to it with the ſame

ſame coolneſs and candour with which we ourſelves have written.

Our readers will obſerve that this diſcuſſion reſpects all the ſubjects of my *Diſquiſitions*, except the doctrine of the *pre-exiſtence of Chriſt*. But though this be the point to which all that I have written tends; it being the capital inference that I make from the doctrines of *materialiſm*, *penetrability of matter*, and *neceſſity* (theſe being, in my idea, parts of the ſame ſyſtem) Dr. Price thought it was a ſubject that had been ſo much debated, that it would be needleſs to enter into it.

I will here acknowledge, that in propoſing this ſcheme, I was not without a farther view, which was, that among ſo many angry opponents as I expected, I might ſecure a friendly one, and at the ſame time one who

could not but be acknowledged to be capable of doing ample juſtice to his argument as any writer of the age. I had pledged myſelf to go through with this buſineſs, replying to every thing that ſhould appear deſerving of notice; and it was much more agreeable to me to urge all that I had to ſay in letters to a candid friend, than in tart replies to an angry diſputant. And I thought that, according to the law of arms, and modern honour, when I had fairly engaged with one antagoniſt on this ſcore, I ſhould be more eaſily excuſed encountering another. The reader, however, will find that I have not entirely availed myſelf of this privilege; for though I have not entered minutely into the argument, which would have been mere tautology, I have noticed ſuch other opponents as have appeared ſince the publication of my work. And though

I think I may now be excuſed from replying to any others in a ſeparate publication, I will promiſe that, in any new edition either of the *Diſquiſitions* themſelves, or of this work, I will take more or leſs notice of every thing that ſhall come out in the mean time, and that ſhall appear to myſelf and my friends to deſerve it; and I will publiſh all ſuch *additions* ſeparately. To do more would, I think, be tedious with reſpect to the Public, and unneceſſary in itſelf.

As many perſons unverſed in controverſies on the ſubject of religion (and I wiſh I could not ſay the ſame of ſome who are verſed in them,) will be apt to entertain a confuſed notion about the *nature* and *importance* of the queſtions that are here diſcuſſed, it may not be amiſs to explain, with ſome diſtinctneſs, though

it ſhould be pretty much at large, what the nature and importance of them really are, and to give our readers a plain rule by which to form a judgment in other caſes of a ſimilar nature.

I muſt aſſume as a maxim, that the object and end of all *ſpeculation* is *practice*, and that, in matters of religion, opinions are on no other account worth contending for than as they influence the heart and the life. If this be allowed me, I think I can eaſily ſatisfy my readers, that they have no reaſon to be alarmed about the tendency or iſſue of this debate, notwithſtanding all the clamour it has, in different ages, and even at preſent, excited.

That the general intereſts of virtue will be effectually ſecured by the belief of a *ſufficient recompence in a future*

future life, for all that has been well or ill done in this, will hardly be denied. Now this is equally taken for granted both by Dr. Price and myſelf. We even believe this day of recompence to take place at the ſame period, viz. at the *general reſurrection*; when "all that are in "the graves ſhall hear the voice of "the ſon of man, and ſhall ariſe; "ſome to the reſurrection of life, "and others to the reſurrection of "condemnation."

The advantage, therefore, that either of our ſchemes can have over the other, muſt ariſe principally from the truth and conſiſtency of ſuch opinions as are uſed in ſupport of the great doctrine of future retribution; on which account one of us may be ſuppoſed to give a more firm and unwavering aſſent to that practical doctrine, and to be in leſs danger of

of abandoning it. Or one ſet of opinions may be ſuppoſed to exhibit our maker, or ourſelves, in a light more proper to excite and keep up a juſt ſenſe of devotion; conſiſting of the ſentiments of love, reverence and truſt in God, and alſo to impreſs the mind with a ſtronger feeling of benevolence towards our fellow creatures.

It muſt be added, alſo, that one ſet of moral and metaphyſical principles, by exhibiting every thing about which we are converſant, and to which our ſpeculations can extend, in ſuch a manner as ſhall impreſs the mind with ideas of *ſimplicity*, *comprehenſiveneſs*, *ſymmetry*, *beauty*, &c. may give the mind more pleaſure in the contemplation of it, and conſequently create a ſtronger attachment to it, and in ſome meaſure heighten the finer feelings of virtue.

But

But these are matters in which the bulk of mankind have certainly very little to do; and as the effect of these views of things depends, in a great measure, upon our own *persuasion* concerning them, it cannot be easy to determine what system of speculative opinions has the most of these lesser advantages. We all claim them, and are too apt to think the system of our adversaries destitute of them; so much so, that we often think it impossible to contemplate it with any degree of satisfaction, or without sensations of pain and disgust. Now the *fact* of this persuasion being generally *mutual* is a proof that there is a great deal of *imagination* in it. Why then should we dispute about these matters, with any other disposition, than that with which we usually discuss other subjects of *taste*; and we do not quarrel with our neighbours if they happen not

to think as favourably of our houſes, gardens, pictures, wives, or children, as we do ourſelves.

All that is worth conſidering, therefore, in this caſe, is whether any of the opinions contended for by Dr. Price and myſelf will, if proved to be falſe, weaken our faith in the great doctrine of a future ſtate of retribution, or indiſpoſe the heart to the love of God or of man.

Having ſtated theſe preliminaries, let us conſider ſeparately the nature and effects of the different opinions we hold with reſpect to the *penetrability of matter*, the *doctrine of the ſoul*, and of *philoſophical neceſſity*.

That matter has, or that it has not, the property of *impenetrability* has no aſpect whatever with reſpect to morals and theology; but as matter

ter being ſuppoſed to be poſſeſſed of it, may be conſidered as an argument againſt its being endued with the properties of *perception* and *thought*, thoſe different properties being apprehended to be incompatible.

But I think it will be generally acknowledged, that there can be no objection to matter, as I deſcribe and conceive of it, being capable of thought, ſo that one ſubſtance may admit of all the properties of man; and its being favourable to this hypotheſis is the circumſtance that gives me a bias towards it: becauſe it is with reluctance that I can admit the intimate union and mutual action of two ſubſtances, ſo different from one another as *matter* and *ſpirit*, are defined to be, in the conſtitution of *one being*, *i. e. man*. To ſuppoſe man to be *all matter*, or *all ſpirit*, will, of itſelf, be allowed to be an advantage

tage in point of ſpeculation, provided the thing itſelf be poſſible, and agreeable to appearances.

The proper advantage derived from the doctrine of *a ſoul*, or the hypotheſis of the perceptive and thinking powers of man reſiding in a ſubſtance diſtinct from his body, is that it will not be affected by the death of the body, but will paſs into a ſtate of recompence when the body is in the grave. This doctrine is, therefore, in fact, nothing more than a proviſion againſt a failure in the arguments for the ſcripture doctrine of the *reſurrection of the dead*, and conſequently does not affect a chriſtian, who, as ſuch, firmly believes that doctrine.

On the contrary, the doctrine of a ſoul places the evidence of a future life on a foundation quite different from

from that on which revelation places it; which always repreſents the *reſurrection of the dead* (founded on the promiſe of God, confirmed by the reſurrection of Chriſt) as the object of all our future hopes, and never ſuggeſts the idea of the ſoul, or the percipient and active part of man, being in one place, and the body in another.

The doctrine of a ſoul is, indeed, generally repreſented as coming in aid of the chriſtian doctrine of a future life, and that would be the caſe if it ſupplied another argument for *the ſame thing*; but here the things themſelves are different: for the conſcious ſtate of the *ſeparate ſoul* is not the reſurrection of the *whole man*; and according to the ſcripture, the rewards of virtue and the puniſhments of vice do not *commence* till the day of judgment; ſo that the chriſtian

chriſtian believes *one thing*, and the mere theiſt *another*.

This, however, has nothing to do with any thing in debate between Dr. Price and myſelf; the difference between us being chiefly this. He ſuppoſes that the powers of perception and thought reſide in an immaterial ſubſtance, but that the exerciſe of theſe powers is made to depend on the organization of the body; whereas I ſuppoſe theſe powers to reſide in the organized body itſelf, and therefore *muſt* be ſuſpended till the time when the organization ſhall be reſtored. This I think can never be conceived to be a difference of much importance, all the *conſequences* being the very ſame.

The conſideration that biaſes me, as a chriſtian, excluſive of philoſophical conſiderations, againſt the doctrine

doctrine of a ſeparate ſoul, is that it has been the foundation of what appears to me to be the very groſſeſt *corruptions of chriſtianity*, and even of that very *antichriſtianiſm*, that began to work in the apoſtles' times, and which extended itſelf ſo amazingly and dreadfully afterwards; I mean the oriental philoſophy of the *pre-exiſtence of ſouls*, which drew after it the belief of the pre-exiſtence and divinity of Chriſt, the worſhip of Chriſt and of dead men, and the doctrine of purgatory, with all the popiſh doctrines and practices that are connected with them and ſupported by them.

Among theſe I rank the doctrine of *atonement* for the ſins of men by the ſufferings or death of Chriſt. For I think it will be allowed, that had Chriſt never been conſidered as any other than a *mere man* (though the

moſt diſtinguiſhed prophet, or meſſenger from God to man) it would never have been imagined that his ſufferings could have had the effect that has been aſcribed to them, and conſequently the doctrine of the proper *placability*, and *free-mercy* of God would not have been impeached. Alſo, what would it have ſignified to contend for the tranſmutation of bread and wine into the real body and blood of Chriſt, if Chriſt had been a mere man, and conſequently his fleſh and blood nothing more than the fleſh and blood of Moſes, John the Baptiſt, or any other man.

As a *Chriſtian*, therefore, and a *Proteſtant*, I am an enemy to the doctrine of a ſeparate ſoul. One who believes in a ſoul *may not*, but one who diſbelieves that doctrine *cannot* be, a papiſt. At the ſame time I readily acknowledge that this bias may

may carry a man too far, even to reject doctrines eſſential to chriſtianity, though held by papiſts. But this objection has no weight here.

I ſhall not enlarge upon this topic; but it would be eaſy to ſhow, that almoſt every thing that has been repreſented as moſt abſurd and miſchievous in the faith of chriſtians, and what, of courſe, has been the cauſe, or pretence, of a great part of the infidelity of the philoſophical world, in the preſent age, muſt be laid to the door of this one article.

It is evident, therefore, that a chriſtian has, at leaſt, no reaſon to be biaſſed in favour of the doctrine of a ſoul, and may, without concern, leave it to philoſophical diſcuſſion.

With thoſe who do not believe the doctrine of an intermediate ſtate,

and myſelf, the difference between *a ſoul* and *no ſoul*, in my opinion, nearly vaniſhes: for according to them, though it be a ſubſtance diſtinct from the body, it is altogether incapable of ſenſation, or action, but in conjunction with the body.

There only remains the doctrine of *neceſſity*, with reſpect to which the difference of opinion between Dr. Price and me can be thought of much importance. But even here our difference of opinion is not ſuch as to affect our expectation of a future ſtate of retribution. For whatever we apprehend to be the *foundation* or *ground* of future recompence, we equally believe both the *fact* and the *propriety* of it. To me it ſeems ſufficient, that men be *voluntary agents*, or that motives, ſuch as hopes and fears, can influence them in a certain and mechanical manner, to make

make it in the higheſt degree *right*, and *wiſe* in the Divine Being to lay ſuch motives before them, and conſequently to place them in a ſtate of moral diſcipline, or a ſtate in which rewards and puniſhments are diſtributed, ſo as to correſpond to certain characters, and actions. By this means, and by this means only, can his great object, the happineſs of his intelligent offſpring, be ſecured. And one principal reaſon why I reject the doctrine of philoſophical liberty, is that exactly in the degree in which we ſuppoſe the mind *not* to be determined by motives, in that very degree do rewards and puniſhments loſe their effect, and a man ceaſes to be a proper ſubject of moral diſcipline.

At the ſame time that I ſecure this great advantage, which is of a practical nature, I think it is a con-

ſideration greatly in favour of the doctrine of neceſſity, that, according to it, all *effects*, even thoſe dependent on the volitions of men, have an *adequate cauſe*, in their previous circumſtances; which, being known, a being of competent underſtanding, may certainly foreſee the effect. On this ſcheme therefore, there is a ſufficient proviſion for a plan of *univerſal providence*, comprehending all events whatever; every thing being what God foreſaw and intended, and which muſt iſſue as he wiſhes it to iſſue, *i. e.* as I ſuppoſe, in the greateſt poſſible happineſs of his creation.

Upon this ſcheme, therefore, we have, as it appears to me, every motive that can poſſibly influence the mind of man to exert ourſelves to the utmoſt, to promote our own happineſs and the happineſs of others,

at

at the ſame time that it lays the deepeſt foundation for the moſt intire ſubmiſſion to the will of God, and an unbounded confidence in his affection and providential care, with reſpect to all things preſent, paſt, and future. It alſo, in my opinion, takes away all poſſible ground for envy and hatred towards men, and thus gives the freeeſt ſcope to the growth of univerſal benevolence, and of all virtue.

In the eye of Dr. Price, however, this ſcheme, great and glorious as it appears to me, wears a very different aſpect. He thinks we cannot juſtly be accountable for our conduct, and rewarded or puniſhed for it, unleſs we be, in his ſenſe of the word, *agents*, or the proper and ultimate cauſes of our own actions; that, therefore, ſince we are in a ſtate of diſcipline, and a future ſtate of retri-

bution will take place, we muſt be poſſeſſed of a power of proper *ſelf-determination*, not ſubject to the control of any being whatever; and that ſince God *does* govern the world, and has frequently foretold events dependent upon the volitions of men, he muſt have a power, incomprehenſible as it is to us, of foreſeeing *ſuch* events.

This difference, however, though real, and important, has nothing to do with any thing that is within the apprehenſion of the bulk of mankind. Nay the difference between the doctrines of *liberty* and *neceſſity* is what few writers appear truly to have apprehended. No neceſſarian denies that, in a ſufficiently proper ſenſe, men have a power over their own actions, ſo that they can do what they pleaſe; and that without this power they could not be accountable

countable beings, or the proper ſubjects of rewards or puniſhments.

The charge of *Atheiſm* has been ſo much hackneyed in religious controverſy, as to have paſſed almoſt into ridicule. It was the common charge againſt the primitive chriſtians, and has hardly ever failed to be urged, on one pretence or other, againſt every man who has diſſented from the generally received faith. But perhaps no character has ſuffered more generally, and at the ſame time more undeſervedly on this account, than that of Mr. Hobbes; who, notwithſtanding his heterodoxy in politics, appears to me, as far as I can judge from ſuch of his writings as have fallen in my way, to have been no atheiſt, but a ſincere chriſtian, and a conſcientious good man. See his Life in the *Biographia Britannica*.

This

The ſame tremendous cry of atheiſm has not failed to be echoed againſt me alſo; but this cry has now been repeated ſo often, that, like other echoes, the ſound is become feeble, and is by no means ſo terrific as formerly. In this caſe I think there is ſomething unuſually abſurd and ridiculous in the charge; becauſe it ſuppoſes that leſs power is requiſite to create and animate mere matter and even to make matter intelligent, than to give life and intelligence to a ſpiritual and immaterial ſubſtance; that the former may ſtart up into being of itſelf, but that the latter requires an author.

If I were diſpoſed to retort upon my adverſaries, I would ſay that a man who believes that *one effect* may exiſt without a cauſe (which I maintain to be the caſe with every perſon who denies the doctrine of neceſſity)

ceſſity) may believe that any *other* effect, and conſequently that *all* effects may exiſt without a cauſe, and therefore that the *whole univerſe* may have none. And what might I not ſay of the Scotch defenders of the doctrine of *inſtinctive principles of truth*; who, diſclaiming *argument*, reſt this moſt ſacred article of all religion upon a fallacious *inſtinct*; and eſpecially of Dr. Oſwald, who even profeſſedly, and at large, endeavours to invalidate the only proper argument for the being of God, viz. from effects to cauſes, and to prove it to be altogether inconcluſive.

I am very far, however, from charging either the oppugners of the doctrine of neceſſity, my Scotch opponents, or Dr. Oſwald himſelf, with *actual atheiſm*; becauſe, notwithſtanding *atheiſtical concluſions* may be drawn from their principles, they themſelves do not admit thoſe concluſions,

cluſions, and I am ſatisfied that, were they convinced of the juſtneſs of thoſe concluſions, they would readily abandon the principles from which they were drawn. I claim the ſame candid conſtruction for myſelf that I allow to others. With the *reaſonable*, and the *candid*, I ſhall have it; and as to the *uncandid*, I thank God it is of little conſequence, except to themſelves, in what light they conſider me.

Dr. Price's letter to me at the cloſe of this Introduction, and which he obligingly inſiſts upon my publiſhing juſt as he has ſent it, ſhews that *all* thoſe who even differ from me the moſt in theſe ſpeculative points do not think ſo ill of their neceſſary effects, with regard to *character* and *morals*. Any teſtimony of mine in his favour, in return, would be impertinent; or I ſhould cer-

certainly, having much more reaſon for it, not expreſs leſs eſteem and good-will for him than he has done for me. It is myſelf only, who avow ſuch unpopular opinions, that ſtand in need of ſuch a teſtimonial; and, on this account, it ſhews conſiderable *courage in friendſhip* to act as Dr. Price has done.

If he will allow me to ſpeak ſo freely, I would ſay, that I ſee no reaſon for ſo particular an *apology* as he makes for a ſeeming want of reſpect in his manner of writing; as I really think he has nothing of this kind to apologize for. I am certain I might with more reaſon apologize for the manner in which I have expreſſed myſelf with reſpect to him. But, in my opinion, it is perfectly conſiſtent with candour, and even with friendſhip, to expreſs the ſtrongeſt diſapprobation of any *opi-*

nions

nions whatever; and freely to say that we think them *inconsistent*, *contradictory*, or even *absurd*, or *dangerous*, if, after an attentive consideration, they really do appear so to us.

All that candour requires is, that we never impute to our adversary a *bad intention*, or a *design to mislead*, and also that we admit his *general good understanding*, though liable to be misled by unperceived biases and prejudices, from the influences of which the wisest and best of men are not exempt. And where *particular friendship* is not concerned, there certainly are occasions that will justify even great asperity, indignation or ridicule in controversial writing. This is often the best method of repressing extreme conceit and arrogance, joined, as it often is, with as great weakness in supporting a bad cause,

cauſe, even when there is no proper want of ſincerity.

A man muſt be very criminal indeed, who can maintain what he, at the ſame time, believes to be ill-founded. There are very few, I hope, ſo much abandoned. But there may be a great degree of guilt ſhort of this. For the diſpoſition may be ſo vitiated by a wrong bias, that the moſt frivolous reaſons ſhall appear to have the force of demonſtration, when a favourite hypotheſis is concerned, and arguments, in themſelves the moſt perfectly concluſive, ſhall appear to have no weight at all when urged againſt it. The truly candid will conſider not the *manner* of writing only, but alſo the *occaſion* of it, and all the *circumſtances* attending it. What can exceed the indignation and zeal with which Paul often writes, the ſeverity with which

which the meek apoſtle John expreſſes himſelf, or the vehement invectives even of our Saviour himſelf on juſt provocation.

The letters which I have addreſſed to my other opponents are written differently, according as I felt myſelf diſpoſed towards them at the time of writing. I do not ſuſpect that any thing will be objected to the manner in which I have expreſſed myſelf with reſpect to Dr. Kenrick, or Dr. Horſeley; and my addreſs to Mr. Whitehead is, I think, as reſpectful as he deſerves. I had alſo addreſſed a letter to the anonymous author of *An Eſſay on the immateriality and immortality of the ſoul*; but as I could not help treating him with a good deal of levity and contempt, I was adviſed by my friends not to inſert it in the preſent publication, as not ſuiting the

the gravity with which the reſt of the work is written.

Beſides, I am not without hopes that this neglect may ſerve to keep back other equally ignorant and ſelf-ſufficient anſwerers, and thereby leave the field more open to the truly *able*, who are generally, at the ſame time, the moſt *candid*. And as the ſubject is of great importance, I ſtill profeſs myſelf ready to argue it with any perſon who ſhall appear to me to have ability, and learning equal to the diſcuſſion; and to ſuch a one it would give me but little pain to make any conceſſion, or retraction, that I might be convinced was neceſſary. They muſt, however, go on other ground than that of Dr. Price, who has certainly done all poſſible juſtice to his argument.

As the *Sheet of Illuſtrations*, ſubjoined to the *Diſquiſitions*, is frequently referred to in this work, and as it is ſuſpected that ſome of the copies may have been ſold without it, it is here reprinted, with *additions*, written for the ſatisfaction of ſome of my friends, who wiſhed me to diſcuſs ſome queſtions that they propoſed to me.

It may be proper to obſerve, that in this publication I confine myſelf to the conſideration of particular *objections* and *difficulties*; and that the proper arguments in ſupport of my hypotheſis are to be looked for in the *Diſquiſitions on Matter and Spirit*, and the *Treatiſe on Neceſſity*.

A LET-

A

LETTER

FROM

Dr. PRICE,

TO

Dr. PRIESTLEY.

NEWINGTON-GREEN, May 14, 1778.

DEAR SIR,

I AM obliged to you for ſending me your laſt replies. I have read them with a deſire to be as open as poſſible to conviction; and even not without wiſhing for an opportunity of ſhewing candour by retracting any miſtakes into which I may have fallen. But more perhaps through

a fault in me, than in you, my views and ſentiments continue the ſame.

I muſt leave you to manage the publication as you pleaſe. You muſt be ſenſible that my *firſt remarks* were written without the moſt diſtant view to publication; and this, I hope, will be an excuſe for the incorrectneſſes and want of order which will be found in them. There is alſo in ſome parts of theſe firſt remarks, a turn of expreſſion which carries an appearance not ſufficiently reſpectful; and which I ſhould have avoided had I written them with a view to publication, and been more on my guard. I know your candour has engaged you to overlook this, but I cannot reflect upon it without ſome concern.

I ſhall be very happy ſhould this publication anſwer any valuable ends; but I am afraid the diſcuſſion it contains will be too dry and metaphyſical to be generally acceptable. Some good ends, however, it may probably anſwer. It will afford a proof that two perſons may differ totally on points the moſt important and ſacred, with a perfect eſteem for one another; and it may likewiſe give a ſpecimen of a proper manner of carrying on religious controverſies. There is nothing that offends me more than that acrimony of ſpirit with which controverſies in general, and particularly religious ones, are commonly conducted. In religion there is nothing ſo eſſential as charity, candour, and benevolence. How inexcuſable then is that cruel

zeal which ſome religious people indulge; and how melancholy is it to ſee them, in the very act of contending for religion, loſing what is moſt valuable in religion? Will you give me leave, Sir, here to add, that your opinions give a ſtriking proof of a truth, which, could it be ſtamped on every human mind, would exterminate all bigotry and perſecution; I mean the truth, that worth of character, and true integrity, and conſequently God's acceptance, are not neceſſarily connected with any particular ſet of opinions. Many think yours to be ſome of the moſt dangerous poſſible; and yet the perſon who holds them is known to be one of the beſt men in the world; and I ardently wiſh my ſoul may be united to his at the time when

when *all that are in their graves ſhall hear the voice of the ſon of man, and come forth; they who have done good to the reſurrection of life, and they who have done evil to the reſurrection of damnation.* Our agreement in expecting this awful period makes it of little conſequence in what we differ.

With great reſpect and affection,

I am,

Dear Sir,

ever yours,

RICHARD PRICE.

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ADVER-

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Reader has been already informed (*Introduction* p. 36) that a great part of the following Remarks (to p. 178) has been written by Dr. PRICE, without any view to publication. He thinks it neceſſary to add here, that his ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS (from p. 327 to 359) are the reſult of a deliberate review of the whole controverſy, as it had been previouſly printed; and have, therefore, been compoſed, with more care and attention. This controverſy having been made too prolix, he has left every perſon to judge for himſelf, of the force of Dr. PRIESTLEY's Replies to theſe Additional Obſervations, (from p. 363, to p. 405) chuſing to take leave with the ſhort Note at the end of this volume.

REMARKS

BY

Dr. PRICE

ON SEVERAL PASSAGES IN

Dr. PRIESTLEY'S

DISQUISITIONS ON MATTER AND SPIRIT.

WITH

Dr. PRIESTLEY'S REPLIES.

PART I.

CURSORY REMARKS,

IN

Reading Dr. Prieſtley's *Diſquiſitions on Matter and Spirit.*

PART I.

N. B. In reading theſe Remarks, great Allowance muſt be made for a Want of Order, and many Repetitions, occaſioned by the Manner in which they have been written.

PART I.

Remarks concerning THE PENETRABILITY OF MATTER.

THE FIRST COMMUNICATION.

DR. Prieſtley obſerves in *Diſquiſitions*, (page 2, 3) "*that it is aſſerted that* "*matter is neceſſarily ſolid, and of itſelf deſti-* "*tute of all powers whatever, as thoſe of at-* "*traction and repulſion, &c. or that matter* "*is poſſeſſed of a* VIS INERTIÆ, *and indif-* "*ferent to reſt or motion but as it is acted* "*upon by a foreign power——I do not won-* "*der* (adds Dr. Prieſtley) *that the vulgar* "*ſhould have formed theſe notions, &c.*"

DR. PRICE'S Remark.

That matter is *inert*, or that it will continue in that ſtate of reſt or motion which it poſſeſſes till ſome foreign cauſe alters that ſtate; and that this alteration of ſtate muſt be in proportion to the impreſſed force, &c. Theſe poſitions are the foundation of all

that is demonſtrated by natural philoſophers concerning the laws of the colliſion of bodies. They are, in particular, the foundation of Sir *Iſaac Newton*'s Philoſophy. The three laws of motion with which he begins his *Principia* have no meaning, or evidence, if they are only *vulgar prejudices*. To me they appear to be *ſelf-evident truths*——" That matter is " of itſelf deſtitute of all powers" may be ſaid with much more truth of matter according to Dr. Prieſtley's ideas of it, than of matter according to the common ideas. *Solid* matter has the power of acting on other matter by impulſe, and the effects of this *action*, in all caſes, have been demonſtrated by mathematicians, particularly in the *laws of* motion, and the corollaries, at the beginning of the *Principia*. But unſolid matter, that is, matter which admits other matter into its place without reſiſtance, cannot act at all by impulſe; and this is the only way in which it is capable of acting.—See the next, and ſome of the following remarks.

ANSWER.

ANSWER, *by* DR. PRIESTLEY.

All the laws relating to what has been called the *colliſion of bodies* are neceſſarily the very ſame, whether their ſeparation from each other be ſuppoſed to take place at the point of contact, or at any given diſtance from it, occaſioned by a power of repulſion, extending ſo far beyond the real ſurface. The *laws of motion* are only general rules, to which the facts relating to the approach of bodies to each other, and their receding from each other, are reducible, and are conſiſtent with any *cauſe* of ſuch approaching or receding.

Unſolid matter is here ſaid to admit other matter into its place *without reſiſtance*; but this is directly contrary to the hypotheſis, which makes matter to be a ſubſtance, which, though penetrable, is poſſeſſed of a power of repulſion, which, if an approaching body be not able to overcome, effectually prevents it from coming into its place. If it was not poſſible for matter to act but by impulſe,

it could not be true that rays of light are reflected from bodies at a diſtance from their ſurfaces, which Sir Iſaac Newton has ſhewn to be the fact.

Dr. Price.

Diſquiſitions, p. 4. "The reſiſtance of "matter is never occaſioned by its *ſolidity*, "but by a *power of repulſion*, always acting "at a real diſtance from the body."

But ſuppoſe it ſolid, or impenetrable, in the common ſenſe, could we not conceive of its being brought into contact with other matter; and would there not then be reſiſtance, and action? Does Dr. Prieſtley here mean that one particle of matter can act upon another without contact and impulſe; or in other words, that matter can, *by its own proper agency*, attract or repel other matter which is at a diſtance from it? If this is true, a maxim hitherto univerſally received muſt be falſe, That *nothing can act where it is not*. If matter can act at the leaſt diſtance from itſelf, it may at the greateſt.

Sir

Sir Iſaac Newton, in his letters to Dr. Bentley, calls the notion that matter poſſeſſes an innate power of attraction, or that it can act upon matter at a diſtance, and attract and repel by its own agency, "an "abſurdity into which, he thought, no "one could poſſibly fall."—Shall I here beg leave to refer to what I have written on this ſubject in the *Diſſertations on Providence?* (p. 39, &c.)

ANSWER.

I do not ſay that, ſuppoſing matter to have ſolidity, it could not act upon other matter by impulſe; but that there is no evidence *from fact*, that reſiſtance is ever occaſioned by any thing abſolutely impenetrable. It is undeniable, that, in *all known caſes*, reſiſtance is owing to ſome *other cauſe*, and therefore it is contrary to the acknowledged rules of philoſophizing to ſuppoſe reſiſtance in *any caſe* to be owing to this cauſe.

The difficulty reſpecting matter *acting where it is not* is preciſely the ſame, whe-

ther it be ſuppoſed to be penetrable or impenetrable. Let any perſon explain how it is that the ſun acts upon the earth, or how the parts of ſolid bodies are kept at a diſtance from each other *upon any hypotheſis*. For a more particular diſcuſſion of this ſubject, I refer the reader to the ſheet of *Illuſtrations*, ſubjoined to the *Diſquiſitions*.

At the cloſe of this remark, Dr. Price refers me to his *Diſſertations on Providence*. (p. 39, &c.) I have read the whole paſſage with care, but find nothing in it that appears to me to bear harder upon my hypotheſis than on the common one. For it only ſhows, though in a very clear and maſterly manner, that the preſent laws of nature require an *intelligence*, and an *energy*, of which what we uſually call matter is not capable. Now I certainly admit an intelligent and active cauſe in nature, and have no objection to ſuppoſing that this intelligent cauſe has even more to do in the execution of the laws of nature than Dr. Price is willing to allow.

DR. PRICE.

DR. PRICE.

Diſquiſitions, p. 14. "The particles of "light never impinge on any ſolid parts in "paſſing through glaſs, &c." How does this appear? All the light never paſſes through glaſs. Part of it probably impinges, and is loſt. This was Sir Iſaac Newton's opinion. *Opticks*, p. 241.

ANSWER.

That the particles of light never impinge on the ſolid part of glaſs, &c. is evident from none of them being obſerved to be deflected from their courſe after they have entered it, provided the ſubſtance be perfectly tranſparent. Newton's ſuppoſition of particles of light being loſt by their impinging on the ſolid particles of bodies, is neither probable in itſelf, nor countenanced by any *fact*. The moſt probable effect of ſuch impinging would be a reflexion, and not a ceſſation of motion.

DR. PRICE.

DR. PRICE.

Diſquiſitions, p. 17. "*Matter has in "fact no properties but thoſe of attraction "and repulſion.*"

This is frequently aſſerted in the courſe of theſe *Diſquiſitions*; and matter is declared to be nothing but *powers*. And yet in p. 25, the property of *extenſion* is expreſsly aſcribed to matter, *by which it occupies a certain portion of ſpace*. And in p. 19, it is ſaid to conſiſt of *phyſical points* only, (that is, ſmall parts of extenſion) *endued with powers of attraction and repulſion taking place at different diſtances*—— This is not conſiſtent; but let us examine it particularly, and conſider what matter is.

Matter, if it be any thing at all, muſt conſiſt of ſolid particles or atoms occupying a certain portion of ſpace, and therefore *extended*, but at the ſame time *ſimple* and *uncompounded*, and incapable of being reſolved into any other ſmaller particles; and it muſt be the different form of theſe *primary* particles and their different combinations

binations and arrangement that conſtitute the different bodies and kinds of matter in the univerſe——This ſeems to have been Sir Iſaac Newton's idea of matter. See his *Opticks*, p. 375, &c.

Mr. Baxter's notion that theſe particles are themſelves compoſed of other particles which cohere by divine agency; and, for the ſame reaſon, theſe others of others ſtill ſmaller which cohere by the ſame cauſe, and ſo on; this notion appears to me abſurd. According to the account juſt given, each of theſe particles is a *monad*, or a *ſolid continuum*, void of pore, and, as ſuch, endued with reſiſtance and impenetrability, and capable of receiving and communicating motion by impulſe, according to the laws of colliſion explained by *Keil*, *Newton*, and others.

If this is not a right account, then matter muſt be either *mere* extenſion; or it muſt be ſomething more, which is entirely unknown to us. If the former is true, then matter is nothing but ſpace. Inſtead of having

having pores, it is all pore. Like ſpace, it muſt be neceſſary and infinite, and a vacuum muſt be impoſſible. This was Deſcartes's notion of matter, and alſo Spinoza's, who has founded upon it a ſyſtem of atheiſm.

On the other hand, if it is aſſerted that the elementary parts of matter have in them ſomething more than extenſion, but that this ſomething, not being *ſolidity*, is unknown to us, it will follow, that, being ignorant what matter is, we cannot reaſon about it, or determine any more concerning it than that, wanting ſolidity, it is incapable of acting or re-acting in any way on other matter.

It muſt not be ſaid, that the property which matter has more than extenſion, is a power of attracting and repelling. This would be ſaying that void ſpace attracts and repels. Beſides, it has been ſhewn that the particles of matter cannot, according to any conception of them, have ſuch a power. When two particles not in contact, are ſaid to attract one another, all that is meant, is, that there is ſome force that drives

drives them towards one another, according to a certain law. That force, it is certain, cannot be their own force, for the reaſon already aſſigned. It muſt then be the *impulſe* of ſurrounding particles, or (if that is not poſſible) ſome other *foreign* force. The power, therefore, of attraction and repulſion aſcribed to matter, is demonſtrably a *foreign* property. I ſay *demonſtrably*; for nothing can be demonſtrated, if a poſition can be falſe which is implied in a maxim ſo clear as that, "nothing "can act where it is not."

In ſhort. Matter, according to the idea of it into which I am enquiring, being an *unknown extended ſomething* which makes no oppoſition to any thing that would take its place, and not being capable of acting beyond the ſpace which it occupies, can have no powers. It can be of no uſe. It is as ſuperfluous in nature as Dr. Prieſtley in p. 65, &c. repreſents matter to be according to Mr. Baxter's account—But more than this may be ſaid. From Dr. Prieſtley's account of matter it may be inferred, not only that it is of no uſe, but that it muſt be

be a *non-entity*. It has, he asserts repeatedly, no other property than the power of attracting and repelling; and the argument in *Disquisitions*, p. 5 and 6, obliges him to assert this. But it has been proved that this is a property that cannot belong to it. It must, therefore, be *nothing*.

Let it, however, be allowed the property of *extension*. If not *mere* extension, it must be something that has shape and form, and is circumscribed within a certain portion of space. It must, therefore, consist of parts. These parts must be held together by some power; and the same must be true of the *parts* of these *parts*, and so on. But we cannot go on thus *in infinitum*. The existence of matter, therefore, is impossible.

Should it be said in answer to this, that the primitive particles of matter may be extended and figured, and yet not be divisible, or want any attracting force to keep them from resolving themselves into nothing. Should this be said, I will say the same of

a *solid*

a *ſolid continuum*, or the *monads* which conſtitute matter, and the argument in *Diſquiſitions*, p. 5, &c. will be overthrown.

But to return to the aſſertion that matter has no other property than the power of attraction and repulſion. All power is the power of ſomething. What is that ſomething in the preſent caſe?—Is it a power of attraction and repulſion only that perceives, thinks, reaſons, &c. Is it only powers that circulate in our veins, vibrate in the nerves, revolve round the ſun, &c.—I will add what ſeems particularly worth Dr. Prieſtley's conſideration. According to his own ſyſtem, the attraction and repulſion of matter, (performed with a ſkill that gives the world its order and beauty) cannot be its own actions. They muſt be the effects of ſome action upon it. But of what action are they effects? Let this be explained. If the effects of ſuch action as that of ideas and motives on conſcious and thinking beings, then ſince all matter attracts and repels, all matter muſt be conſcious and intelligent.

ANSWER.

ANSWER.

It is very poſſible that, in defining matter in different places in a large treatiſe, with a view to different objects, I may ſometimes have omitted ſome particulars, to which it was not then neceſſary to attend. The complete definition is evidently this, viz. that *matter is an extended ſubſtance, poſſeſſed of certain powers of attraction and repulſion.*

That "matter wanting ſolidity muſt be "incapable of acting or re-acting in any "way on other matter" cannot be aſſerted, without taking it for granted, that a ſubſtance defined as matter is defined above, is in itſelf impoſſible. Now, it is rather extraordinary, that the only *proof* of impenetrability ſhould be *actual impulſe*, and yet that no clear caſe of actual impulſe can be aſſigned; and that a definition of matter framed purpoſely to correſpond to *facts only*, ſhould be deemed impoſſible, that is, *contrary to fact*.

The reaſoning in this remark goes upon the idea that matter muſt be nothing at all, if it have not the property of *impenetrability*,

bility, a property which no one fact requires, and therefore which ought not to be admitted by any philoſopher. It alſo ſeems to have ariſen from a want of conſidering, that the term *thing*, or *ſubſtance*, ſignifies nothing more than that to which properties are aſcribed, and is itſelf abſolutely unknown, and incapable of ſuggeſting any idea whatever. For when we exclude all properties, we, at the ſame time, exclude from our minds all idea of ſubſtance, and have nothing left to contemplate. Thus, a maſs of gold is defined to be a ſubſtance of a certain length, breadth, and thickneſs, of a certain colour, weight, &c. But take away all colour, weight, length, breadth, thickneſs, with every other ſenſible quality, and where is the ſubſtance of the gold? Impenetrability is only a property, or ſomething that is *affirmed* concerning material ſubſtances, and therefore muſt not be affirmed without proof, any more than penetrability, or any other property. Now what I demand, is, *a proof from fact*, that any material ſubſtance is impenetrable to other material ſubſtances. Till this be

produced, I cannot, as a philoſopher, admit that matter has ſuch a property. On the contrary, analogy obliges me to ſuppoſe, that, ſince all the evidence of bodies being impenetrable, when rigorouſly examined, *i. e.* by actual experiments, (as optical, electrical, &c.) appear to be caſes in which bodies are prevented from coming into actual contact by *powers*, acting at a diſtance from their ſurfaces, that *all* reſiſtance is of this kind only.

If the reaſoning in the laſt part of this remark be juſt, it will not follow that, becauſe all the powers of matter may be analized into modes of attraction and repulſion, all particular ſubſtances muſt have the very *ſame modes* of attraction and repulſion, and conſequently that there is no difference between *acids* and *alkalis*, *metals* and *earths*, &c. The powers of perception and thought, in how great a degree ſoever they be unknown to us, may be the reſult of a certain ſtate of the brain, and certain motions taking place within it, though they could not reſult from

from matter of a different form, texture, or conſiſtence.

Dr. Price.

Diſquiſitions, page 81 and 104. *Matter has no other powers than thoſe of attraction and repulſion.*

What is it that attracts and repels, and that is attracted and repelled? Till I am informed of this, no more is told me of matter, than would be told me of the inhabitants of *Jupiter*, by ſaying that they have no other powers than thoſe of *moving* (or rather *being moved*) *to* and *from* one another. And to make the idea of matter to conſiſt in being thus moved; or to ſay, that it has no other power or property, and at the ſame time to aſcribe to it the powers of thought, ſenſation and reaſon—This ſeems to me indeed extraordinary—How totally different are attraction and repulſion from perception, conſciouſneſs and judgment? What connexion can there be between them?

Answer.

It is impoſſible to know more of matter than can be inferred from the *phenomena* in which it is concerned. The relation that attractions and repulſions bear to ſeveral modes of thought, may be ſeen in *Hartley's Obſervations on Man*. But though the *mode* of the connection be ever ſo much unknown, the *reality* of the connexion is evident from fact. Perception, and all the modes of thinking, as much depend upon the brain, as the power of giving a blow to a ſtick. Is not the *reality* of the union of the ſoul and body, on the common hypotheſis, always aſſerted, without any perſon pretending to have the leaſt idea of the *mode* of ſuch an union?

Dr. Price.

Page 105. "When we attempt to form "an idea of the ſubſtance of matter ex- "cluſive of the powers of attraction and "repulſion which it has, and excluſive of "impenetrability

"impenetrability which it has not, ab-
"ſolutely nothing is left"—This is very true, and the juſt concluſion from it is, that matter does not exiſt.

Excluſive of attraction and repulſion, it is here ſaid, matter is abſolutely nothing. But it has been demonſtrated that it does not attract and repel, therefore it muſt be nothing. Beſides, allow it the power of attracting and repelling, yet if, as here aſſerted, it is nothing but this power, it muſt be the power of nothing, and the very idea of it is a contradiction—What a ſtrange thing indeed is matter according to Dr. Prieſtley's ideas? Its eſſence, it ſeems, conſiſts in impelling (without touching, or exerting any force that is conceivable) other matter, *towards* itſelf and *from* itſelf. Take this away; ſet it at reſt, or remove its neighbours, ſo as that it may have nothing to act upon, and it becomes nothing. The whole of it may be crouded into the very ſpace that is now occupied by the ſmalleſt of its component parts, or into any compaſs not ſo little as a mathematical point,

and in conſequence of this, having nothing to attract or repel it would be nothing.

Answer.

What a ſtrange thing, indeed, is matter, according to Dr. Price's conſtruction of my meaning; but ſuch matter as he here deſcribes I never had in contemplation. The matter of which I treat is a ſubſtance poſſeſſed of certain powers of attraction and repulſion. Theſe powers may be exerted more or leſs, or not at all, according to circumſtances. To matter thus defined I cannot conceive that any of theſe remarks do in the leaſt apply.

A Query by Dr. Price.

If matter is not ſolid extenſion, what is it more than mere extenſion?

Answer.

If, as Dr. Clarke and Dr. Price ſuppoſe, *Spirit* be extended, but not ſolid, what is *that*

that more than mere extenſion? If Spirit can act upon matter, as they ſuppoſe, it muſt have the very power of attraction and repulſion with reſpect to matter that I aſcribe to unſolid matter. If they chuſe to call my matter by the name of *Spirit*, I have no ſort of objection. All that I contend for is ſuch a *conjunction of powers in the ſame thing*, or ſubſtance, by whatever term it be denominated, as we find by experience always go together, ſo as not to multiply ſubſtances without neceſſity.

THE

The second Communication.

Of the Nature of Matter, *containing Remarks by Dr.* Price *on Dr.* Prieſtley's *Replies to the* firſt Communication; *with Dr.* Prieſtley's ſecond *Replies.*

Dr. Price's *Obſervations on the Reply*, p. 5.

THE laws of the colliſion of bodies, as determined by mathematicians, relate to two ſorts of bodies; *elaſtic* and *unelaſtic*. The laws which govern the colliſions of the latter ſuppoſe no repulſion between them; and are founded entirely on the conſideration of matter as *ſolid* extenſion, and conſequently *inert*, and endowed with all thoſe properties expreſſed by Sir Iſaac Newton in his three laws of motion—The laws alſo which govern the colliſions of the latter ſort of bodies, ſuppoſe matter to poſſeſs ſolidity, or a *momentum* in moving, proportioned to its quantity

quantity and velocity, independent of its power of repulſion—For example, When an elaſtic body at reſt is ſtruck by another equal elaſtic body, the effect of the colliſion will be that the latter will loſe its whole motion, and the other move forward with the very velocity which the impelling body poſſeſſed before colliſion. But if both bodies were void of ſolidity, or nothing but figured and moveable extenſions repelling one another, the impelling body would move *back*, and the other would move *forward* as ſoon as they began to repel one another. It would be impoſſible for them to enter into the ſphere of one another's repulſion, becauſe they wanted that *ſolidity* which gives *momentum*.

It is not, in my opinion, conſiſtent with Dr. Prieſtley's own ſyſtem to intimate (as he ſeems to do in the paſſages in his *Diſquiſitions*, to which I have referred in my firſt remark) that "matter poſſeſſes "powers", and that it is a vulgar error to think it "indifferent to reſt or motion "but as it is acted upon by ſome fo- "reign cauſe." If matter can move without

out being acted upon by a foreign cauſe, it muſt move itſelf; but this Dr. Prieſtley cannot allow. He muſt, therefore, ſay that it is entirely a torpid and paſſive thing. This, without doubt, is the matter which is the object of natural philoſophy: and it is this property that, in my opinion, forms one of the fundamental differences between it and ſpirit.

When I ſay that *unſolid* matter will admit other matter into its place "without re-"ſiſtance," I mean, "without any re-"ſiſtance given by itſelf;" and I ſuppoſe *contact*, which Dr. Prieſtley muſt grant to be at leaſt *conceivable*. The reſiſtance ariſing from repulſion, being always made at a diſtance, is not the reſiſtance of the matter itſelf that is ſaid to repel, but of ſome foreign cauſe: and this I apprehend to be juſt as certain as that nothing can act on another thing without being preſent to it. When a ray of light is reflected from a body *before* contact, it is certainly not that body itſelf that reflects the light: nor did Sir Iſaac Newton, who diſcovered the fact, ever mean

mean to assert this; on the contrary, he has called this an absurdity which no one can receive. He professes to have discovered only certain facts in the constitution of nature: the causes he has left others to investigate.

Answer.

I cannot conceive any difference between the case of *elastic* and *non-elastic* bodies, with respect to the hypothesis in question; since whatever may be supposed concerning the parts of a *solid*, may be said concerning that *sphere of repulsion*, which, on the new hypothesis, is to be substituted in the place of such solid parts. It is denied that solidity is necessary to give *momentum*, since a sphere of resistance may, in certain circumstances, be as impenetrable as any supposed solid substance. It is not solidity, but the *resistance* occasioned by it that is the immediate cause of *momentum*.

I readily admit the inaccuracy that Dr. Price observes. But I could not mean to give to a stone the self-determining power which I had

I had denied to man. My meaning through the whole was, that matter, to be what it is, muſt be poſſeſſed of what has been denominated a *power*, viz. attraction, eſpecially that of coheſion. All that I mean by a repulſion at a diſtance from the ſurface of a body, is, that which Sir Iſaac Newton proves to be the caſe with reſpect to light; ſo that whatever ſolution may be found for the difficulty in his caſe, will ſerve for mine. His too is the caſe of an elaſtic ſubſtance.

DR. PRICE's *Obſervations on the Reply*, p. 7, 8.

Dr. *Prieſtley*, in his *Illuſtrations*, (ſee the *Diſquiſitions*, p. 350.) ſays, that *Newton* conſidered attraction and repulſion as "pow-"ers inhering *in* and properly belonging *to* "matter." With great deference to Dr. Prieſtley's ſuperior knowledge on this ſubject, I would obſerve, that I have never met with any aſſertion in Sir Iſaac Newton's works that can be fairly conſtrued to imply this; and that it is ſcarcely poſſible that he ſhould have uſed any expreſſions which will bear this interpretation, except when ſpeaking

ſpeaking looſely, and by way of accommodation to vulgar conceptions. I have quoted a paſſage from the letters that paſſed between him and Dr. Bentley, in which he ſays the contrary very ſtrongly. In the ſame letters he ſays to Dr. Bentley, "Pray "don't aſcribe the notion of *innate* gravity "to me." And, in an advertiſement prefixed to his *Treatiſe on Optics*, he informs the public, that he had, in the ſecond edition of this treatiſe, added a queſtion concerning the cauſe of gravity, on purpoſe to ſhew that he did not take it to be an eſſential property of bodies. And what he thought of the attraction or gravitation of matter he certainly thought likewiſe of its repulſion; and would have acknowledged concerning the repulſion of that æther which (merely in the way of conjecture and illuſtration) he has ſuppoſed to be the cauſe of gravity.

Dr. Prieſtley here takes notice of the difficulty there is in accounting for the attractions and repulſions of bodies on *any hypotheſis*. But the maxim that "nothing "can

"can act where it is not," proves more than a difficulty in this case. It proves that since these attractions and repulsions are always performed at a distance, and sometimes the *greatest* distance from the surfaces of bodies, it is impossible they should be the actions of the bodies themselves; and consequently, that they are not properties inhering in bodies, or that belong to the nature of matter as matter.

If nothing can act where it is not, matter cannot attract or repel where it is not. It cannot, therefore, have the *power* of attraction and repulsion: and it must be an absurdity to include such a power in the definition of it; or to make it *an essential property* of matter. In short, this seems to me the same absurdity, that it would be to ascribe to man actions done by a higher order of beings; and when it is asked what he is, to describe or define him by these.

No light (see p. 9.) that falls perpendicularly on an uniform transparent surface can be deflected in passing through it. But how

how does it appear that any ſubſtance can be made ſo tranſparent as to ſtop *none* of the light that enters it?

DR. PRICE's *Obſervations on Reply*, p. 16.

What has been ſaid under the laſt head is all I would ſay with reſpect to the firſt part of this *Reply*. As to the latter part of it, I would obſerve, that we aſcribe impenetrability or ſolidity to matter partly becauſe we find that we never can make one body occupy the place of another without removing it. The reaſon of this appears indeed in ſome inſtances to be, that they repel one another: but in moſt inſtances no ſuch repulſion appears: and the true reaſon may be, that they are brought into contact, and will not penetrate one another in conſequence of that eſſential property which we call *ſolidity*, and which we find ourſelves under a neceſſity of aſcribing to matter, in order to diſtinguiſh it from *mere extenſion*, or void ſpace. Even in the colliſions of elaſtic bodies, the probability is, that there is contact and impulſe; and that the reaſon of their flying off from one another,

another, or rebounding, is, that their parts, by impinging, are bent inwards, and afterwards unbent: agreeably to the reaſonings of natural philoſophers. I am, however, of opinion, that we derive our ideas of the ſolidity of bodies, not ſo much from experience, as from another more important inlet of ideas, which I have endeavoured to explain in the firſt chapter of my *Treatiſe on Morals*. But I may be very wrong: and I refer all my diſquiſitions on theſe and other ſubjects, to the candid attention of thoſe who may think it worth their while to conſider them.

When I ſay that "Matter wanting ſo-
"lidity muſt be incapable of acting, or re-
"acting on other matter," I mean, by any action of its own. Two equal ſolid bodies moving towards one another in contrary directions, and with equal velocities, will meet and impinge and ſtop one another: but if *unſolid* they would not act at all on one another, but paſs through one another, juſt as if there had been nothing in their way. Dr. Prieſtley, in a ſubſequent reply, (ſee P. 22) ſays,

ſays, if I underſtand him, that matter ſometimes neither attracts nor repels "according "to circumſtances." It is of *ſuch* matter I here ſpeak.—Sir Iſaac Newton calls that *vis inertiæ* and *ſolidity*, which he ſays experience teaches us to aſcribe to all bodies, even the minuteſt, *the foundation of all philoſophy*. See his comment on his third rule of philoſophizing.

DR. PRICE's *Obſervations on Reply*, p. 22.

In the paſſage which has occaſioned the remark to which Dr. Prieſtley makes this reply, it is ſaid, that matter without the power of attraction and repulſion is nothing; and in p. 5, &c. he aſſerts, that this power is neceſſary to the very being of matter. I muſt inſiſt upon it that matter cannot poſſeſs this power; and that, conſequently, according to Dr. Prieſtley's account of matter, it is *nothing*. Let it be as clearly proved that matter cannot poſſeſs *ſolidity*, and I will ſay the ſame of my own account of matter.

Dr. Prieſtley, in this reply, ſeems to acknowledge that, in particular circumſtances, matter neither attracts nor repels: and it is very obvious that there muſt be ſuch circumſtances; how then can attraction and repulſion be its eſſential property? Would not one think that if it is eſſential to it to attract, it cannot be alſo eſſential to it to repel? What is matter when it neither attracts nor repels, different from void ſpace? I wiſh for a direct anſwer to this queſtion. How does matter know *when*, and *where*, and with *what preciſe degree of force*, at different diſtances, to attract and repel other matter? Or were there a poſſibility of its being *knowing* enough for this, how can it have the *power*, when perhaps the matter it is ſaid to act upon, is at the diſtance of millions of miles from it? Even the Deity knows all things, and acts upon all things, only by being preſent with all things. "Deus eſt om-
"nipreſens (ſays Newton at the end of
"the *Principia*) non per *virtutem* ſolam,
"ſed per *ſubſtantiam*; nam *virtus* ſine *ſub-*
"*ſtantia* ſubſiſtere non poteſt." But I have perhaps

perhaps repeated theſe arguments too often: and however deciſive they appear to me, I am afraid Dr. Prieſtley will think I mean to teaze him, and to wrangle with him. But I am as far as poſſible from having any ſuch intention.

I am glad to learn from his Reply (p. 8.) that he approves of the reaſoning I have uſed in the *Diſſertation on Providence*, to prove that the laws of nature are derived from an intelligence, and a conſtant energy, of which matter is not capable. With this is connected a truth the moſt important and joyful of all truths: I mean, that there exiſts an All-wiſe Providence, or a benevolent and perfect direction of all events. Our agreement in theſe things ſhould make us regard leſs our differences on other points.

In anſwer to a query of mine which follows this reply, Dr. Prieſtley aſks, p. 22, "If *ſpirit* be extended, what is it more than "mere extenſion?" I anſwer, conſciouſneſs, perception, thought, &c. If this is likewiſe what matter is *more* than mere ex-

tenſion, then *matter* and *ſpirit* are the ſame; and our controverſy is at an end. But the truth ſeems to be, that not extenſion, but ſolidity, inertneſs, figure, diſceptibility, &c. are the properties which diſtinguiſh matter: and that, on the contrary, ſenſation, perception, ſimplicity, ſelf-determination, judgment, &c. are the properties which diſtinguiſh ſpirit. I am entirely in the dark with reſpect to the *extenſion* of ſpirit, and therefore chuſe to enter into no diſpute about it. All I am ſure of, is, that it poſſeſſes locality. The *manner* I do not comprehend.

ANSWER.

If certain effects invariably take place in any caſe in which bodies are concerned, as on their mutual approach when placed at a given diſtance, the analogy of language requires us to ſay, that thoſe bodies are poſſeſſed of the power of approaching or attracting one another. But by ſaying that bodies have certain properties, philoſophers, I apprehend, only mean to expreſs the unknown cauſe of the known effects. As to

real

real *agency*, a neceſſarian can allow of no more than one proper ſeat or ſource of it.

If, in any caſe, "no light can be de-"flected in paſſing through an uniformly "tranſparent ſubſtance", whether we can by art make it perfectly ſo or not, (p. 5.) it is all that my hypotheſis requires.

By matter attracting, or not attracting, I could only mean, either that, in certain circumſtances, attraction and repulſion may be ſo balanced, as that no effect would be apparent, or that leaving out the conſideration of attraction of coheſion, there might be no foreign body to be attracted. Take away all attraction of coheſion, and let any perſon ſay whether any thing will be left to correſpond to our common definition of matter, which is my ground for ſaying that, in that caſe, it will *ceaſe to be*. There would, in that caſe, be an actual diviſion *in infinitum*. Attraction and repulſion may be, and probably are, in reality, the ſame power; and ſome philoſophers

are inclined to think it to be the one, and ſome the other.

As to the queſtion to which Dr. Price requires a direct anſwer, viz. "How matter can *know* when and where to act," I reply, that the anſwer will be the very ſame as to this queſtion: How do the rays of light, or the bodies to which they approach, know at what diſtance they are to begin to recede from each other? Whatever ſhall be deemed a ſufficient cauſe in this caſe, I ſhall admit to be ſufficient in the other. In my hypotheſis I only mean to combine known *facts*, without entering into the doctrine of *cauſes*.

Dr. Price ſays, that beſides extenſion, ſpirit is poſſeſſed of *conſciouſneſs*, *perception*, &c. I anſwer, that beſides extenſion body poſſeſſes a power of attraction, &c. He ſays, take away attraction, and what is *body* but mere extenſion; I alſo ſay, take away conſciouſneſs, perception, &c. and what is *ſpirit* but mere extenſion?

THE

The third Communication.

Of the Nature of Matter, *containing Remarks by Dr.* Price *on Dr.* Prieſtley's *Replies in the* Second Communication, (p. 27 and 36.) *with Dr.* Prieſtley's *third Replies.*

MATTER that is not ſolid is the ſame with *pore:* it cannot therefore poſſeſs what natural philoſophers mean by the *momentum*, a *force of bodies*, which is always in proportion to the quantity of matter in bodies, void of pore. *Momentum* is the cauſe of reſiſtance, and not *vice verſa*.

I muſt here repeat (ſee p. 36, 37, &c.) the following propoſitions, which I think have been demonſtrated; that matter has not the power of attracting and repelling—That this power is the power of ſome foreign

cauſe, acting upon matter according to ſtated laws—and that, conſequently, attraction and repulſion, not being actions, much leſs inherent qualities of matter, it ought not to be defined by them.

ANSWER.

I by no means allow, that though matter have not the property called *ſolidity*, or *impenetrability*, it muſt be all *pore*, *i. e.* have no properties at all, or be nothing but empty ſpace. If ſo, it would follow that *no ſubſtance* deſtitute of ſolidity can be any thing at all. Even every thing that has been called *ſpirit* would be a non-entity.

If what Dr. Price calls ſpirit, a ſubſtance without ſolidity, and conſequently without *momentum*, can nevertheleſs act upon bodies; *e. g.* the brain, ſurely the ſubſtances that I term material, though they be not impenetrable, may have the ſame power with reſpect to each other.

Article

Article II. Every thing that exiſts muſt be defined by its properties, or to ſpeak more exactly, by the circumſtances reſpecting it. Thus if I deſcribe a magnet, I muſt mention, as peculiar and *belonging* to it, the kinds of attraction and repulſion that take place when it is introduced, whether thoſe attractions and repulſions, ſtrictly ſpeaking, neceſſarily accompany it, or be cauſed by the Deity, or ſome intermediate unknown agent.

THE FOURTH COMMUNICATION.

OF THE NATURE OF MATTER, *by Dr.* Price, *with Dr.* Prieſtley's *Anſwer.*

IT is, in my opinion, particularly incumbent on Dr. Prieſtley, to give a more explicit anſwer than he has yet given to the queſtion, "What the true idea of "matter is?" or "what inherent and eſ-"ſential property it poſſeſſes that diſtin-"guiſhes it from mere ſpace?"—I muſt repeat here what I have ſaid in my firſt remarks, and inſiſt upon it as of particular importance, that no anſwer is given to this queſtion, by ſaying, that matter is SOMETHING which is attracted and repelled; or, in other words, that it is *ſomething* which is continually acted upon by a foreign force ——What is it that is ſo acted upon?——

Not

Not mere ſpace. That is abſurd——Not a *ſolid* ſubſtance. There is no ſuch thing according to Dr. Prieſtley——Not the ſubject of conſciouſneſs and thought. That would imply there is nothing but ſpirit in nature——The attractions and repulſions which take place between different bodies are only *external circumſtances* which diſtinguiſh one parcel of matter from another (a magnet, for inſtance, from other ſubſtances) but they enter not into the idea of matter *as* matter. There are circumſtances in which matter neither attracts nor repels; as, particularly in the limit between the ſphere of attraction and repulſion.

But this leads me to the chief obſervation I intended to make——If I underſtand Dr. Prieſtley, all bodies at a ſmall diſtance repel one another, ſo as to make contact between them impracticable. Within the ſphere of repulſion, the *attraction of coheſion* takes place; and this is the power which, according to Dr. Prieſtley, *unites* the parts of matter, and gives it exiſtence. But, ſince matter is penetrable, will not this

this attraction drive all the parts of it into one another, and cauſe them to coaleſce into nothing?——This effect muſt follow, unleſs there exiſts, beyond the ſphere of attraction and nearer to matter, a ſecond ſphere of repulſion, which again prevents contact. The argument which Dr. Prieſtley draws from the effect of cold in contracting bodies, and of heat in ſwelling them, makes it probable that this is his opinion. And, if true, the elementary parts of matter poſſeſs juſt the contrary principle to that which he aſſerts to be neceſſary to preſerve their exiſtence.

In ſhort, ſince we cannot go on aſſigning a ſphere of repulſion beyond a ſphere of attraction, and a ſphere of attraction beyond a ſphere of repulſion *in infinitum*; either no power at all acts on the elements of matter, or, if a power does act, it muſt be either a power of attraction, or a power of repulſion. Dr. Prieſtley aſſerts, that if no power at all acts to keep matter together, it muſt *crumble* into *nothing*. And it appears evident to me, that if a power of attracting acts, it muſt *contract* itſelf into nothing; and

that

that if a power of repulſion acts, it muſt *diſſipate* itſelf into nothing.

What can be done in this dilemma? The truth ſeems to be, that there is an abſurdity in ſuppoſing the elements of matter to conſiſt of parts actually diſtinct and ſeparable, which require a foreign agency to unite them. For the ſame reaſon that theſe elements muſt conſiſt of ſuch parts, the elements of thoſe elements muſt conſiſt of ſuch parts, and ſo on for ever. I have obſerved in my firſt remarks, that we muſt terminate in parts, each of which is a ſolid *continuum* incapable of diviſion.—Indeed, every real exiſtence or ſubſtance muſt be a *monad*. We are ſure this is true of the beings we are beſt acquainted with; I mean, *ourſelves*, and all conſcious and ſentient beings. And if it be not true of matter, I know not what it is.

ANSWER.

With reſpect to the *definition of matter*, I really am not able to be more explicit than I have been. A definition of any particular *thing*, *ſubſtance*, or *being* (call it what you will) cannot be any thing more than

than an enumeration of its known *properties*, and in all cafes whatever, as with refpect to *matter*, *fpirit*, &c. &c. if we take away all the known properties, nothing will be left, of which we can poffibly have any idea at all; every thing elfe being merely *hypothetical*, and the terms *fubftance*, *thing*, *effence*, &c. being, as I have obferved, nothing more than a help to expreffion; it being a convenience in fpeech to have certain words of this univerfal application.

Solid *atoms*, or *monads of matter*, can only be hypothetical things; and till we can either touch them, or come at them, fome way or other, by actual experiment, I cannot be obliged to admit their exiftence. Admitting the exiftence of thefe folid atoms, they do not help us, in the leaft, to explain any of the known properties of matter. All the *effects* are reducible to attractions or repulfions. Now what connection is there between *folidity*, and *attraction*, or even repulfion at a diftance from the furface of a body; and though refiftance at the point of contact might be explained by it,

no

no ſuch thing as *real contact* can be *proved*; and moſt of the known repulſions in nature, do certainly take place in *other circumſtances*, and therefore muſt have ſome *other cauſe*.

In reply to Dr. Price, I muſt obſerve, that the limit between a ſphere of attraction and another of repulſion, cannot be a place where neither of theſe powers are exerted, but where they balance each other. It does not follow that becauſe a beam is in equilibrio, there are no weights in the ſcales.

That there are ſpheres of attraction and repulſion within each other is evident from fact, as in electricity, magnetiſm, &c. nor can the coheſion of bodies, the parts of which (as is demonſtrable from the phenomena of cold) do not actually touch each other, be explained without it. The parts of bodies muſt therefore attract each other at one diſtance, and repel at another; and in the limit between both they muſt remain; and by this means bodies retain their form and texture.

PART

PART II.

Of the Nature of MIND *or* SPIRIT.

THE FIRST COMMUNICATION,

By Dr. Price, *with Dr.* Prieſtley's *Anſwers.*

IN anſwer to the ſeveral arguments in the *Diſquiſitions*, Sect. III. and IV. it ſeems enough to ſay, that a *connection* and *dependence* by no means prove *ſameneſs*. We are conſcious of the contrary in the preſent caſe. Seeing depends on our eyes, but *we* are not our eyes, any more than the eye itſelf is the teleſcope through which it looks, or the artiſt is the tool which he uſes.

ANSWER.

This is by no means a juſt ſtate of the argument. I infer that the buſineſs of thinking is wholly carried on *in*, and *by*

the brain itſelf, becauſe all the effects from which we infer the faculty of thinking, can be traced to the brain, and *no farther*. I conclude that the ultimate perceptive power relating to objects of ſight is not in the eye, becauſe, though the eye be neceſſary to acquire ideas of ſight, they remain *ſomewhere* when the eye is deſtroyed. But I have no reaſon whatever to refer this perceptive power to any thing beyond the brain, becauſe when the brain is deſtroyed, there is, to all appearance, an end of all ſenſation and thought. To ſuppoſe that when the brain is deſtroyed the ideas remain in *ſomething elſe*, is a mere hypotheſis, unſupported by any fact whatever.

A philoſopher ſuppoſes no more *cauſes* than are neceſſary to explain *effects*. He finds the buſineſs of thinking to be dependent upon the brain, and therefore he concludes that the brain itſelf is competent to this buſineſs, whatever it be. To ſuppoſe any thing farther is mere hypotheſis, and utterly unphiloſophical. What I maintain then is, that, according to the eſtabliſhed

bliſhed rules of philoſophizing, we are not authorized to ſuppoſe any thing *within the brain* to be the ſeat of thought. If we do, we may juſt as well ſuppoſe it to reſide in ſomething within that, and in ſomething again within that, and ſo on without end; and juſt as the Indians are ſaid to place the earth upon an elephant, the elephant upon a tortoiſe, and the tortoiſe on they knew not what.

Dr. Price.

In the *Diſquiſitions*, page 37 and 102, it is aſſerted, that ideas are certainly diviſible. This ſeems to me very abſurd. It would be as proper to aſſert ideas to be hard or round. The idea of an object is the apprehenſion, view, or notion of it; and how can this be diviſible?——Perception is a ſingle and indiviſible act. The object perceived may be diviſible; but the *perception* of it by the mind cannot be ſo.

Answer.

What appears to Dr. Price to be *very abſurd*, I cannot help thinking, after the

moſt deliberate review, to be very certain, and very clear. What correſpondence can there be between an idea and its archetype, if the archetype conſiſt of parts, and the idea have no parts. He ſeems to have been miſled, by not diſtinguiſhing between the *power*, or rather the *act* of perception, and the thing (*i. e.* the *idea*) perceived. The object of perception, he acknowledges to be diviſible, but *the perception of it by the mind* cannot be ſo. True, becauſe perception is either a faculty, or an act of a faculty, to which diviſibility is not applicable; but the thing about which the perceptive power is employed (which is not the object itſelf, but the idea, or repreſentation of it in the mind) muſt be as diviſible as the archetype of that idea. If the mind be a ſimple and indiviſible ſubſtance, it cannot be poſſeſſed of more than a ſingle idea, and that the idea of ſomething to which diviſion is not applicable. However, I do not ſee why Dr. Price ſhould object to a *repoſitory of diviſible ideas* in a mind which he ſuppoſes to be actually extended,

extended, and conſequently to have room enough for that purpoſe.

Dr. Price.

Diſquiſitions, page 44, &c. 74, &c. Mr. *Baxter*, and other ingenious men, have undoubtedly ſaid a great deal that is very groundleſs about the union of the body to the ſoul; its being a clog; its leaving the ſoul more capable of exerting its powers when ſeparated from it, &c. Were all that has been ſaid on theſe ſubjects true, there would be no occaſion for a reſurrection. Nay, it would be a calamity, not a benefit. A falſe philoſophy has, in this inſtance, contradicted nature and experience, as well as revelation. Thus far I agree entirely with Dr. Prieſtley; but ſome of the objections in Sect. V. have little weight with me, and cannot eaſily be anſwered on any hypotheſis. If it muſt be taken for granted that brutes, or the ſentient principles in brutes, are annihilated at death, as ſeems to be hinted ſometimes by Dr. Prieſtley, I am afraid it will not eaſily be

believed that the ſame is not true of men. And if true, there will be a complete end of us: a reſurrection will be a contradiction—But it will come in my way to ſay more to this purpoſe.

Answer.

My only reaſon for not ſuppoſing that *brutes* will not ſurvive the grave, is, that there is no hint of it in revelation, where only it is that we are informed that *men* will riſe again. It may, however, be true, though we have not been informed of it, and the analogy between men and other animals, makes it not very improbable.

Dr. Price.

Diſquiſitions, p. 54. Dr. Prieſtley here, and throughout a great part of this work, argues on the ſuppoſition, that, according to the ideas of modern metaphyſicians, ſpirit can have no relation to place, and is incapable of being preſent any where. This ſeems to me a miſtake. I do not know what modern metaphyſicians Dr. Prieſtley

Prieſtley means, except the Carteſians. I am certain Dr. Clarke, and ſome others of the beſt modern writers, did not entertain theſe ideas of ſpirit. It is a maxim that cannot be diſputed, that *time* and *place* are neceſſary to the exiſtence of all things. Dr. Clarke has made uſe of this maxim, to prove that infinite ſpace and duration are the eſſential properties of the Deity; and I think he was right. Sir Iſaac Newton thought in the ſame way, as appears from ſome paſſages at the end of his *Principia*, and in the queries at the end of his *Opticks*. As far, therefore, as Dr. Prieſtley combats a notion of ſpirit that implies it has no relation to ſpace, and exiſts no where, he combats an abſurdity and contradiction which deſerves no regard ——What the nature is of the relation of ſpirit to place, or in what *manner* it is preſent in ſpace, I am utterly ignorant. But I can be ſure that, if it exiſts at all, it muſt exiſt *ſomewhere*, as well as in *ſome time*.

Dr. Clarke was not for excluding expanſion from the idea of immaterial thinking

ſubſtances. See his *firſt defence of an argument to prove the Immateriality and Natural Immortality of the Soul*, in anſwer to *Collins*. ——Has Dr. Prieſtley read this controverſy? or has he read the chapter on a Future State, with which *Butler*'s Analogy begins?——If he had, I fancy he would have writ differently in ſome parts of this book. Dr. Clarke is, without all doubt, the beſt and ableſt of all writers, on the ſubjects of the Immateriality and Natural Immortality of the Soul, and alſo on *Liberty* and *Neceſſity*. What he ſays on theſe ſubjects in his *Demonſtration of the Being and Attributes of God*, is but inconſiderable, compared with what he has ſaid in his *Anſwer to Dodwell*, his *Controverſies with Collins*, and the *Letters* between *him and Leibnitz*.

I think it of little conſequence, whether it *can*, or *cannot*, be determined, whether the ſubject of conſciouſneſs and thought in man is matter, if by matter is meant not ſolid extenſion, but an unknown ſomething, that has a relation to place; and it was hardly worth while to write a book to prove this.

Matter

Matter is incapable of conſciouſneſs and thought, not becauſe it is *extended*, but becauſe it is *ſolid*, and as ſuch inert and capable of being divided without being annihilated.

Solid extenſion; and *perception*, *thought*, *volition*, &c. are totally different things; and it is juſt as clear that the latter cannot be the figure, motion, and arrangement of the parts of the former, as that any one thing cannot *be* another; that a ſquare, for inſtance, cannot *be*, or be *made to be*, ſound, or colour. Our ideas of *figured*, *extended*, *ſolid ſubſtances*, and of *conſcious*, *perceiving*, *thinking ſubſtances*, are, according to Mr. Locke's obſervation, equally clear and diſtinct. It ſeems, therefore, very unreaſonable to confound them, or to talk of ſuperadding one of them to the other.

Dr. Clarke makes uſe of the inſtance of *ſpace*, to prove that there is no neceſſary connection between extenſion and diſcerptibility. *Moveantur partes ſpatii de locis ſuis & movebuntur de ſeipſis. Newton's Princip. Lib.* I. *Schol. Defin.* 8.

ANSWER.

ANSWER.

I conſider Mr. Baxter as having been one of the moſt conſiſtent of all the Immaterialiſts. That ſuch a ſcheme as his is the only conſiſtent one, is, I think, ſufficiently proved by Dr. Watts. Some of his arguments I have referred to p. 221, and other reaſons for this opinion I have ſuggeſted, p. 55, &c.

If, as Dr. Clarke ſuppoſes, ſpirits have real extenſion, they muſt be of ſome ſhape, and therefore their relation to ſpace cannot be a thing of which we are *utterly ignorant*. We may not know *where* they are, or *how much ſpace* they occupy, (whether, for inſtance, *more*, or *leſs* than the bodies they belong to) but they muſt occupy *ſome ſpace*, as well as bodies.

I will farther obſerve, that if, according to Dr. Clarke, the Divine Being has infinite extenſion, and finite ſpirits a limited one, they muſt mutually penetrate each other; and theſe ſpiritual ſubſtances being of

of *the ſame nature*, the difficulty attending it muſt be juſt as great as that which attends the mutual penetration of material ſubſtances.

I have carefully read all Dr. Clarke's metaphyſical works, but thought it ſufficient to quote his *Demonſtration*, as the *beſt known* of all his writings, and containing a ſummary of his ſtrongeſt arguments on all the topics that I have had occaſion to diſcuſs. I have alſo read *Butler's Analogy*, but this work does not ſtand ſo high with me as it does with Dr. Price. I did not think that, with reſpect to any thing that I have written, it was at all neceſſary to conſider any paſſages of Dr. Clarke's writings, or any of Butler's; but if Dr. Price thinks otherwiſe, I will give particular attention to any thing, in either of them, that he ſhall be pleaſed to point out to me.

Dr. Price admits, that if matter be not ſolid and impenetrable, it may be capable of thought, but wonders that I ſhould have written a book to prove this. My book

was

was not written to prove this, but to prove that, whatever matter be, *thinking* is the result of a modification of it, or that this faculty does not belong to an invisible substance, different from the body, which I apprehend to have been the source of the greatest corruptions of the system of revelation. Effectually to explode this notion, originally borrowed from heathenism, and thereby to discharge from Christianity many enormous errors, that now disfigure it, and make it appear absurd in the present enlightened age of philosophy, appears to me to be rendering it the most important of all services. Whether I have in any measure *succeeded*, such, if I know my own heart, have been my views in writing both the *Disquisitions* themselves, and this defence of them.

I wish Dr. Price would inform me what is the connection between *a capacity of consciousness*, and *being indivisible without being annihilated*. Also, if spirits be extended, and something more than space, whether they may not be divisible, and discerptible, as well as matter.

Dr.

Dr. Hartley has ſhewn that all the faculties of the human mind may be the reſult of vibration, except that of *ſimple perception*; but this, though *different* from the other known properties of matter, may not be *incompatible* with them. The facts alledged in Sect. III. do, I apprehend, prove, that according to the eſtabliſhed rules of philoſophizing, it is a property that muſt *in fact* belong to the brain, whether we ever be able to conceive *how* it reſults from the ſtructure of the brain, or not. In my opinion there is juſt the ſame reaſon to conclude that the brain *thinks*, as that it is *white*, and *ſoft*.

Though Mr. Locke was of opinion that our ideas of thinking ſubſtances are as diſtinct as thoſe of ſolid ones, he was likewiſe of opinion, that, for any thing that we know to the contrary, thinking *may* be the mere property of a ſolid ſubſtance.

Dr. Clarke ſhould have ſhewn not only that *extenſion*, but that *a capacity of motion from place to place* is not neceſſarily connected

nected with diſcerptibility. It appears to me very clear, that, if ſpirit be a thing that is extended and moveable, one part of it may be conceived to be moved, and the other part left behind, whether the property of *conſciouſneſs* would be deſtroyed in conſequence of it, or not.

Dr. Price.

In *Diſquiſitions*, p. 72, Dr. Prieſtley ſays, that "it is demonſtrable that matter is in-"finitely diviſible"—Can he ſay that the being he calls *himſelf* is likewiſe infinitely diviſible. What would be the reſult of ſuch a di-viſion? Would it not be an infinite number of *other* beings? But does not this imply a contradiction? Can there be ſuch a thing as *half* a ſelf?—Or can the being I call *myſelf* be ſplit into two *others?* Impoſſible! This would not be to *divide*, but to *annihilate* me—And the truth is, that in this caſe diviſion cannot be imagined without annihilation—In another place Dr. Prieſtley intimates, that matter conſiſts of *indiviſible points*, p. 23. How then can it be infinitely diviſible?

Answer.

ANSWER.

The matter of which I conſiſt may be diviſible, though the *actual* diviſion of it might ſo diſarrange the parts of it, that the property of thinking (which is the reſult of a particular modification of them) would be deſtroyed. A whole brain may think, but half a brain may be incapable of it. I ſee no ſort of difficulty in this caſe. Alſo, may not an extended ſpirit be conceived to be divided without annihilation, as well as an extended ſolid ſubſtance? To the imagination it is equally eaſy.

DR. PRICE.

Diſquiſitions, p. 92. *The percipient power may as well belong to one ſyſtem as to one atom.* —See likewiſe the anſwer to the fourth Objection in p. 88. *I am one perſon, but it does not follow that I cannot be divided: A ſphere is one thing, but it does not follow that it conſiſts of indiviſible materials*——But if matter conſiſts of *indiviſible points* (as is ſaid in p. 23.) and the ſoul is matter, then the

ſoul

ſoul conſiſts of indiviſible materials. But not to inſiſt on this. Can any one believe of *himſelf* that he is one thinking being only as a great number of bodies forming a ſphere are one ſphere? If this is true, he muſt be either the parts themſelves that compoſe the ſphere; and if ſo, he is a *multitude* of beings; or he muſt be their *ſphericity*; and if ſo, he is nothing but an *order* or *relation* of parts, and can never remain the ſame any longer than that order is preſerved. As any change in the ſurface of a ſphere would deſtroy the ſphericity, and convert it into ſome other figure, ſo would any change in that *order* of parts which conſtitutes *myſelf*, deſtroy *me*, and convert me into ſome *other perſon*.

ANSWER.

If I ſay that matter conſiſts of indiviſible points, I uſe a common expreſſion, though perhaps not a correct one. But as every ſenſible part of matter conſiſts of an *infinity* of ſuch points, it is plain that the ſubſtance can never be exhauſted by any diviſion.

To

To infer from this, that the ſoul (conſiſting of matter) conſiſts of an indiviſible ſubſtance, ſeems to me to be a play upon words.

If a thinking being be a material ſubſtance of a particular texture and form, as I define it, it cannot follow, as is here aſſerted, that it is *a mere order or relation of parts*. A diſarrangement of this texture would deſtroy all *power of thought*, but would not make *another perſon*.

Dr. Price.

Diſquiſitions, p. 89. "*It is impoſſible to "ſay a priori, whether a ſingle particle, or a "ſyſtem of matter, be the ſeat of perception, "but fact proves the latter.*" If a ſyſtem of matter is the ſeat of perception, then the ſyſtem is the percipient being. But the percipient being is *one*. A ſyſtem conſiſts of *many* beings.

It is inconceivable to me how any perſon can think that many ſubſtances united can be one ſubſtance or that all

the parts of a ſyſtem can perceive, and yet no ſingle part be a percipient being.

ANSWER.

A ſyſtem, though conſiſting of many beings or things, is nevertheleſs but *one ſyſtem*. A brain, though conſiſting of many parts, is but one brain; and where can be the difficulty of conceiving that no ſingle part of a brain ſhould be a whole brain, or have the properties of a whole brain?

DR. PRICE.

Diſquiſitions, Sect. IX. It ſeems evident that Dr. Prieſtley's principles go to prove, that the Deity is material, as well as all inferior beings. He would otherwiſe have no common property with matter, by which it would be poſſible for him to act upon it—But at the ſame time would there not be ſomething ſhocking in ſaying of the Deity, that he is nothing but a power of attraction and repulſion?

ANSWER.

ANSWER.

By what conſtruction am I made to aſſert that the divine eſſence is *material*, that is, of *the ſame kind of ſubſtance* with what we generally term *matter*, when I ſuppoſe it to have quite *different properties*, on account of which I expreſsly ſay, that it ought to have a quite *different name*, and not receive its denomination from the mere negation of the properties of matter, which is, in fact, no definition at all? Let all beings, and all things, be defined by their *known properties*, and no miſtake can poſſibly ariſe; for then our knowledge and our language will always correſpond to one another. It would certainly be ſomething ſhocking to ſay that "the Deity is nothing but a "power of attraction and repulſion," but it would be ſaying what is directly contrary to the doctrine of my treatiſe, as muſt, I think, be obvious to the moſt ſuperficial attention.

DR. PRICE.

Diſquiſitions, p. 103. I am ſurprized Dr. Prieſtley ſhould here ſay, that it is almoſt

univerſally acknowledged that, according to the Scriptures, the Deity *is incapable of local preſence*, when it is ſo well known that ſome of the firſt Chriſtian writers have believed *infinite ſpace* to be an attribute of the Deity.

ANSWER.

What I maintain, is, that according to the only conſiſtent ſcheme of immaterialiſm, the Divine Being, as well as other immaterial ſubſtances, have no *local preſence*, and it is the opinion that till lately I held myſelf. That the Divine Being has a proper omnipreſence, and conſequently a proper extenſion, I now admit, but ſhould not chuſe to ſay with any perſon, though ever ſo juſtly called the *firſt Chriſtian writer in other reſpects*, that ſpace is merely *an attribute of the Deity*; becauſe, ſuppoſing that there was no Deity, ſpace would ſtill remain. It cannot be annihilated even in idea.

DR.

Dr. Price.

Disquisitions, p. 102, &c. *But till we know something positive concerning this supposed immaterial substance, &c.* ——What is similar to this may be more properly said of matter, according to Dr. Priestley's account of it—Whatever the soul is, it must, if it is to exist for ever, be somewhat so substantial as to have no tendency to decay, or wear out. But this cannot be true of any thing compounded.

Answer.

If, as Dr. Price supposes, a spiritual substance be extended, it must consist of an aggregation of parts, and therefore may be as liable to be dissolved as a homogeneous corporeal substance.

Dr. Price.

When it is asserted that the soul is *naturally immortal*, the meaning is, that being

a *ſubſtance* and not a *mode*, it will go on to exiſt, till by ſome poſitive act of the Creator it is annihilated. In the ſame ſenſe it may be ſaid of the *atoms*, or *elements* that compoſe our bodies, that they are naturally immortal: for it is, I think, a general truth, that only the power that brought any ſubſtance into being can put it out of being. Does Dr. Prieſtley deny the natural immortality of the ſoul in this ſenſe? If he does, and if he really means when he ſays, "that the whole man becomes extinct at death," that death deſtroys, or annihilates the thinking ſubſtance; and if alſo this is the dictate of nature and reaſon, then the doctrine of a reſurrection is contradictory to nature and reaſon; and Dr. Prieſtley, by maintaining the natural mortality of the ſoul, injures revelation. But it is certain he means the contrary. He muſt, therefore, acknowledge, that death does not naturally deſtroy the ſoul; or, in other words, that it preſerves its exiſtence at death; and that what then happens to it, can be no more than a

ſuſpenſion

ſuſpenſion of the exerciſe of its faculties, or an *incapacitation* from which it will, by the power of Chriſt, be delivered at the reſurrection. If he acknowledge this, he and I, and many other zealous immaterialiſts, are agreed. If he does not mean this, the reſurrection will be, not a *reſurrection*, but a *creation* of a new ſet of beings. If death annihilates us, there can be no future ſtate. This is ſelf-evident. A being who has loſt his exiſtence cannot be recovered. It is very improper here to mention the renewal of the flame of a candle after extinction; for the ſubſtance of the candle is not affected by the extinction of the flame, juſt as the ſubſtance of the ſoul is not affected by the ſuſpenſion of its powers at death. It ſhould be conſidered alſo, that the flame of a candle, being nothing but a current of hot and ſhining vapour, that is conſtantly paſſing away, like the water of a river, it never continues a moment the ſame; and that, conſequently, the *renewed* flame is properly a *new* and *different* flame.

ANSWER.

I am ſurpriſed at theſe conjectures concerning my meaning, which is, I think, always expreſſed with ſufficient clearneſs, viz. that the faculty of thinking is the reſult of a certain arrangement of the parts of matter; ſo that the diſarrangement of them by death is neither the *extinction*, nor the *annihilation* of them, and the re-arrangement of them after death, is (if any thing can be ſo called) a proper *reſurrection*. It is as much ſo, as that of a ſeed ſown in the ground, the *germ* of which does not periſh, but riſes again in the form of a new plant, though the greateſt part of the bulk of the ſeed (being merely nutritious, and *extraneous matter*) does not properly riſe again.

DR. PRICE.

If I underſtand what is ſaid in the beginning of Sect. XIII. on *Perſonal Identity*, the drift of it is to ſhew that a being may be the ſame with a *former* being, though their *ſubſtances*, and conſequently all their *properties*, are

are different.—It is likewiſe implied, that the men who are to be raiſed from death, will be the ſame with the men who have exiſted in this world, *only* as a river is called the ſame, becauſe the water, though different, has followed other water in the ſame channel; or as a foreſt is called the ſame, becauſe the preſent trees, though new, have been planted and grown up on the ſame ſpot, in the room of other trees which had been cut down and conſumed—Did I believe this to be all the identity of man hereafter, I could not conſider myſelf as having any concern in a future ſtate.

The aſſertion that the man or the agent may be the ſame, though his ſubſtance, or every component part of him, is different, appears to me very extraordinary indeed. I am a different perſon from my neighbour, though organized in the ſame manner, becauſe the organized matter is different—If, therefore, man after the reſurrection will be, not only a different ſyſtem of matter, but alſo a ſyſtem of matter differently organized, and placed in a different world, what

what will there be to make him the ſame with man in this world?——I think, therefore, that Dr. Prieſtley ſhould, by all means, keep to what he advances towards the concluſion of this 13th Section. It is eſſential to his ſcheme to maintain the reſurrection of the *ſame body*, or that the very matter that compoſes man at death, will be collected at the reſurrection, and compoſe him again in another world, and for ever.

But what am I ſaying? Man a compoſition of ſubſtances! It is utterly impoſſible. The thinking ſubſtance would then be not *one being*, but a *multitude*; nor is it poſſible to evade this conſequence, without denying that the ſoul is a ſubſtance, or any thing more than a modification of a ſubſtance, or an arrangement and order of the parts of ſubſtances. Can this be true? Is the ſubject of thought and perception; is what every one calls *himſelf*; not *a being*, and *one being*; but a mere reſult from the figure, motion, and order of a ſyſtem of material beings?——In ſhort, if the ſoul

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is material, it must certainly be one of the primary atoms of matter. No where else in the corporeal world can we find any thing like that unity and substantiality which belong to the soul of man; and if it is an atom, it must have existed from the first creation of matter, unless there are new atoms created every time an animal is generated.

ANSWER.

In Sect. XIII. I professedly speculate upon principles that are not my own. It is intended to prove, that there may be such an *identity of person*, as will be a foundation for future *expectation*, *obligation*, &c. though every particle of the man should be changed. The reasoning in this section I must take the liberty to say, I do not think to be invalidated by Dr. Price's remarks, though to him it appears so very extraordinary.

The remainder of this remark has been obviated again and again, in the course of my work, and also in the preceding parts of this. What I call *myself* is an organized system

ſyſtem of matter. It is not, therefore, myſelf, but my *power of thought*, that is properly termed the reſult of figure, motion, &c.

Dr. Price.

Diſquiſitions, p. 160, &c. "*What is there* "*in the matter that compoſes my body, that* "*ſhould attach me to it more than to the matter* "*that compoſes the table on which I write?*" This is a ſurprizing queſtion from Dr. Prieſtley. If the matter which compoſes my body is myſelf, I certainly have as much reaſon to prefer it to the matter of a table, as I have to prefer *myſelf* to a *table*. To aſſert, as Dr. Prieſtley does, that the matter of the body is the ſoul, and at the ſame time to ſuppoſe, as he does, in this 13th Section, that the ſoul may remain the ſame, though the whole matter of the body is changed, appears to me indeed ſo apparently inconſiſtent, that I cannot help ſuſpecting I muſt greatly miſunderſtand him. Should he ſay, that the ſoul is not ſtrictly the *matter* of the body, but the *organization* of that matter; this, as I have already obſerved

more

more than once, is making the ſoul a modification, an order and juxta-poſition and connection of parts, and not a *being*, or *ſubſtance*. But is it poſſible to conceive of any thing more ſubſtantial than the ſoul? Can there be a *being* in nature, if the ſentient principle, the ſubject that feels pleaſure and pain, that thinks and reaſons, and loves and hates, is not a *being?* Suppoſe it, however, if you can, to be merely the organization of the body; would not a change in the matter of the body make *another* body? And would not *another* body make *another* ſoul, though the ſame organization ſhould be preſerved? If not, then may not I and Dr. Prieſtley be the ſame man, ſince the organization of our bodies is the ſame, and only the matter different? Would not, in ſhort, any number of living bodies be one ſoul, one ſentient principle, ſuppoſing their organization the ſame?

ANSWER.

The beginning of this remark relates to the ſpeculation abovementioned, which goes upon other principles than my own. To the

the queſtion at the end of the remark, viz. "Would not any number of living bodies "be one ſoul, one ſentient principle, ſup-"poſing their organization the ſame," I anſwer, that different ſyſtems of matter, organized exactly alike, muſt make different beings, who would feel and think exactly alike in the ſame circumſtances. Their minds, therefore, would be exactly *ſimilar*, but *numerically different*.

Dr. Price.

Diſquiſitions, p. 123. It ſeems to be hinted here, that the ſoul, after death, is as little of a ſubſtance (that is, as truly nothing) as matter would be without extenſion.—It is added, *if together with the ceſſation of thought they will maintain the real exiſtence of the ſoul after death, it muſt be for the ſake of hypotheſis only, and for no real uſe whatever.* Does Dr. Prieſtley then really mean that the ſoul loſes its exiſtence at death?

How can it be ſaid to be of no uſe to maintain the exiſtence of the ſoul after death, when without this, a reſurrection muſt be impoſſible?

Answer.

ANSWER.

I ſay, that they who maintain the ceſſation of thought after death, cannot maintain the ſeparate exiſtence of the ſoul, except for the ſake of an hypotheſis, and for no real *uſe* whatever, for this plain reaſon; that, during this entire ceſſation of thought, the ſoul is, in fact, of no uſe, no phenomena indicating that any ſuch thing exiſts. Had not the perſons who maintain ſuch an inſenſible ſtate of the ſoul, believed a reſurrection of the body, they would naturally have concluded that the ſoul, or the thinking part of man, *ceaſed to be*, becauſe its exiſtence would never more be manifeſted by any *effect*.

How is it true, that there can be no reſurrection, unleſs there be a ſoul diſtinct from the body? If the ſoul be the ſame thing with the body, or a part of the body, may not the body, or this part of it, riſe again without the aid of *another ſubſtance?* On the contrary, I think that a reſurrection, properly ſo called (becauſe this

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can be only a reſurrection of ſomething that *had been dead*, viz. the body) is manifeſtly uſeleſs, upon the ſuppoſition of there being a ſoul diſtinct from the body; it being upon this hypotheſis, the ſoul, and not the body, that is the ſeat of all perception, and the ſource of all action.

Dr. Price.

Diſquiſitions, p. 224. *It was unqueſtionably the opinion of the Apoſtles, that the thinking powers ceaſed at death.*

If, indeed, the Apoſtles (as is here aſſerted too poſitively) thought that the powers of ſenſation were deſtroyed at death, or as Dr. Prieſtley ſpeaks in p. 248, that death is the utter extinction of all our percipient and intellectual powers; if, I ſay, the Apoſtles thought thus, they believed a contradiction in believing a reſurrection. If theſe powers are not deſtroyed, they muſt remain, and it can be only the *exerciſe* of them that ceaſes at death. Certainly Dr. Prieſtley ſhould have guarded better his language on this ſubject, which is often ſuch as implies that the ſoul loſes its exiſtence

exiſtence at death. Indeed, I never knew before that any believer in a future ſtate could aſſert, not only that *thought* and *perception* ceaſe at death, but that there is then a total extinction of the very *powers* themſelves. In ſhort, Dr. Prieſtley ſhould be explicit in ſaying which it is he believes, the *ſleep*, or the *non-exiſtence* of the ſoul after death. There is no leſs than an infinite difference between theſe two things. The former may be the truth, and it implies the natural immortality of the ſoul; but if the latter is true, there is an end of all our hopes. Talking of the reſtoration of man after death, will be talking of the reſtoration of a non-entity. Dr. Prieſtley calls this, (in *Diſquiſitions*, p. 125.) *an extraordinary aſſertion*; but it appears to me ſelf-evidently true. Of what uſe, Dr. Prieſtley aſks, is an exiſtence after death, without thought and perception? I have given a plain anſwer to this queſtion. It is of infinite uſe, by making a future ſtate, or a reſtoration of man, poſſible. Would it not be ſtrange to ſay of a man who is fallen

into a ſwoon, that ſince he is inſenſible it makes no difference whether he is in a ſwoon or dead?—Would it not be proper to ſay in anſwer, that if he is only in a ſwoon he may recover, but if he is dead he will never recover.—Juſt ſo; if a man at death is only *diſabled*, he may be reſtored. But if his exiſtence is gone, he never can be reſtored.

ANSWER.

I cannot help expreſſing my ſurpriſe at this remark. As far as I ſee, my language upon this ſubject is always uniform, and ſtrictly proper. I ſuppoſe that the powers of thought are not merely ſuſpended, but are *extinct*, or *ceaſe to be*, at death. To make my meaning, if poſſible, better underſtood, I will uſe the following compariſon. The power of *cutting*, in a razor, depends upon a certain coheſion, and arrangement of the parts of which it conſiſts. If we ſuppoſe this razor to be wholly diſſolved in any acid liquor, its power of cutting

cutting will certainly be *loſt*, or *ceaſe to be*, though no particle of the metal that conſtituted the razor be annihilated by the proceſs; and its former *ſhape*, and *power of cutting*, &c. may be reſtored to it after the metal has been precipitated. Thus when the body is diſſolved by putrefaction, its power of thinking entirely ceaſes; but, no particle of the man being *loſt*, as many of them as were eſſential to him, will, I doubt not, be collected, and revivified, at the reſurrection, when the power of thinking will return of courſe. I do not, therefore, think that any thing that I have advanced implies that *the ſoul*, that is, *the man* loſes his *exiſtence* at death, in any other ſenſe than that the man loſes his *power of thinking*.

I really do not know how I can be more explicit than I have been through the whole of my treatiſe on this ſubject, with reſpect to which Dr. *Price* complains that I am not explicit enough. The latter part of this remark I have replied to before.

DR. PRICE.

Diſquiſitions, p. 96. *All the exertions of the ſoul are as much produced by ſenſations and ideas as any one effect in nature can be produced by its proper cauſe. They have a proper impelling force. They are moving powers.* p. 97.——An idea, therefore, is an *agent*, and the ſoul is paſſive under its action in the ſame manner a ball is paſſive when impelled by another.——But what is an idea? Nothing but a *perception*, or *judgment* of the mind; that is, of the being that acts. How can this impel? What can it be more than the *occaſion* of action?

There muſt be ſomewhere a *ſelf-moving power*. For one thing cannot move another, and that another *in infinitum*—And if there is one ſelf-moving power in nature, why may there not be many?

ANSWER.

Dr. *Price* ſhould diſtinguiſh between a *perception*, or *judgment*, which is an *act* of *the mind*, and the *idea* perceived and judged of

of by the mind, which muſt be different from the *mind itſelf*, or any of its *acts*. I maintain that ideas, whatever they be, have a proper *impelling power*, becauſe men are invariably impelled to action in conſequence of them; but as to a *ſelf-motive power*, I deny that man has any ſuch thing, for the reaſons that are alledged in the *Treatiſe on Neceſſity*.

DR. PRICE.

Upon the whole, it may perhaps be poſſible to convince me that there is no ſuch thing as *matter*, and Dr. *Prieſtley* has contributed a little to it; but I cannot be convinced that there is no ſuch thing as *ſpirit*, meaning by ſpirit ſuch a thinking intelligent nature as I feel myſelf to be. I am indeed full of darkneſs about myſelf; but in the midſt of this darkneſs I am taught the following particulars by an irreſiſtible conſciouſneſs, which will not ſuffer me to doubt, 1ſt. That I am a *being*, or a *ſubſtance*, and not a *property*, or a mere *configuration of parts*.

2dly, That I am *one being*, and not *many* beings, or a *ſyſtem*.

3dly, That I am a *voluntary agent*, poſſeſſed of powers of *ſelf-motion*, and not a paſſive inſtrument.

4thly, That my ſenſes and limbs, my eyes, hands, &c. are *inſtruments* by which I act, and receive information; and not *myſelf*; or *mine*, and not *me*.

ANSWER.

If, by *ſpirit*, Dr. *Price* means nothing more than a thinking and an intelligent ſubſtance, I have the ſame conſciouſneſs of it that he has. I alſo believe with him that I am a *being*, or *ſubſtance*; alſo that I am a *ſingle being*, and a *voluntary agent*, though not poſſeſſed of a ſelf-motive power; and that my limbs and ſenſes are inſtruments by which I act, and not *myſelf*, or *me*. So that, if theſe be all the eſſential articles of Dr. *Price*'s faith, and he ſeems to enumerate them as ſuch, we are very nearly agreed, though in *words* we have differed ſo widely.

QUERIES

QUERIES *by* DR. PRICE.

1. Is not the *ſoul*, or what I call *myſelf* a being, or ſubſtance, and not merely a mode, or accident.

2. Does the ſoul loſe its exiſtence at death, or am I, the ſubject of thought, reaſon, conſciouſneſs, &c. to be annihilated?

3. If I am to loſe my exiſtence at death, will not my reſurrection be the reſurrection of a non-entity, and therefore a contradiction?

4. If I am not to loſe my exiſtence at death, may it not be properly ſaid that I am *naturally immortal?*

ANSWER.

I conſider myſelf as a being conſiſting of what is called matter, diſpoſed in a certain manner. At death the parts of this material ſubſtance are ſo diſarranged, that the powers of perception and thought, which

depended upon that arrangement, ceaſe. At the reſurrection they will be re-arranged, in the ſame, or a ſimilar manner, as before, and conſequently the powers of perception and thought will be reſtored. But this will require a miraculous interpoſition of divine power, and therefore it cannot be ſaid that thinking beings are *naturally* immortal, (*i. e.* as thinking beings) though the parts that compoſe them are ſo.

THE

THE SECOND COMMUNICATION,

Containing Dr. Price's *Obſervations on the Replies to the Firſt Communication, with Dr.* Prieſtley's ſecond *Replies.*

Of the Nature of MIND *or* SPIRIT.

Obſervations on Dr. Prieſtley's *Reply*, p. 49, *&c.*

WHEN the eye is deſtroyed we cannot ſee. So likewiſe when the brain is deſtroyed we cannot reaſon. If from hence it follows that it is the brain that reaſons, why ſhould it not alſo follow that it is the eye that ſees? From the dependence of actual ſenſations and thought on the brain, we have, I think, no more reaſon to conclude that the brain is the mind, than a ſavage who had never heard the muſic of a harpſichord, and did not ſee the hand that played upon it, would have to conclude, that it played on itſelf, and was *the* muſician; becauſe he could trace all the ſounds to the inſtrument, and found that when the ſtrings were

were out of order, the muſic was diſturbed or deſtroyed.

What experience teaches us, is, that the *exerciſe* of the mental powers *depends* on the brain and the nerves; not that the mind *is* the brain and the nerves. Common ſenſe exclaims againſt ſuch a concluſion as much as againſt concluding that there is pain in the point of a ſword. We are ſure the mind cannot be the brain, becauſe the brain is an aſſemblage of beings. The mind is *one* being. Nothing ſeems to me more unphiloſophical in this caſe than to reſt our ideas in the organ, and to confound it with the being whoſe organ it is. This, I have ſaid, is like thinking that a muſical inſtrument plays on itſelf. But to go higher. It is not unlike reſting our ideas in this viſible world, and ſuppoſing it the ſame with that Deity who made, and actuates, and governs it. The laws of nature ſeem to terminate in matter. But is it philoſophical, in order to avoid multiplying cauſes, to conclude they have no other cauſe than matter itſelf; and,

with

with the French philoſophers, to make *nature* the only Deity? In ſhort, I am fully of opinion, that if that *maſs of fleſh and blood* which we call the *brain*, (no one part of which, or part of any part, touches another) may be that ſentient and intelligent being we call the *mind*; then that maſs of corporeal ſubſtances which we call the *world*, may be *God*; and it muſt be unphiloſophical to ſearch farther than *itſelf* for its cauſe. Dr. Prieſtley, I know, is far from being ſenſible of this: But ſuch indeed is the tendency of his principles, and manner of reaſoning. The very foundation of this atheiſtical concluſion, is totally ſubverted by the demonſtration which, I think, I have given, that the laws which govern matter, or its attractions and repulſions, are not the actions or properties of matter itſelf, but effects of the conſtant operation of a higher cauſe.

ANSWER, *by Dr.* Prieſtley.

I cannot help expreſſing ſome ſurprize that my reaſoning on this ſubject ſhould not ſeem to be underſtood, and that ſuch ſtrange concluſions

concluſions ſhould be drawn from it. If, upon examination, nothing could be *found*, or *reaſonably conjectured*, to move the ſtrings of the harpſichord, it would be philoſophical to conclude, that the cauſe of the muſic that came from it was *within itſelf*. But when we open it, and ſee the ſtrings to be moved in ſuch a manner as ſimilar ſtrings are never known to be moved but by *human means*, there is reaſon to conclude, from analogy, that theſe ſtrings alſo are moved, though we do not ſee *how*, by the ſame, or a ſimilar cauſe.

In like manner, when we ſee the parts of which the univerſe conſiſts, to be arranged in ſuch a manner, as, from analogy, we have reaſon to believe, that no other than an intelligent being could arrange them, we conclude that an intelligent being, viſible or inviſible, *has* arranged them.

I conclude, that there is nothing within the brain itſelf that is the cauſe of perception, becauſe, for any thing that I know, perception may be the property

of

of that material, as well as of any ſuppoſed immaterial ſubſtance; the relation of *perception* to *material* or *immaterial* ſubſtances being equally unknown. If the faculty of *playing could* be ſuppoſed to belong to the harpſichord, it would be unphiloſophical to inquire for any *concealed muſician*; ſo alſo if the power of arranging and moving the component parts of the univerſe *could* belong to themſelves, it would be unphiloſophical to inquire for a ſuperintending mind, or God. But it is denied that the laws of nature do *ſeem* to terminate in the viſible parts of the univerſe.

For the ſame reaſon that perception is aſcribed to ſome immaterial ſubſtance within the brain, it ſeems to me that attraction ought to be aſcribed to ſome immaterial ſubſtance within the earth, the ſun, &c. becauſe, according to Dr. Price, *attraction* is a power quite foreign to the nature of matter, as well as *perception*

Dr. Price.

Obſervations on Dr. Prieſtley's *Reply*, p. 51, 52.

I had ſaid that it is very abſurd to imagine that ideas are diviſible. Dr. Prieſtley here ſays, that after the moſt deliberate review, the contrary is very clear to him. Others muſt judge. What is the *idea* of an object? Is it not the *notion* or *conception* of the object? A line is infinitely diviſible. Is the mind's *idea*, or *conception* of a line alſo infinitely diviſible? But I find Dr. *Prieſtley* thinks ideas to be the bodies themſelves in miniature, which they repreſent, or models and delineations of external objects, diſtinct from the mind, but contained in it, like maps and globes in a chamber. And I ſuppoſe he will go ſo far as to aſcribe all the properties of bodies to them, and particularly attraction and repulſion; and maintain, that in volition they act upon and impel the mind containing them, as one body acts upon and impels another. The bare repreſentation of ſuch an opinion ſeems ſufficient to confute

fute it. But if not, it muſt be in vain to argue about it.

ANSWER.

If ideas be nothing diſtinct from the mind, or modifications of the mind, varying as their architypes vary, a mind *with ideas*, and a mind without *ideas*, would be the ſame thing; and if the ideas of compound objects be not compounded things, and conſiſt of as many parts as the objects of which they are the ideas, I am unable to conceive any thing about ideas. That motions, or volitions of the mind, do depend upon ideas, or, in other words, that the mind is *influenced*, or *acted upon* by them, is a certain *fact*, whether the repreſentation confute itſelf or not. No perſon acquainted with the principles of *Hartley*'s *theory*, can be at a loſs to know what I ſuppoſe ideas to be, and in what manner they operate.

DR. PRICE.

Obſervations on Dr. Prieſtley's *Reply*, p. 58, *&c.*

I have already ſaid, that I know nothing of the extenſion of ſpirit. I only wiſh to diſtinguiſh

diſtinguiſh on this ſubject between what is certain, and what is uncertain. I think it *certain*, that whatever the ſubject of conſciouſneſs may be in other reſpects, it is incapable of being divided without being annihilated.

I do not expect that the chapter in *Butler's Analogy*, on a future State, which I have wiſhed to recommend to Dr. Prieſtley's attention, can appear to him as weighty as it does to me. *Butler* and *Clarke* are with me two of the firſt of all writers. In p. 222 of the *Diſquiſitions*, *&c.* to which Dr. Prieſtley refers me, the contradictory account of ſpiritual beings, which makes them to exiſt no where, or to have no relation to place, is ſaid to be "*the only* "*conſiſtent* ſyſtem of immaterialiſm, held "by Mr. *Baxter*, and *all the moſt approved* "*modern* writers on the ſubject." Can it be right to ſay this, when there are ſuch men as Dr. Clarke and Newton who have entertained different ideas, and extended them even to the ſupreme Spirit? I do not believe

believe that even Mr. Baxter entertained any ſuch notion. It is, however, the notion of Spirit which is combated through the greateſt part of Dr. Prieſtley's work.

Dr. Prieſtley's view in writing, was, to prove that there is no diſtinction between matter and ſpirit, or between the ſoul and body: and thus to explode what he calls the heatheniſh ſyſtem of chriſtianity, by exploding the doctrines of Chriſt's præ-exiſtence, and an intermediate ſtate. But if in doing this, it comes out that his account of matter does not anſwer to the common ideas of matter; or that it is not *ſolid* extenſion, but ſomething *not ſolid* that exiſts in ſpace; it agrees ſo far with ſpirit: And if ſuch matter is, as he aſſerts, the only matter poſſible, what he has proved will be, not that we have no *ſouls* diſtinct from our *bodies*, but that we have no *bodies* diſtinct from our *ſouls*. Matter which poſſeſſes ſolidity, or impenetrability and inertneſs, is certainly the only matter that is the object of natural philoſophy. This, *Newton* has ſaid, in a paſſage I have quoted from

him. If ſuch matter is impoſſible, it will follow that all in nature is Spirit.

Dr. Prieſtley, in this reply, p. 60, mentions his *views*. They are, I doubt not, the pureſt and beſt poſſible. There is no one of whoſe heart I have a higher opinion. But at the ſame time my fixed apprehenſion is, that he is one of thoſe great and good men who have puſhed on too eagerly in the purſuit of truth, and who, in endeavouring to ſerve the beſt of all cauſes, have run upon bad ground, and, without knowing it, employed means of the moſt dangerous tendency.

ANSWER.

To this I have nothing particular to ſay. My quotations from various writers prove, that beſides the profeſſed Carteſians, many other philoſophers and metaphyſicians have ſuppoſed that *ſpirit bears no relation to ſpace*. Dr. Watts, without having ever been refuted that I know of, has ſhewn that this is the only conſiſtent idea of an immaterial being. I have added ſome additional arguments

guments to prove the ſame thing, and this was my own idea while I held the doctrine of immaterialiſm. This idea, therefore, I have *chiefly* combated; but not this only, but alſo every other idea of immaterialiſm that I have met with, that appeared to me to deſerve particular notice.

Dr. Price.

Obſervations on the Replies, p. 65 and 66.

A thinking being, Dr. Prieſtley ſays, is a material ſubſtance of a particular texture; not a mere order or relation of parts. Does it not then follow, that the deſtruction of the order or texture of the parts; that is, their diſ-arrangement, cannot be the deſtruction of the thinking being?

"A ſyſtem," it is farther ſaid, "though "conſiſting of many *beings*, is but one "*ſyſtem:* and a brain, though conſiſting "of many *parts*, is but one *brain*; no "ſingle part of which can be the whole." But it is ſelf-evident, that a ſyſtem, conſiſting of many beings, though *one as a*

ſyſtem, in the ſame ſenſe that an army is one as an army, muſt be a *multitude* of beings; and can no more be one being than an army can be one man. In like manner, though a brain conſiſting of many material ſubſtances, not one of which, according to Dr. Prieſtley, is in contact with another; though I ſay ſuch a brain may be one as a *brain*, it cannot certainly be one *ſubſtance*. But the ſoul is one *ſubſtance*, one being. This Dr. Prieſtley grants at the end of theſe replies, and it is impoſſible he ſhould deny it. He cannot, therefore, think the brain to be the ſoul. All that he can believe, is, that the ſoul's *thinking* depends on the order and texture of the brain. Experience proves this; and it is indeed, as I have before ſaid, all that experience teaches us.

ANSWER.

I cannot ſee any thing in this remark that is not merely verbal. A man, in my idea, is *one thinking being*, and not two thinking beings, let this thinking being conſiſt

conſiſt of as many ſubſtances, or *unthinking beings* as any perſon pleaſes.

Dr. Price.

Obſervations on the Reply, p. 67.

" By what conſtruction am I made to " aſſert, that the Divine Eſſence is ma- " terial; that is, of the ſame kind of ſub- " ſtance with what we generally term " matter, when I ſuppoſe it to have *quite* " *different properties*, &c.?"

I have mentioned this only as an inference from Dr. Prieſtley's principles; and particularly from a principle which he has argued upon as a maxim, namely, " that nothing can act upon another with- " out having *common properties* with it." If this is true, the Deity muſt have *common properties* with matter; and matter being a power of attraction and repulſion united to extenſion, the Deity muſt be the ſame. If, in order to avoid this conſequence, Dr. Prieſtley ſhould acknowledge

this maxim not to be univerſally true, it will follow that Spirit may act upon matter without having any other common property with it than being locally preſent to it; and one of his chief arguments for the materiality of the ſoul will be given up.

Indeed, I cannot imagine how it is poſſible for him to maintain this maxim without aſſerting the impoſſibility of the *creation* of the world out of nothing: For what common property can the Creator have with *nothing?* It would not ſatisfy me to be told here, that the Divine Nature poſſeſſing peculiar properties, we can draw no argument from it. The contrary is true in many caſes: Particularly in the following.—The Deity acts on matter, without having any common property with it; therefore ſuch action is poſſible.—The Deity is an immaterial being; therefore immaterial beings are poſſible: And the negation of matter is not the ſame with the negation of all exiſtence.—In like manner, the Deity is an intelligent being; therefore intelligent beings are poſſible.—He poſ-

ſeſſes

ſeſſes the powers of ſelf-determination; therefore ſuch powers are poſſible.—He is an agent; therefore there may be other agents.—All theſe concluſions appear to me to be juſt.

I have by no means deſigned to charge Dr. Prieſtley with maintaining that the Deity is nothing but a power of attraction and repulſion. I only mean to ſay, that if the Deity be a material being, and matter (as Dr. Prieſtley contends) is nothing but ſuch a power, then the Deity muſt alſo be nothing but ſuch a power. I know that Dr. Prieſtley aſſerts the immateriality of the Deity. I only doubt about the conſiſtence of this with the other parts of his theory.

Dr. Prieſtley ſays, p. 68, that he does not chuſe to call ſpace an *attribute of the Deity*; becauſe, ſuppoſing there was no Deity, "ſpace would ſtill remain; it "being impoſſible to be annihilated even "in idea."

According to Dr. Clarke, the impoſſibility of annihilating even in idea, *ſpace* and *time*, is the ſame with the *neceſſary exiſtence* of the Deity, whoſe attributes they are. Inſtead therefore of ſaying, "was "there no Deity ſpace would ſtill remain," we ſhould ſay "ſpace will ſtill remain; "and therefore the Deity will ſtill remain, "and his non-exiſtence cannot be ima- "gined without a contradiction." It appears to me, that whatever cannot be annihilated, even in idea, muſt be an attribute of the Deity. This may be applied not only to *ſpace* and *time*, but to *truth*, *poſſibles*, &c. as I have done in my *Treatiſe on Morals*. *Eternity*, *immenſity*, *infinite truth*, &c. cannot be *conceived* not to exiſt. All exiſtence preſuppoſes *their* exiſtence. That is, there exiſts neceſſarily an eternal and omnipreſent intelligence, the parent of all things.—I am afraid Dr. Prieſtley will not like this; but I am as much ſatisfied with it as he is with any part of Dr. Hartley's Theory.

ANSWER.

ANSWER.

What is attraction or repulsion but a power of moving matter in a certain direction? If, therefore, the Deity *does* thus act upon matter, he must have that power, and therefore *one* property in common with matter, though he be possessed of ever so many *other* powers of which matter is incapable.

Dr. Price's argument, that because God is *a self-determined being*, there may be other self-determined beings, and because God is an *agent* there may be other agents, &c. &c. may, I am afraid, carry us too far. For may it not be said also, that because God is a *self-existent being*, there may be other self-existent beings, and because God can *create out of nothing*, &c. &c. other beings may have the same powers?

I cannot, I own, see any thing conclusive in Dr. Price's argument for the being of a God, *a priori*. I do not see why

why it ſhould be taken for granted, that "whatever cannot be annihilated, even in "idea, muſt be an attribute of the Deity." This appears to me to be quite an arbitrary ſuppoſition. That *ſpace*, *duration*, *truth*, *poſſibles*, &c. ſhould be denominated *attributes*, ſounds very harſh to me. If the infinite ſpace occupied by the Deity be an attribute of his, I ſhould think that the finite ſpace, occupied by finite minds and things, ſhould be called *their* attributes, and alſo the portions of duration to which they are co-exiſtent, another of their attributes, &c. ſo that the ſame individual portions of ſpace and time, muſt be attributes both of the Deity and of created beings. Alſo mere attributes of things cannot, in idea, be ſeparated from them; whereas nothing is eaſier than to form the idea of *mere ſpace*, without any thing to occupy it. But this is not my ſubject.

DR. PRICE.

Obſervations on Reply, p. 69.

I muſt repeat here what I have already ſaid, that I know no more of the extenſion of

of ſpirit, than that it poſſeſſes local preſence, and is at the ſame time indiſcerptible. Let any one reflect on himſelf, or on the immenſity of the Divine Nature, and deny the poſſibility of this if he can.

Space has parts, but they are only *aſſignable* parts. A ſeparation of them from one another implies a contraction.

ANSWER.

If a finite ſpirit occupy a finite portion of ſpace, one part of that ſpirit may be *conceived* to be removed from another, as well as one part of ſolid matter from another; though this is not true of the Deity, who neceſſarily fills *all ſpace*.

DR. PRICE.

Obſervations on Reply, p. 75.

Dr. Prieſtley here ſays, that he intended in Sect. XIII. to prove, "that there may "be ſuch an identity of perſon as will be "a foundation

" a foundation for future *expectation*, *ob-*
" *ligation*, &c. though every particle of
" the man ſhould be changed." In anſwer to this I have obſerved, that if every particle that conſtitutes the man is to be different at the reſurrection, the *man* muſt be different; and that, conſequently, the men who exiſt in this world can have no ſuch concern in what is to happen to the men who are to exiſt hereafter, as lays a foundation for expectation, obligation, &c. becauſe thoſe men will not be *them*, but *other* men. In anſwer to this, Dr. Prieſtley muſt ſay, either that a man may be the ſame, though every particle that conſtitutes him is different; or he muſt ſay, that men in this life are obliged to act with a view to *their own* exiſtence in another life, though there is to be no ſuch exiſtence.

I am ſenſible that in this ſection he reaſons on the opinions of *others*; but, if in reaſoning on theſe opinions, he attempts to prove what is plainly impoſſible, the reaſoning muſt be ſo far wrong.

ANSWER,

ANSWER.

I ſtill ſay that I have nothing to add on this ſubject. I profeſſedly argue on an hypotheſis that is not my own, and ſubmit the force of the argument to the judgment of the reader.

DR. PRICE.

Obſervations on Reply, p. 79.

It is here ſaid, that " if the ceſſation of " thought at death is allowed, it can be of " no uſe whatever to maintain the ſeparate " exiſtence of the ſoul." I have given what appears to me a full anſwer to this obſervation, by ſaying, that if the ſoul does not *exiſt* after death, there can be no *reſtoration* of it: And that, conſequently, it muſt be of the utmoſt uſe to maintain that it does ſo exiſt, though perhaps in an *incapacitated* ſtate. There is an infinite difference between the *annihilation* of the ſoul at death, and its *incapacitation*. One who believed the former could not poſſibly entertain the hope of a future ſtate, but one who

who believes the latter, might reaſonably entertain ſuch an hope. He might think that a period would come when it ſhould be reſtored. He might even think of men, as Dr. Prieſtley (*Diſquiſitions*, p. 239) ſeems to think of brutes, that their reſurrection may be a part of the courſe of nature.

Dr. Prieſtley here adds, that "a reſur-"rection is manifeſtly uſeleſs, if there is a "ſoul diſtinct from the body." He well knows, that according to Mr. Locke, and many others, the future reſurrection taught in the Scriptures, is to be the reſurrection not of the *body*, but of the *ſoul*. It is to be the reſtoration of the *man* (incapacitated by the deſtruction of the organization by which he here acted, and received information) to the exerciſe of all his powers, in a new ſtate of being, by furniſhing him with another, and (if virtuous) a more durable and perfect organization. All then that can be ſaid with any propriety, is, that a reſurrection of the *ſame body* is uſeleſs, if there is a ſoul diſtinct from the body; and, in ſaying this, ſome of the moſt zealous

Chriſtians

Chriſtians and immaterialiſts will agree with him.

ANSWER.

What I ſay of the reſurrection being manifeſtly uſeleſs, if there be a ſoul diſtinct from the body, is upon the common hypotheſis; according to which the ſoul is the only ſource of action, and the body is ſo far from being neceſſary to its exertions as to be a *hindrance* to them. This is the original and genuine hypotheſis of *a ſoul*, as a ſubſtance diſtinct from the body, though the phenomena have at length compelled thoſe who cannot yet perſuade themſelves to give up the notion of a ſoul altogether, to acknowledge its neceſſary dependance upon the body, unaccountable as the mutual connection and dependance of ſubſtances ſo very different in their nature muſt appear. It has been in conſequence of finding more and more of the phenomena of the mind to depend upon the body, that myſelf and others conclude, that *every thing* belonging to man is corporeal. And I cannot help thinking that the general perſuaſion

perſuaſion of the ſoul being incapable of any perception or action without the body, and therefore that all its faculties are in a perfectly dormant ſtate from death to the reſurrection, muſt gradually abate men's zeal in the defence of the doctrine of a ſoul, and prepare the way for the general belief, that the hypotheſis is altogether unneceſſary.

Dr. Price.

Obſervations on Reply, p. 82, *and the following.*

In p. 75, at the top, Dr. Prieſtley ſays, "What I call myſelf, is, *an organized "ſyſtem of matter*." Is not every atom of the matter that compoſes a *ſyſtem*, a diſtinct *ſubſtance*, or being? Does not, therefore, Dr. Prieſtley, here call himſelf a *ſyſtem* of beings?—But waving this, becauſe perhaps it has been too often repeated, I will here beg leave to ſtate, as briefly as I can, the whole queſtion relating to the nature of the human ſoul and its mortality, according to my ideas. Should I be

I be wrong in any inſtance, Dr. Prieſtley will, I hope, be ſo good as to ſet me right.

The ſoul, that is, the being that thinks and acts, muſt, if an organized ſyſtem of matter, be either the material ſubſtances themſelves which compoſe that ſyſtem; or it muſt be their organization, their texture, motion, arrangement, &c.

If the latter is true, it will follow:

Firſt, That man is not a ſubſtance or a *being*, but a *mode*. For texture, motion, and arrangement of parts, are not ſubſtances, but modes of ſubſtances.

Secondly, It muſt follow, that any number of men, having the ſame organization, have the ſame ſoul, or are the ſame man; juſt as points having the ſame arrangement round a center, make the ſame figure.

Thirdly, It muſt follow, that the ſame ſyſtems of matter organized differently, will make different ſouls, or new men; juſt as the ſame points, arranged differently round a center, will make different figures.

Now it ſhould be remembered, that at the reſurrection, man being to live in a new ſtate, the organization of his body muſt be new: And this, if man be that organization, muſt make a new man.

But I need not urge theſe conſequences; becauſe Dr. Prieſtley has allowed, that the man is the matter itſelf which conſtitutes the man, and not its form or arrangement: And two ſyſtems of matter organized alike, he expreſsly ſays, would make two men thinking, indeed, alike, but *numerically different*. The former, therefore, of the two accounts I have mentioned, muſt be his account of the ſoul of man, and it will follow from it.

Firſt, That the man will always remain while the matter which conſtitutes him remains; however different its organization, or arrangement may be.

Secondly, That ſince death does not deſtroy the matter which conſtitutes man, it does not deſtroy the man: And that, conſequently,

ſequently, he goes on to exiſt after death; or is naturally immortal.

Thirdly, That in order to the reſurrection of the ſame man, the ſame matter muſt ariſe; and that for this reaſon, if the contrary is intended to be proved in *Diſquiſitions* Sect. XIII. it cannot be right.

Fourthly, That it is no leſs poſſible for man to have exiſted *before* his *birth*, than it is that he ſhould *exiſt* after his *death*: And that, conſequently, all the ſupport to the Socinian ſcheme, which Dr. Prieſtley derives from his ſentiments of materialiſm, falls to the ground. Indeed, man muſt have exiſted, according to this account, before his birth, if the matter that conſtitutes him exiſted before his birth: And his birth, or rather his conception, could have been nothing but putting that matter together, or new arranging it after it had been diſ-arranged in ſome former ſtate.

But this leads me to the main inference from this account of the ſoul; namely, that the organization of the matter which

conſtitutes man, ſince it is not the being that thinks, can only conſtitute actual thinking; and, conſequently, that it is only *actual thinking*, or the *exerciſe* of our powers, that depends on the bodily organization, and which can ceaſe at death. Even his own ſimile in p. 82, implies that he means no more. For matter formed into a razor, would not loſe its *exiſtence*, but its *cutting power* only, by being diſ-arranged. And, though, ſuppoſing the ſame matter formed into a *bullet*, we ſhould ſay the *razor* was deſtroyed, yet we ſhould mean no more than that the matter which conſtituted it had aſſumed another ſhape, and could no longer cut. To this iſſue I wiſhed to bring this diſpute. Dr. Prieſtley agrees with me in believing that the ſoul does not loſe its exiſtence at death, p. 83. He, therefore, believes what I mean by the natural immortality of the ſoul: And I fancy he will go even farther with me, and allow that the being which thinks, cannot *then* ceaſe to exiſt, without a poſitive act of the Creator to deſtroy it, like that which firſt brought it into exiſtence.

In

In return, I am ready to concede to Dr. Prieſtley, what he ſeems in p. 88, to give as the whole of his meaning, that "as "*thinking* beings we are not immortal;" that is, "that ſometimes we fall into an "*unthinking* ſtate." Sound ſleep may be ſuch a ſtate. *Death*, being the deſtruction of the whole machinery that connects us with this world, may be a more remedileſs ſtate of the ſame kind; and the chief difference between theſe two ſtates may be, that whereas there are *natural* and *ordinary* means by which we are recovered from the one, there may be no ſuch means by which we can be recovered from the other. Dr. Prieſtley, indeed, ſeems to be doubtful about this. But does it not deſerve his conſideration, whether he has not, by expreſſing ſuch a doubt, contradicted a ſentiment on which he has laid great ſtreſs, namely, that "ſince man becomes extinct "at death, our only hope of ſurviving the "grave is derived from revelation?" For if the reſurrection may be, as he ſays, (*Diſquiſitions*, p. 239) *within the proper courſe of nature:* that is, if there may be natural

means by which the dead may be hereafter reſtored, why may there not be arguments from reaſon which make it probable that it is fact? He has mentioned, in the paſſage to which I have juſt referred, one argument which he thinks may lead to ſuch a hope with reſpect to *brutes*. Why may there not be likewiſe arguments which, independent of revelation, may reaſonably produce the ſame hope with reſpect to *men*?

I am of opinion, however, that all appearances are againſt the exiſtence of any ſuch *natural* and *ordinary* means; and I will take this opportunity to add, that the ſcripture doctrine ſeems to be, that death is a diſtreſs in which our ſpecies has been involved by *extraordinary* cauſes; and from which we have obtained the hope of being ſaved by the moſt *extraordinary* means; I mean, by the interpoſition of *Jeſus Chriſt*; who by taking upon him our nature, and *humbling himſelf to death*, has acquired the power of *deſtroying death*; and is on this account ſtyled *the Saviour of the World*.

Reply,

Reply, p. 84. *Dr. Price ſhould diſtinguiſh, &c.*

With reſpect to what is here ſaid by Dr. Prieſtley, I muſt refer to what I have ſaid in p. 51, 84, 94; and what will be ſaid on the ſubject of the Doctrine of Neceſſity at the end of this correſpondence.

ANSWER.

Admitting, as I do, that a man is a material ſyſtem, ſo organized as to perceive and think, I muſt believe that the *materials* of which he is made had a pre-exiſtence, and, conſequently, thoſe of *the man Jeſus*. But this is certainly a very different *kind* of pre-exiſtence from that of thoſe who make Chriſt, or rather the principal part of him, to have pre-exiſted in an active ſtate, and to have afterwards entered into the embryo of the child of Mary. The belief that Chriſt was the maker of all things, the doctrine of a purgatory, and the worſhip of the dead, could never have ariſen from my hypotheſis; but theſe, and many other

corruptions of the chriſtian ſyſtem, aroſe but too eaſily from the other. As a chriſtian, (though it is not every body that, like Dr. Price, has the candour to allow me to be one) I think I have the greateſt reaſon to be jealous of this kind of pre-exiſtence, but none at all of the mere pre-exiſtence of the parts of which, men, animals, and even plants are compoſed.

I am happy to concur with Dr. Price in the bulk of what he ſays under this head. My idea of the ſtate of man between death and the reſurrection, is, in fact, no way materially different from his. It is a ſtate of *inaction* and *inſenſibility*, from which we ſhall not recover till the reſurrection; which, whether it will be brought about in a manner that may be ſaid to be *within the laws of nature extenſively conſidered*, or not, I cannot tell, and I am ſometimes inclined to one opinion, and ſometimes to the other. But though I ſhould decide for the former, the *evidence* for it is not ſo ſtrong; but that I think myſelf

ſelf juſtified in ſaying, " that our only hope " ſurviving the grave is derived from re- " velation." For *hope* implies a *preponderance* of the arguments in favour of a deſirable event, which preponderance of evidence *nature* does not appear to me to furniſh. What the amount of that evidence, in my opinion, is, I have ſtated in my *Inſtitutes of Natural and Revealed Religion*, Vol. I.

THE

PART II.

THE THIRD COMMUNICATION.

Containing Remarks by Dr. Price *on Dr.* Prieſtley's *Replies to the* ſecond *Communication with Dr.* Prieſtley's third *Replies.*

Obſervations on Dr. Prieſtley's *Reply*, p. 91.

MOST certainly the attraction of the earth, the ſun, the planets, &c. (See page 93.) not being the action of the *matter itſelf* that is ſaid to attract, ought to be aſcribed to the action of ſome other ſubſtance *within* the earth, the ſun and planets—Does not Dr. Prieſtley himſelf acknowledge this?—And does he not, by maintaining God to be the ſource of all the motions in the world, allow a *ſoul* to the *world*, though he will not to *men?*

ANSWER.

My argument goes to prove, that for the ſame reaſon that *man* has been ſuppoſed to

to have a ſoul, every *particular ſubſtance* to which any powers or properties are aſcribed, may have *a ſeparate ſoul* alſo.

Dr. Price.

Ibid. It is here ſaid, that *perception is the property of the brain.* I muſt again repeat, that the being that perceives is *one.* The brain conſiſts of *many* ſubſtances. It is not, therefore, the brain that perceives. —In p. 100, it is ſaid, *that though man is one thinking being, he may conſiſt of many unthinking beings*——Nothing can be more incomprehenſible to me than this. Is it not the ſame with ſaying, that *many* beings who want reaſon, may make *one* being who has reaſon? Or that a perfection may exiſt in the whole which does not exiſt in any of the parts? If this can be true, why may not the component parts of this material world, though all of them ſeparately unintelligent, make one ſupreme intelligent being?

Answer.

ANSWER.

I find no difficulty in conceiving that *compound ſubſtances* may have properties which their *component parts* cannot have. But it does not, therefore, follow, that all the conjoined parts of any *particular whole*, *e. g. the univerſe*, can have the peculiar attributes of the being that we call *God*; though they may have various properties that cannot be affirmed of any of the parts ſeparately taken.

DR. PRICE.

If I underſtand Dr. Prieſtley, he ſays in page 105, that the Deity has a common property with matter, becauſe, like matter, he has the power of attracting and repelling. But I have all along denied that matter has this power. According to Dr. Prieſtley himſelf, no being in nature *acts* but the Deity.

ANSWER.

If the ſuppoſed immaterial principle in man can really act upon the brain, it muſt neceſſarily

neceſſarily be in the manner that we term attraction or repulſion: becauſe theſe compriſe all the poſſible affections of body; and what may be predicated of a finite mind, in this reſpect, may alſo be predicated of the infinite mind.

DR. PRICE.

Does not Dr. Prieſtley's manner of arguing in p. 92, imply, that it is *poſſible* for a harpſichord to play on itſelf, and that there are circumſtances in which it would be philoſophical to draw this concluſion?

ANSWER.

My argument only proves, that, in certain *given*, but *impoſſible circumſtances*, there could be no *apparent ground* to conclude that the muſic came from any thing but the harpſichord itſelf.
What can we reaſon but from what we know?

DR. PRICE.

It is ſaid, in p. 95, that *if ideas are not things diſtinct from the mind, a mind with ideas,*

ideas, and a mind without ideas, would be the same——I maintain, that ideas are not distinct from the mind, but its conceptions; or not themselves *things*, but *notions* of things. How does it follow from hence, that a mind with or without ideas, is the same? It would seem that this follows much more from the contrary assertion.

ANSWER.

By a *thing* I mean whatever has properties. Now ideas have many properties, and a mind may have ideas, or be without them. According to Dr. Hartley's Theory, however, ideas are only *vibrations in the brain*, which corresponds to what Dr. Price might call *modifications of the mind*; so that on this subject our opinions are not materially, if at all, different.

PART

PART III.

Of the Doctrine of NECESSITY.

THE FIRST COMMUNICATION.

QUERIES, *by Dr.* Price.

1. DO we not neceſſarily aſcribe our volitions and actions to ourſelves?

2. Do we not determine ourſelves?

3. If we do not determine ourſelves, are we not deceived when we aſcribe our actions to ourſelves, and for that reaſon reckon ourſelves accountable for them?

ANSWER.

By the principle of aſſociation we do aſcribe our volitions and actions to ourſelves,

ſelves, and therefore we *neceſſarily* do ſo; but not in ſuch a manner as to exclude *motives* from being neceſſary to every determination; and if we ſuppoſe that our volitions and actions have no cauſe foreign to themſelves, that is, to our wills, we deceive ourſelves, as in various other wrong judgments.

By being *liable to puniſhment* for our actions, and *accountable* for them, I mean its being wiſe and good in the Divine Being to appoint that certain ſufferings ſhould follow certain actions, provided they be *voluntary*, though *neceſſary* ones; ſuch a connection of voluntary actions and ſufferings being calculated to produce the greateſt ultimate good.

Dr. Price.

Query 4. Does it follow from its being certain that we ſhall determine ourſelves in a particular way, that we do not in that inſtance determine ourſelves at all?

Answer.

ANSWER.

I conſider all *ſelf-determination*, properly ſo called, as an impoſſibility, implying, that ſuch a determination has, in fact, *no cauſe at all.* If the determination be *certain*, it muſt have a *certain or neceſſary cauſe*, ariſing from views of things preſent to the mind. For the illuſtration of this argument, I refer to my *Treatiſe of Neceſſity*, Sect. II. and to the *Letter to Dr. Horſeley.*

THE

THE SECOND COMMUNICATION,

On the Doctrine of NECESSITY.

Observations on Dr. Prieſtley's *Anſwers to the* Queries *in* p. 127 and 128, *by*

DR. PRICE.

IN order to bring the diſpute between me and Dr. Prieſtley as much to a point as poſſible, and to diſcover how far we *agreed* and *differed*, I ſent to him, after my firſt communication, on the nature of matter and ſpirit, and the immortality of the ſoul, the following Queries:

1. Can any thing act on another without being *preſent* to it?

2. Can, therefore, matter act on other matter without contact and impulſe?

3. Is

3. Is not the *ſoul*, or what I call *myſelf*, a *being*, or *ſubſtance*; and not merely a *mode* or *property*?

4. Does the ſoul loſe its exiſtence at death? Or am I, the ſubject of thought, reaſon, conſciouſneſs, &c. to be then annihilated?

5. If I am to loſe my exiſtence at death, will not my reſurrection be the reſurrection of a non-entity; and therefore impoſſible?

6. If I am not to loſe my exiſtence at death, may it not be properly ſaid that I am naturally immortal?

7. Do we not neceſſarily aſcribe our volitions or actions to ourſelves?

8. Do we not determine ourſelves?

9. If we do not determine ourſelves, are we not deceived when we aſcribe our actions to ourſelves; and, for that reaſon, reckon ourſelves accountable for them?

10. Does it follow from its being certain, in any inſtance, that we ſhall determine ourſelves in a particular way, that we do not, in that inſtance, determine ourſelves at all?

In anſwer to theſe queries, I wiſhed for no more than a ſimple affirmation, or negation; thinking it would be a matter of ſome curioſity, ſhould it appear that our minds were ſo differently framed, as that one of us would write an *yes* where the other would write a *no*. But I find that we are more nearly agreed than I expected. To the two firſt queries, Dr. Prieſtley has given no direct anſwer; but what he has ſaid in different places, ſeems to imply that he would agree with me in anſwering them in the negative. The 3d query he has in p. 86 and 87 anſwered, as I ſhould, in the affirmative; and the 4th and 6th in the negative. It appears, however, I think, that I had ſome reaſon for expecting that he would not grant the ſoul to be a *ſubſtance*; much leſs *one ſingle ſubſtance*. For the obvious inference from hence, is, that the

the ſoul cannot be, either any ſyſtem of ſubſtances, or the *organization* of any ſyſtem; and, therefore, not ſuch an aſſemblage of ſubſtances as the brain, or the organization of the brain.

To the 7th query it appears alſo, (ſee p. 127) that he anſwers in the affirmative, and yet that to the 8th he anſwers in the negative. In other words, he acknowledges that we neceſſarily aſcribe our determinations to ourſelves, but denies that we do *really* determine ourſelves; aſſerting in anſwer to the 9th query, that we are deceived when we imagine that our volitions are not produced by a cauſe foreign to our wills, and *on that account* believe ourſelves reſponſible for them; all ſelf-determination being impoſſible; and *accountableneſs* or liableneſs to puniſhment, being only the connexion which divine wiſdom, in order to produce the greateſt ultimate good, has eſtabliſhed between certain *voluntary* though *neceſſary* actions, and certain ſufferings.

In ſeveral paſſages in my *Review of Morals* (p. 301 to 304, and p. 349 to 352,

ſecond edit.) I have ſtated, in the beſt manner I am able, the queſtion concerning Liberty and Neceſſity. Dr. Prieſtley, in his ſecond volume (Sect. 5th and 6th) has replied to what I have ſaid in moſt of thoſe paſſages, with *candour* and *ability:* But I cannot ſay that I think he has done it with *ſucceſs*. He ſeems to miſunderſtand me, and, therefore, I will endeavour to give a more diſtinct account of my ideas on this ſubject. If they are wrong, I ſhall rejoice to ſee them proved to be ſo. If they are right, it will be eaſy to form a judgment of all Dr. Prieſtley's arguments in his ſecond volume, and to determine how far we *agree*, and *differ*.

After Dr. Clarke, I define Liberty to be "a power to act", or "a power of *ſelf-motion*, or ſelf-determination." On this definition I would make the following obſervations.

1. That liberty is common to all *animals*, as well as to all *reaſonable beings*; every animal, as ſuch, poſſeſſing powers of *ſelf-motion*, or *ſpontaneity*.

2. There

2. There are no *degrees* of liberty, becauſe there is no medium between *acting*, and *not acting*; or between poſſeſſing ſelf-motive powers, and not poſſeſſing them.

3. The liberty now defined is poſſible. One thing cannot move another, and that another *in infinitum*. Some where or other there muſt exiſt a power of beginning motion, that is, of *ſelf-motion*. This is no leſs certain than that ſince one thing cannot produce another, and that another *in infinitum*, there muſt be a *firſt* cauſe.

This argument ſeems to me deciſive, not only for the *poſſibility*, but the *actual exiſtence* of liberty. But farther. We are conſcious of it in ourſelves. I can ſay nothing to convince a perſon who will declare that he believes *his* determinations do not originate *with himſelf*, or that he has no power of moving or determining himſelf. It is another queſtion, whether he moves himſelf *with* or *without* a regard to *motives*. Aſſerting ſelf-determination with a regard to motives, (and no one ever yet aſſerted the contrary) is aſſerting *ſelf-*

determination, and, therefore, it is the ſame with aſſerting liberty. Dr. Prieſtley often ſays, that ſelf-determination implies an effect without a cauſe. But this cannotbe juſtly ſaid. Does it follow that becauſe I am *myſelf* the cauſe, there is no cauſe?

4. This definition implies, that in our volitions, or determinations, we are not *acted upon*. *Acting*, and being *acted upon*, are incompatible with one another. In whatever inſtances, therefore, it is truly ſaid of us that we *act*, in thoſe inſtances we cannot be *acted upon*. A being in receiving a change of its ſtate, from the exertion of an adequate force, is not an *agent*. Man therefore would not be an *agent*, were all his volitions derived from any force, or the effects of any mechanical cauſes. In this caſe it would be no more true that he ever acts, than it is true of a ball that it *acts* when *ſtruck* by another ball. But the main obſervation I would make is the following.

5. "The liberty now defined is con-
"ſiſtent with acting with a regard to mo-
"tives." This has been already intimated; but

but it is neceſſary it ſhould be particularly attended to and explained.

Suppoſing a power of ſelf-determination to exiſt, it is by no means neceſſary that it ſhould be exerted without a regard to any end or rule. On the contrary, it can never be exerted without ſome view or deſign. Whoever acts, means to do ſomewhat. This is true of the loweſt reptile, as well as of the wiſeſt man. The power of determining ourſelves, by the very nature of it, wants an *end* and *rule* to guide it; and no probability, or certainty, of its being exerted agreeably to a rule, can have the leaſt tendency to infringe or diminiſh it. All that ſhould be avoided here, is, the intolerable abſurdity of making our reaſons and ends in acting the phyſical *cauſes* or *efficients* of action. This is the ſame with aſcribing the action of walking, not to the feet (or the power which moves the feet) but to the eye, which only *ſees the way*. The perception of a reaſon for acting, or the judgment of the underſtanding, is no more than ſeeing the way. It is the eye of the mind,

mind, which informs and directs; and whatever *certainty* there may be that a particular determination will follow, such determination will be the *self-determination* of the mind; and not any change of its state stamped upon it, over which it has no power, and in receiving which, instead of being an *agent*, it is merely a *passive subject* of agency.

In a word. There is a distinction here of the last importance, which must never be overlooked. I mean the distinction so much insisted on by Dr. Clarke, between the *operation* of *physical causes*, and the *influence* of *moral reasons*. The views or ideas of beings may be the *account* or *occasions* of their acting; but it is a contradiction to make them the *mechanical efficients* of their actions. And yet I suspect that Dr. Priestley will avow this to be his opinion. Ideas he makes to be divisible and extended. He ascribes an impulsive force to them: And asserts that they act by mechanical laws on the mind, as one material substance acts upon another. See his *Replies*, p. 52, 85, 95; and the *Disquisitions*, p. 38.

In

In order better to explain the diſtinction I have mentioned, I will beg leave to give an account of the following particulars, in which it appears to me that *phyſical* and *moral* cauſes differ.

1. The one are *beings*; the others are only the *views* of beings.

2. The one always *do*, and the other *may* produce a certainty of event. But the certainties in theſe two caſes differ eſſentially. It is, for inſtance, *certain* that a man dragged along like a piece of timber, will follow the ſuperior force that acts upon him. It may be alſo *certain*, that a man invited by the hope of a reward, will follow a guide. But who ſees not that theſe certainties, having different foundations, are of a totally different nature? In both caſes the man might in common ſpeech be ſaid to *follow*; but his following in the one caſe, however certain in event, would be *his own* agency: In the other caſe, it would be the agency of *another*. In the one caſe, he would really *follow*: But in the other caſe, being dragged, he could not properly be ſaid

ſaid to *follow*. In the one caſe, ſuperior power moves him: In the other, he moves himſelf. In ſhort; to aſcribe a neceſſary and phyſical efficiency to motives, is (as Dr. Clarke has obſerved) the ſame with ſaying, that *an abſtract notion can ſtrike a ball*.

3. The certainty of event ariſing from the operation of *phyſical* cauſes is always equal and invariable, but the certainty of event ariſing from *moral* cauſes, that is, from the views and perceptions of beings, admits of an infinite variety of degrees; and ſometimes paſſes into *probability* and *contingency*.

Suppoſing contrary reaſons equally balanced in the mind, it may be *uncertain* how a being will act. If, for inſtance, a temptation to an act of wickedneſs comes in the way of a man whoſe love of virtue is nearly equal to the ſtrength of his paſſions, it may be doubtful which way he will determine. If his love of virtue exceeds the influence of paſſion, there will be a *probability* of his acting virtuouſly, proportioned

portioned to the degree in which the love of virtue prevails within him: And it may be ſo prevalent as to make it *certain* that he will always follow his perceptions of virtue.

4. In the operation of phyſical cauſes, it is always implied that there is not in any ſenſe a power to produce, or a poſſibility of producing any other effect than that which is produced; but the contrary is true of effects dependent on the wills, and occaſioned by the views of free agents. A benevolent man will *certainly* relieve miſery when it falls in his way; but he has the *power* of not relieving it. On the contrary, a ſtone thrown from the hand *muſt* move. There is no ſenſe in which it can be ſaid, that it poſſeſſes the power of not moving in the preciſe direction in which it is thrown. The reaſon of this is, that the benevolent man *acts*: The ſtone only *ſuffers*. Were the determination to give relief in the former caſe, and the motions of the ſtone in the latter, both alike *ſufferances*, (if I may ſo ſpeak) or both effects of a force which could not be reſiſted, they would

would be both alike void of all merit A man at the bottom of St. Paul's *will* not jump *up:* A man at the top *will* not jump *down*. Both events may be *certain*. But a man at the bottom *cannot* jump up: A man at the top *can* jump down. And if in common ſpeech we ſhould ſay in the latter caſe, that a man at the top *cannot* jump down, we ſhould ſpeak figuratively and improperly; meaning only that he certainly *will* not. Who can deny, even with reſpect to the Supreme Deity, that, however certain it may be that he will not make his creation miſerable, he has the power to do it? It is, indeed, on this power that all our notions of moral excellence in the actions of beings depend. Were the beneficence of a being no more *his* action, or *ſelf-determination*, than the falling of rain is the action, or ſelf-determination, of rain, it would not be the object of moral approbation; or the ground of eſteem and gratitude. (See *Review of Morals*, p. 410 to p. 415. *ſecond edit.*) This leads me to obſerve, laſtly,

6. That

6. That the *caſuality* implied in the views and diſpoſitions of beings is entirely conſiſtent with moral obligation, and reſponſibility: But that all effects brought about by mechanical laws are inconſiſtent with them. This appears ſufficiently from the preceding obſervations.

Upon the whole. The queſtion concerning Liberty is not, "Whether the "views or ideas of beings *influence* their "actions," but "what the *nature* of that "*influence* is." That it is not any kind of *mechanical* or *phyſical* efficiency, appears to me palpably evident. But if I am miſtaken in this opinion; and if indeed, as Dr. Prieſtley maintains, man has no other liberty in following motives than water has in running down hill, or than the arms of a ſcale preſt by weights, have in riſing and falling: If, I ſay, this is the truth, man never *acts*. It is folly to applaud or reproach ourſelves for our conduct; and there is an end of all moral obligation and accountableneſs—Dr. Prieſtley does not acknowledge theſe conſequences. I think them clear to ſuch a degree

degree as not to admit of proper proof. The beſt that can be done in this caſe is to ſtate the queſtion diſtinctly and intelligibly, and leave the deciſion to common ſenſe.

In reviewing theſe papers I have found, that my deſire to explain myſelf fully has led me to a redundancy of expreſſion and many repetitions. Dr. Prieſtley will, I hope, excuſe this. I refer myſelf to his candour, and chuſe now to withdraw from this controverſy——His firſt volume concludes with ſome obſervations in defence of the *Socinian* ſcheme of chriſtianity. I will not enter into any debate with him on this ſubject. My opinion is, that the Socinian ſcheme degrades chriſtianity, and is by no means reconcileable to the Scriptures. But I know that ſome of the beſt men and wiſeſt chriſtians have adopted it. Among theſe I reckon Dr. *Prieſtley*, Mr. *Lindſey*, and Dr. *Jebb*; and ſhould it, contrary to my apprehenſions, be the true chriſtian doctrine, I wiſh them all poſſible ſucceſs in propagating it.

ANSWER.

ANSWER.

On the ſubject of *Neceſſity* I have nothing material to add to what is contained in the ſecond volume of my work, and I cannot help thinking, that if what I have there advanced be attended to, it will be ſufficient to obviate the objections here urged by Dr. Price. But as he has been ſo obliging as to give his ideas with great frankneſs, and diſtinctneſs, on the ſubject, and I conceive this to be the only difference of real conſequence between us, I ſhall ſo far repeat the ſubſtance of what I have ſaid before, as may be neceſſary to reply with equal explicitneſs to what he has here obſerved.

If *ſelf-motion*, or *ſelf-determination*, properly ſo called, be eſſential to liberty, I muſt deny that man is poſſeſſed of it; and if this, and nothing elſe, muſt be called *agency*, I muſt deny that, *in this ſenſe*, man is an agent; becauſe every human volition is invariably directed by the circumſtances in which a man is, and what we

call *motives*. It appears to me that we have no more reaſon, *from fact and obſervation*, to conclude that a man can *move himſelf*, that is, that he can *will without motives*, than that a ſtone can move itſelf. And if the will is as invariably influenced by motives as the ſtone is influenced by gravity, it may juſt as well be ſaid that the ſtone moves itſelf, though always according to the laws of gravity, as that the will, or the mind, moves itſelf, though always according to the motives; and whether theſe motives be called the *moral* or the *phyſical* cauſes of our volitions, is of no ſort of ſignification; becauſe they are the *only* and the *neceſſary* cauſes, juſt as much as gravity is the only and neceſſary cauſe of the motion of the ſtone. Let the mind act contrary to motives, or the ſtone move contrary to the laws of gravity, and I ſhall then, but not before, believe that they are *not* the only and neceſſary cauſes.

" The perception of reaſons or motives " Dr. Price calls the eye of the mind, " which informs and directs;" but if the determination

determination of the mind, which follows upon it, be invariably *according to* that perception, I muſt conclude that the nature of the mind is ſuch, as that it *could not* act otherwiſe, and therefore that it has no ſelf-determination properly ſo called. A power manifeſted by no effects, muſt be conſidered as merely imaginary, it being from *effects* alone that we arrive at the knowledge of *cauſes*.

Judging from facts, I muſt conclude that a proper *ſelf-motion* can no more belong to man than *ſelf-exiſtence*. Indeed, we have no more idea of the nature of ſelf-motion than we have of ſelf-exiſtence. Motion and exiſtence cannot be eternally derived, and *actual exiſtence* and *actual motion*, neceſſarily lead us to ſome *ſelf-exiſting*, and conſequently *ſelf-moving being*. Though the idea be ever ſo incomprehenſible, and confounding to our faculties, we muſt acquieſce in it; for to ſtop *ſhort* of this, or go *beyond* it, is equally impoſſible.

The difference that Dr. Price and others make between *moral* and *phyſical* cauſes and

effects, appears to me to be that which ſubſiſts between *voluntary* and *involuntary* cauſes and effects; and this is indeed a moſt important difference. Where involuntary motions are concerned, as in the caſe of a man dragged by force, it is abſurd to uſe any reaſoning or expoſtulation, or to apply rewards or puniſhments becauſe they can have *no effect*; but where voluntary motions are concerned, as in the caſe of a man who is at liberty to go where he pleaſes, and chuſe what company he pleaſes, &c. reaſoning and expoſtulation, rewards and puniſhments, have the greateſt *propriety*, becauſe the greateſt *effect*; for they are applied to, and influence or move the will, as much as external force moves the body.

It is on this circumſtance, viz. *the influence of motives on the will*, that the whole of *moral diſcipline* depends; ſo that if the will of man were ſo formed, as that motives ſhould have no influence upon it, he could not be the ſubject of moral government; becauſe the hope of reward, and the fear of puniſhment, operate in no other manner than

than as *motives applied to the will.* And ſince the whole of moral government depends upon the diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments, what has been called *liberty*, or a power of acting independently of motives, is ſo far from being the only foundation of moral government, that it is abſolutely inconſiſtent with it, as I have ſhewn at large in my ſecond volume.

The ideas belonging to the terms *accountableneſs*, *praiſe and blame*, *merit and demerit*, all relate to the buſineſs of moral diſcipline, and therefore neceſſarily imply that men are influenced by motives, and act from *fixed principles*, and *character*; though, on account of our not comprehending the doctrine of *cauſes*, and ſtopping where we ought not, we are generally under ſome miſtake and miſconception with reſpect to them. Therefore, to guard againſt all miſtake, it may be more adviſable that, in treating the ſubject philoſophically, thoſe words be diſuſed. Every thing that really correſponds to them may be clearly expreſſed in different language,

and all the *rules of diſcipline*, every thing in *practice*, on the part both of the *governor* and the *governed*, will ſtand juſt as before. To make my meaning intelligible, and ſhow that I do not advance this at random, I ſhall here endeavour to expreſs in a ſtrict and philoſophical manner the full import of all the terms abovementioned.

In common ſpeech we ſay that we are *accountable creatures*, and *juſtly liable to rewards and puniſhments* for our conduct. The philoſopher ſays, that *juſtice* ought to be called *propriety* or *uſefulneſs*, or a rule of conduct adapted to anſwer a good purpoſe, which in this caſe is the good of thoſe who are the ſubjects of government or diſcipline; and therefore, inſtead of ſaying, We are *juſtly liable to rewards or puniſhments*, he ſays, We are beings of ſuch a conſtitution, that to make us happy upon our obſervance of certain laws, and to make us ſuffer in conſequence of our tranſgreſſing thoſe laws, will have a good effect with reſpect both to our own future conduct and that of others; *i. e.* tending to our own melioration,

melioration, and operating to the melioration of others.

In common language we ſay a man is *praiſe-worthy*, and has *merit*. The philoſopher ſays, that the man has acted from, or been influenced by good principles, or ſuch principles as will make a man happy in himſelf, and uſeful to others; that he is therefore a proper object of complacency, and fit to be made happy; that is, the *general happineſs* will be promoted by making him happy.

So alſo when, in common language, a man is ſaid to be *blame-worthy* and to have *demerit*, the philoſopher ſays, that he has acted from, or been influenced by bad principles, or ſuch as will make a man unhappy in himſelf, and hurtful to others; that he is therefore a proper ſubject of averſion, and is fit to be made unhappy; that is, the making him unhappy will tend to promote the general happineſs.

Upon the whole, therefore, though the vulgar and philoſophers uſe different lan-

guage, they would ſee reaſon to *act* in the ſame manner. The governors will rule voluntary agents by means of rewards and puniſhments, and the governed, being voluntary agents, will be influenced by the apprehenſion of them. It is conſequently a matter of indifference in whatever language we deſcribe actions and characters. If the common language be in ſome reſpects inconſiſtent with the doctrine of neceſſity, it is ſtill more inconſiſtent with the doctrine of liberty, or the notion of our being capable of determining without regard to motives.

For the *effect* of the more exalted views of the philoſophical neceſſarian, (as unſpeakably ſuperior to the more imperfect views of the vulgar) I refer to what I have ſaid upon that ſubject in my ſecond volume. We are not, however, to expect that neceſſarians ſhould univerſally, and to the eye of the world, be better than other men. Even chriſtianity does not univerſally appear to this advantage in the lives of its profeſſors. But of this I am perſuaded, that

that if any man had ſtrength of mind fully to comprehend the doctrine of neceſſity, and to keep his mind at all times under the influence of it, he would be much ſuperior to the *mere chriſtian*, though not perhaps as much ſo as the chriſtian may be to the *mere virtuous heathen*.

Before I conclude this ſubject, I cannot help noticing what appears to me to be an inconſiſtency in Dr. Price's account of his view of it. He ſays, p. 137, "The "power of ſelf-determination can never "be exerted without ſome view, or de- "ſign," *i. e.* the will cannot be determined without motives, and "The power "of determining ourſelves, by the very na- "ture of it, wants an end, and rule, to "guide it." From this I ſhould infer, that the end and rule by which the will was guided being given, the determination would be certain and invariable; whereas, in another place, p. 139. he ſays, that "moral cauſes only *may* produce a cer- "tainty; and even that the certainty of "an event ariſing from moral cauſes, that is,

"from

" from the views and perceptions of things, " admits of an infinite variety of degrees, " and ſometimes paſſes into probability " and contingence," p. 140. Alſo that " in " the operation of moral cauſes there is a " poſſibility of producing any other ef- " fect than that which is produced."

Now that the will ſhould, by the very nature of it, want an end and rule to guide it, and yet be capable of determining not only *without*, but *contrary* to that rule, is, I think, inconſiſtent; and yet upon this it is that the whole controverſy hinges. If the will be always determined according to motives (whether it be alledged to be *by itſelf*, or *by the motives*) the determination is certain and invariable, which is all that I mean by *neceſſary*; whereas if it may determine *contrary to motives*, it is *contingent*, and uncertain; which I maintain to be a thing as impoſſible as that, in any caſe whatever, an effect ſhould ariſe without a cauſe; and alſo to be a thing that is, in its nature, incapable of being the object of *fore-knowledge*.

ledge. And yet, if there be any truth in the ſcriptures, the Divine Being certainly foreſees every determination of the mind of man.

THE THIRD COMMUNICATION.

Of the Doctrine of NECESSITY.

DR. PRICE.

ON the ſubject of neceſſity I will only ſay farther, that notwithſtanding what Dr. Prieſtley has ſaid in his laſt reply, p. 145, &c. I remain of opinion that "*Self*-determination and certainty of determination are perfectly conſiſtent."—"That a ſelf-determining power which is under no influence from motives, or which deſtroys the uſe of diſcipline and the ſuperintendency of providence, has never been contended for, or meant by any advocates for liberty."—And, that I am by no means ſenſible of any inconſiſtency between

between aſſerting that every being who acts at all muſt act for ſome end, and with ſome view; and aſſerting, that a being may have the power of determining his choice to any one of different ends, and that when a regard to different ends is equal, *contingency* of event takes place.——The controverſy, however, does not according to my views of it, hinge on the conſideration laſt mentioned; but merely on this, whether man is a proper agent, or has a ſelf-determining power, or not. Beings may have a ſelf-determining power, as, according to Dr. Prieſtley's conceſſion, the deity has; and yet they may be always guided, as the deity certainly, is by a rule or end.—I know Dr. Prieſtley will not allow me to argue thus from the deity to inferior beings. But this method of arguing appears to me fair; and, in the preſent caſe, it ſeems deciſive. It is only the *manner* in which God poſſeſſes his attributes that is incommunicable. We may juſtly ſay, God poſſeſſes power. Therefore, he may *give* power. But we cannot, without a contradiction, ſay, God is ſelf-exiſtent: Therefore, he may

may give ſelf-exiſtence; for this would be to ſay, that he can make a *derived* being, *underived*.——Nor can we ſay, God poſſeſſes infinite power; therefore, he can communicate *infinite* power; for this would be to ſay, that he can make a being, who, as a creature, muſt be finite and dependent, infinite and independent.——It might be ſhewn, that creation out of nothing implies infinite power, and therefore cannot be communicated.

Dr. Prieſtley will, I hope, allow me to add the following queries.

Is is not more honourable to the deity to conceive of him, as the parent, guide, governor, and judge of free beings formed after his own image, with powers of reaſon and ſelf-determination, than to conceive of him, as the former and conductor of a ſyſtem of conſcious machinery, or the mover and controuler of an univerſe of puppets?

Can Dr. Prieſtley believe eaſily, that in all thoſe crimes which men charge *themſelves*

themſelves with, and reproach *themſelves* for, God is the agent; and that (ſpeaking philoſophically) *they*, in ſuch inſtances, are no more *agents*, than a *ſword* is an agent when employed to commit murder?

Is it ſurpriſing that few poſſeſs ſtrength of mind enough to avoid ſtarting at ſuch concluſions?—I am, however, ready to own the weight of ſome of the obſervations Dr. Prieſtley has made to explain and ſoften them. And though I think, that were they commonly received, they would be dreadfully abuſed; yet I doubt not, but Dr. Prieſtley may be, as he ſays he is, a better man for believing them.

But I muſt not go on. Were I to write all that offers itſelf, I ſhould fall into numberleſs tautologies; and there would be no end of this controverſy.

ANSWER.

I know very well that Dr. Price, and other advocates for what is called philoſophical free-will, do not *think* that a ſelf-determining

determining power deſtroys the uſe of diſcipline, and but I contend that it neceſſarily does ſo, I alſo deny that, ſtrictly ſpeaking, there can be any ſuch thing as *contingency*, it always implying that there is *an effect without a cauſe*; and therefore that a determination of the mind in circumſtances in which a regard to different objects is equal, is an impoſſibility. This muſt be univerſal, and conſequently reſpect the ſupreme mind as well as others. Thoſe who ſpeak with the greateſt reverence of the Divine Being, always ſuppoſe that he never acts but for ſome *end*, and that the beſt, *i. e.* he acts according to ſome invariable *rule*. But we ſoon loſe ourſelves in ſpeculation concerning the *firſt cauſe*.

In anſwer to the *Queries*, I reply, in general, that I cannot conceive any thing honourable to the deity, becauſe the thing is *not poſſible in itſelf*, and if poſſible, not at all *beneficial to man*, in the ſuppoſition of his having endued us with what is called *ſelf-determination*. And though the doctrine of neceſſity may, like every thing the

the moſt true and ſublime, be exhibited in a ridiculous light, it is the only ſyſtem that is even *poſſible*; and in my opinion it is in the higheſt degree *honourable*, both to the univerſal parent, and his offspring; the juſt contemplation of it being eminently improving to the mind, and leading to the practice of every thing great and excellent, as I think I have ſhewn in my ſecond volume.

It certainly ſounds harſh to vulgar ears, to ſay that "in all thoſe crimes that men "charge themſelves with, and reproach "themſelves for, God is the agent; and "that, in ſuch caſes, they are in reality "no more *agents*, than a ſword is an agent "when employed to commit a murder." It does require *ſtrength of mind* not to ſtartle at ſuch a concluſion; but then it requires nothing but ſtrength of mind; *i. e.* ſuch a view of things as ſhall carry us beyond *firſt* and *fallacious appearances*. And it requires, I think, but a ſmall degree of ſagacity to perceive that, whatever there is ſhocking in theſe concluſions, it is actually

found, and under a very ſlight cover, in Dr. Price's own principles; ſince, I believe, he admits that God foreſees all the crimes that men would commit, and yet made man; that he ſtill has it in his power, in various ways, to prevent the commiſſion of crimes, and yet does not chuſe to do it. If Dr. Price will anſwer a queſtion that is frequently put by children, viz. "Papa, Why does not God "kill the Devil?" I will undertake to tell him why God *made* the Devil. Let him tell me why God *permits* vice, and I will tell him why he *appoints* it.

However, the very language that Dr. Price uſes to make the doctrine of neceſſity appear horrid and frightful, is the very language of the ſcriptures, in which wicked men are expreſsly called *God's ſword*, and are ſaid, in a great variety of phraſes, to do *all his pleaſure*; though, in a different ſenſe, the very contrary expreſſions occur. The reply that Paul makes to what might be objected to his ſaying, *God has mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will*

will he hardeneth, Rom. 9, &c. viz. *Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault, for who has resisted his will*, savours more of the ideas of a necessarian, than I suspect, the abettors of the contrary doctrine can well bear; *Nay but? O man, who art thou that replieſt against God? Shall the thing formed say unto him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?*

I do not say it is impossible to explain this passage of scripture in a manner consistent with Dr. Price's opinions; but I will say that, with less latitude of interpretation, I will undertake to explain every text that can be produced in favour of the Arian hypothesis, in a manner consistent with Socinianism.

Since, upon all schemes, it is a fact, that vice, as well other evils, *does* and *must* exist, at least for a time; is it not more honourable to the universal creator, and supreme

ruler, to ſuppoſe that he *intended* it, as an inſtrument of virtue and happineſs, rather than that, though he by no means choſe it (as a thing that neceſſarily thwarted his views) it was not in his power to foreſee or prevent it; but that he is content to make the beſt he can of it when it does happen, interpoſing from time to time to *palliate* matters, as *unforeſeen emergencies* require. This, if it be poſſible in itſelf, is what we muſt acquieſce in, if we reject the doctrine of neceſſity. There is no other alternative.

I think it hardly poſſible that a perſon who believes in *contingencies* can have a ſteady faith in the doctrine of *divine preſcience*; and to diveſt the Divine Being of this attribute, which in the ſcriptures he claims as his diſtinguiſhing prerogative, is ſuch a *leſſening* and a *degradation* of God, reſpecting him too in his moſt important capacity, or that in which we are moſt concerned, viz. as *governor of the univerſe*, that every thing that Dr. Price can repre-

ſent

ſent as the conſequence of the doctrine of neceſſity appears to me as nothing in compariſon with it.

But, as Dr. Price is fully ſenſible, we ſee things in very different lights; and it is happy for us that, in general, every light in which we view *our own principles* is more or leſs favourable to virtue. The Papiſt, I doubt not, thinks his mind powerfully and advantageouſly impreſſed with the idea of the ſacramental elements being *the real body and blood of Chriſt*; the Trinitarian with the notion of *the ſupreme God being incarnate*, and the Arian with his opinion, that it was the *maker and governor of the world that died upon the croſs*; and numbers will ſay that chriſtianity is of no value, and with Mr. Venn, that they would *burn their bibles*, if theſe ſtrange doctrines be not contained in them.

Dr. Price, however, does not *feel* that chriſtianity is degraded *in his apprehenſion*, by conſidering theſe opinions as abſurd, or ill founded, though he

does think it degraded by the Socinian hypothesis. Neither do I think christianity degraded, but, on the contrary, I think its effect upon the mind is much improved, and the wisdom and power of God more conspicuous, on the scheme which supposes that our Saviour was a *mere man, in all things like unto his brethren*; and that as by a *mere man came death*, so *by a mere man*, also, *comes the resurrection of the dead*. I chearfully conclude with Dr. Price in saying, in his *letter* subjoined to the *Introduction*, "that our agreement in "expecting this awful period, makes it "of little consequence in what we dif-"fer."

QUERIES *addressed to* DR. PRICE.

Of the penetrability of matter.

1. Is it not a fact, that *resistance* is often occasioned not by the contact of solid matter, but by a *power of repulsion* acting at a distance from the supposed substance, as in electricity, magnetism, optics, &c.?

2. What

2. What is the effect of ſuppoſed *contact*, but another reſiſtance?

3. Is it not even certain, that this ſuppoſed contact cannot be *real contact*, ſince the particles that compoſe the moſt compact bodies, being capable of being brought nearer together by cold, appear not actually to touch one another?

4. Since, therefore, there cannot be any evidence of impenetrability, but what reſults from the conſideration of *contact*, and there is no *evidence* of any real contact, does not the doctrine of impenetrability ſtand altogether unſupported by any *fact*; and therefore muſt it not be unphiloſophical to admit that it is any property of matter?

Of the SOUL.

1. If matter be not impenetrable, Dr. Price ſeems (if I may judge from what he ſays in page 56,) not unwilling to admit that it may be endued with the properties of perception and thought. Since, therefore, *the uniform compoſition of the*

whole man will be gained by the preceding hypotheſis, is it not a conſideration in favour of it? It can only be a ſuppoſed *neceſſity* that could lead any perſon to adopt the hypotheſis of *two ſubſtances* in the compoſition of *one being*, eſpecially two ſubſtances ſo exceedingly heterogeneous as *matter* and *ſpirit* are defined to be.

2. Admitting matter to have the property of impenetrability, is there any reaſon to believe that the powers of perception and thought may not be ſuperadded to it, but that we cannot *conceive* any connection between the different properties of impenetrability and thought, or any relation they can bear to each other?

3. Have we, in reality, any idea of a connection between the property of perception, and extended ſubſtance, that is *not impenetrable?*

4. If not, is it not more philoſophical to ſuppoſe that the property of perception *may* be imparted to ſuch a ſubſtance as the body; it being certainly unphiloſophical to

ſuppoſe

ſuppoſe that man conſiſts of *two kinds of ſubſtance*, when all the known properties and powers of man *may* belong to *one ſubſtance*.

5. If the ſoul of man be an extended ſubſtance, it is certainly in idea, and why may it not *in fact*, be as diſcerptible as matter. If ſo, are all the parts into which it may be divided, thinking and conſcious beings? If not, why may not a material being, poſſeſſed of thought, conſiſt of material ſubſtances, not poſſeſſed of thought, as well as a ſpiritual one?

6. Whether is it more probable that God can endue organized matter with a capacity of thinking, or that an immaterial ſubſtance, poſſeſſed of that property, can be ſo dependent upon the body, as not to be capable of having a perception without it, ſo that even its peculiar power of *ſelf-motion* cannot be exerted but in conjunction with the body?

7. If there can be any ſuch thing as a proper connection between material and imma-

immaterial ſubſtances, muſt not the former neceſſarily, according to the common hypotheſis, impede the motions of the latter?

8. Is there, therefore, any proper medium between the hypotheſis which makes man *wholly material*, and that which makes the body a clog upon the ſoul, and conſequently the death of the body the freedom of the ſoul?

9. They who maintain the Arian hypotheſis, believe that an immaterial ſpirit, ſimilar to the human ſoul, is capable of the greateſt exertions in a ſtate independent of any connection with body, at leaſt ſuch bodies as ours. They alſo ſuppoſe that between the death and the reſurrection of our Lord, he poſſeſſed, and exerted, his original powers. Is it not then inconſonant to this ſyſtem, to ſuppoſe that the human ſoul, which to all appearance is influenced by bodily affections exactly like the embodied ſoul of Chriſt, ſhould be incapable of all ſenſation or action during the ſleep or death of the body?

10. Con-

10. Consequently, does not every argument that proves the dependence of the soul on the body favour the Socinian hypothesis, by making it probable, that the soul of Christ was equally dependent upon his body, and therefore was incapable of exertion *before* as well as *after* its union to it? In other words, that Christ had no proper existence before his birth?

Of the Doctrine of Necessity.

1. If any mental determination, or volition, be preceded by nothing, either within the mind itself, or external to it, but what might have existed without being followed by that determination, in what does that determination differ from *an effect without a cause?*

2. Admitting the possibility of such a determination, or a determination without any previous motive, with what propriety can it be the subject of praise or blame, there being no *principle*, or *design* (which would come under the denomination of *motive)* from which the determination proceeded?

ceeded? How then can ſuch a power of ſelf determination make us *accountable creatures*, or the proper objects of rewards and puniſhments?

3. If certain definite determinations of mind be always preceded by certain definite motives, or ſituations of mind, and the ſame definite motives be always followed by the ſame determinations, may not the determinations be properly called *neceſſary*; neceſſity ſignifying nothing more than the *cauſe of conſtancy?*

4. If certain determinations always follow certain ſtates of mind, will it not follow, whether theſe determinations be called neceſſary, or not, that no determination could have been *intended*, or *expected*, by the author of all things, to have been otherwiſe than it *has been*, *is*, or *is to be?* Since, in this caſe, they could not have been otherwiſe without a miracle.

5. If any event be properly *contingent*, *i. e.* if the determination does not depend upon the previous ſtate of mind, is it poſſible that the moſt perfect knowledge of that

that mind, and of all the ſtates of it, can enable a perſon to tell what the determination will be? In other words, is a contingent event the object of fore-knowledge, even to the deity himſelf?

Dr. Price.

In anſwer to Dr. Prieſtley's 4th query, (page 172,) and alſo to what he ſays in page 161, 162, &c. I readily admit that all events are ſuch as the power of God (acting under the direction of infinite wiſdom and goodneſs) either *cauſes* them to be, or *permits* them to be. I rejoice in this as the moſt agreeable and important of all truths: But I by no means think with Dr. Prieſtley, that there is no difference between it, and God's *producing* all events. I ſcarcely think he would conclude thus in other caſes. Are there not many inſtances in which Dr. Prieſtley would think it hard to be charged with *doing* what he only foreſees, and for the beſt reaſons, thinks fit not to *hinder?*

Active and ſelf-directing powers are the foundation of all morality; all dignity of nature

nature and character; and the greateſt poſſible happineſs. It was, therefore, neceſſary ſuch powers ſhould be communicated; and being communicated, it was equally neceſſary that ſcope, within certain limits, ſhould be allowed for the exerciſe of them. Is God's *permitting* beings, in the uſe of ſuch powers, to act wickedly, the ſame with being himſelf the agent in their wickedneſs? Or can it be reaſonable to ſay, that he *appoints* what cannot be done without breaking his laws, contradicting his will, and *abuſing* the powers he has given?

Were I to be aſked ſuch a queſtion as that which Dr. Prieſtley (in page 162,) puts into the mouth of a child—"Why God made the Devil?" or, "Why God does not con-"fine or kill the Devil?" I ſhould probably anſwer, that God made the Devil good, but that he made himſelf a Devil; and that a period is near when the Devil and all wicked beings will be deſtroyed; but that, in the mean time, the miſchief they do is not prevented by confining them, or taking away their power, for the

the ſame reaſon that a wiſe government does not prevent crimes by ſhutting men up in their houſes, or that a parent does not prevent his children from doing wrong by tying up their hands and feet.—— I would, in ſhort, lead the child to underſtand if poſſible, that to prevent wickedneſs by denying a ſphere of agency to beings, would be to prevent one evil by producing a greater.

The anſwer I would give to moſt of Dr. Prieſtley's other queries, may be eaſily collected from my former replies.

With reſpect to the laſt of them in particular, I cannot help obſerving, that it implies what I can by no means admit, that free agency is inconſiſtent with a dependence of our determinations on the ſtate of our minds, and with a certainty of event. I think I have proved that our determinations may be *ſelf*-determinations, and yet this be true of them.

The fore-knowledge of a *contingent* event carrying the appearance of a contradiction, is

is indeed a difficulty; and I do not pretend to be capable of removing it.

ANSWER.

I ſtill cannot ſee any difference, with reſpect to *criminality*, between *doing*, and *permitting* what may be prevented, even with reſpect to men, and much leſs with reſpect to the deity; and I ſhould *not* think it hard to be charged with what I thought proper not to hinder. If I had, as Dr. Price ſays, *the beſt reaſons for it*, they would ſufficiently juſtify me, and in both caſes alike.

But men have only an imperfect control upon each other, and the exertion of it is often difficult, or at leaſt inconvenient. We, therefore, make an allowance with reſpect to men, for which there is no reaſon with reſpect to God. He diſtinctly foreſees every action of a man's life, and all the *actual conſequences* of it. If, therefore, he did not think any particular man, and his conduct, proper for his plan of creation and providence, he certainly would not

not have introduced him into being at all.

All that Dr. Price obſerves with reſpect to what he calls *active* and *ſelf directing powers*, I entirely approve; but I think the ſame concluſions will follow on the ſuppoſition of man and ſuperior beings, having what we call mere *voluntary powers*, liable to be influenced by the motives to which they will be expoſed, in the circumſtances in which the Divine Being thinks proper to place them. It is this that I call *the foundation of morality*; and not to have given this power, or, by miraculous interpoſition, to controul it, would either be, as Dr. Price ſays, *to prevent ſmaller evils by producing greater*, or not to produce the greateſt poſſible good. His reply to the child is the ſame that I make, but the queſtion has a meaning to which the capacity of a child does not extend.

If Dr. Price admits, as, in this, place, he ſeems to do, that our determinations *certainly* depend upon the ſtate of our minds,

I ſhall have no objection to his calling us *free agents*. I believe we are ſo, in the popular ſenſe of the words, and I think it perfectly conſiſtent with all the *neceſſity* that I aſcribe to man. When men ſay that they are *free*, they have no idea of any thing farther than a freedom from the control of others, or what may be called *external force*, or cauſes of action not ariſing within themſelves. *Internal cauſes* are never ſo much as thought of, and much leſs expreſsly excluded, when they ſpeak of this moſt perfect liberty.

LETTERS

TO

DR. KENRICK,

MR. JOHN WHITEHEAD,

AND

DR. HORSELEY.

To Dr. KENRICK.

SIR,

YOU and I differ ſo very little with reſpect to any thing of importance in my *Diſquiſitions*, &c. that notwithſtanding the obligation I have laid myſelf under, I ſhould hardly have thought it neceſſary to addreſs you on the ſubject; and I freely acknowledge, that it is rather your importunity, than any thing elſe, that has induced me to do it.

We equally maintain that matter is not that impenetrable ſtuff that it has been imagined to be, that man is an homogeneous being, the ſentient principle not reſiding in a ſubſtance diſtinct from the body, but being the reſult of organization; and, as far as I can perceive, you likewiſe

agree with me in holding the doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity.

Of what then is it that you complain; It ſeems to be, principally, that I do not acknowledge to have learned my doctrine in your ſchool, and that the manner in which I explain it is not perfectly conſiſtent, or juſt. You ſay, *Review* for 1778, p. 48, "I cannot eaſily abſolve you from the cen-"ſure of unpardonable neglect, in being ig-"norant of what has ſo recently, and re-"peatedly been advanced on the fundamental "ſubject of your *Diſquiſitions*. Twenty years "are now nearly elapſed ſince I firſt took "up the ſubject, on occaſion of the late "Cadwallader Colden's treatiſe of the *prin-"ciple of action in matter*, a ſubject on which "I have frequently deſcanted, in various "publications, as occaſion offered." In the ſame page you ſay, "that this neg-"lect of mine is not ſo much *real* as *af-"fected*."

Now, Sir, whatever be the degree of *blame* that I have juſtly brought upon myſelf, I do aſſure you that my ignorance of your

your having maintained what I contend for is not affected, but *real*; and indeed my not having learned *more* of you, and my not holding your doctrine with perfect conſiſtency, may be allowed to weigh ſomething in anſwer to a charge of *plagiariſm*. Beſides, whatever injury I have done you, I reap no advantage from it; becauſe I do not advance the doctrine as my own diſcovery, but profeſs to have learned the ſyſtem from F. Boſcovich, and Mr. Michell.

I am but an occaſional reader of *Reviews*, and I have not the leaſt recollection either of Mr. Colden's treatiſe, or of any thing that was ever ſaid about it; and yet I am far from thinking diſreſpectfully either of *anonymous*, or of *periodical* publications, of which, without the leaſt reaſon, you frequently charge me: but certainly there is leſs chance of an anonymous publication being generally known, and eſpecially of its being aſcribed to its right author.

You ſay, p. 402, that you find I do not think you much my *friend*, becauſe I ſaid ſo of the author of the *Eſſay* in your

Review for September 1775; but I had not the moſt diſtant ſuſpicion of your being the writer of that Eſſay. It is there called *a Letter to the Reviewers*, and was announced by yourſelf, as a piece ſuppoſed to be written either by *myſelf*, or *ſome of my able friends*; and, in conſequence, probably, of that manner of announcing it, it has, with many perſons, paſſed for mine. You muſt not blame me for not knowing it to be yours, when yourſelf announced it as mine.

As you ſeem not to have any recollection of this circumſtance, which has led myſelf and others into a miſtake, I ſhall take the liberty to recite the whole paragraph, which is in a note of your Review for Auguſt 1775, p. 175, " For the rea-
" ſons alledged in our account of Dr.
" Prieſtley's Eſſays, we beg leave to be
" excuſed for the preſent from entering
" into this intereſting diſpute, and that
" ſtill the more earneſtly, as we have had
" ſent us a long and laboured defence of
" the paſſage that appeared ſo exception-
" able

" able to Mr. Seton, intended to have been " printed in a pamphlet by itſelf, had not " the author (either the Dr. himſelf, or " ſome able friend) juſtly conceived ſo " good an opinion of our candour, as to " think we ſhould afford a place for it " in our Review, which we purpoſe to do " in our next number." Accordingly in the very next number (September 1775,) appeared this Eſſay, which you now call your own.

There are ſeveral other things in your letters to me that are almoſt as unaccountable as this. I am very far from having a mean opinion of your underſtanding, and men of ſenſe are generally candid; at leaſt they are able to perceive the real meaning of a writer who wiſhes to be underſtood, and they are above little cavils. And yet, p. 64, you aſcribe to me what I am profeſſedly refuting, and only ſuppoſe for the ſake of that refutation, viz. the ſolidity of the atoms, or the ultimate conſtituent parts of bodies. You write variouſly, and perhaps not very conſiſtently

ſiſtently with reſpect to me; but, in general, you ſeem to think that I write with tolerable *perſpicuity*, as well as readineſs; you ſhould therefore have reconſidered the paſſages which you except againſt. I ſee little, if any thing, that I can amend in them; and yet you ſay that, "with the "beſt diſpoſition in the world to compre-"hend me, you cannot poſſibly conceive "what I am about.

Your cavil, p. 65, appears to me to be equally ill founded: for by the *ſmalleſt parts* of bodies, I evidently mean thoſe that are *ſuppoſed to be* the ſmalleſt, or the ſolid indiſcerptible atoms of other philoſophers; which I maintain to be reſolvable into ſtill ſmaller parts. I do not wonder to find this wretched cavil in ſuch a writer as Mr. Whitehead, but it is altogether unworthy of a perſon who has any degree of reputation, as a writer, or a man of ſenſe, and candour.

You ridicule what you call my *pompous liſt* of authors prefixed to the *Diſquiſitions*, when

when I barely mention thoſe of which there are *different editions*, that, as I quote the *pages*, thoſe who had different editions of the ſame book might be apprized of it. What could the moſt modeſt writer, yourſelf for inſtance, who wiſhed to be underſtood, do leſs? Had I meant to ſwell the liſt, I ſhould have inſerted in it *all* that I have quoted; which, however, is a very common practice, and not at all exceptionable. On many occaſions you charge me with *vanity* and *conceit*; and once, in imitation, I ſuppoſe, of the ſtyle of Dr. Johnſon, you term it *an exuberance of ſelf-exaltation:* but this charge is founded upon nothing but the moſt forced and uncandid conſtruction of my expreſſions. This I conſider as an unworthy artifice. Had I affected an unuſual degree of *modeſty*, inconſiſtent with writing ſo much as I do, (as it certainly implies that I think myſelf capable of inſtructing, at leaſt, ſome part of mankind) there would have been more reaſon for your conduct.

As to the work which you promiſe the public, I ſhall expect it with ſome impatience,

tience, and ſhall certainly read it with the greateſt attention; and as you ſay that "the *theory of phyſics*, or the ſyſtematical "principles of natural philoſophy, the ſci- "ence which Lord Bacon repreſents as the "baſis and foundation of all human know- "ledge is the department of your pecu- "liar profeſſion," I do hope that you will throw ſome light upon it, and I have every reaſon to wiſh you ſucceſs. If you can prove, as you ſay, page 277, that *all matter is poſſeſſed of ſome degree of perception*, you will effectually remove the only difficulty under which my ſcheme labours; which is *how* a ſentient principle is the reſult of organization. The *fact* I think indiſputable, and muſt be admitted on the received rules of philoſophizing; but that it *muſt be ſo*, from the nature of things, I own I do not yet ſee, any more than I am yet ſatisfied that "the form and magnitude "of bodies are to be conſidered as gene- "rated by motion," p. 161, or that "every natural phenomenon, or diſtinct "object of ſenſe, is a compound of active "and paſſive phyſical powers," notwith-

ſtanding

ſtanding the very ingenious obſervations that you have advanced with reſpect to them.

You frequently hint that, the reaſon why I have generally appeared to advantage in controverſy, is that I have always pitched upon *weak antagoniſts*. I can only ſay, that, if this has been the caſe, it has been becauſe I have not had the good fortune to meet with any better; and in general they have not been weak either in their own eyes, or in thoſe of the public. This character, however, can by no means apply to Dr. Brown, Dr. Balguy, Dr. Blackſtone, Dr. Reid, or Dr. Beattie, whatever you may ſay of Dr. Oſwald, on whoſe work you will find the higheſt encomiums in the Reviews of the day; and it was in fact, held in very great and general admiration.

You will alſo find the ſame to be, in a great meaſure, true of the *Letters on Materialiſm*. Beſides the ſtating of *objections actually made*, and anſwering them, has a much better effect than propoſing them in other

other words; as it may be ſuſpected, that, by this means, the anſwerer gives himſelf an unfair advantage; and when I replied to him, no other anſwer had appeared. For as to your *Mr. Seton*, who, it ſeems, notwithſtanding the incredulity of ſome, did really *live*, and is now actually *dead*, I could not, though I endeavoured to do it, perſuade myſelf to take any notice of him; he appeared to know ſo very little of the very rudiments of theological knowledge. Many other opponents I have neglected to notice becauſe I thought them inſignificant, though they are not without their admirers, and boaſt, as you do, that I make no reply, becauſe I am not able to do it. As to yourſelf, pretend what you will, I cannot conſider you in the light of an adverſary.

You aſk me repeatedly, why, ſince I deny all ſolidity or impenetrability, I ſhould chuſe to make uſe of ſo obnoxious a term as *matter*, when the leſs exceptionable one of *ſpirit* would anſwer my purpoſe full as well. I anſwer, that the cauſe of truth is beſt

beſt anſwered by calling every thing by its *uſual name*, and I think it a mean ſubterfuge to impoſe upon mankind by the uſe of words.

Man, I believe, was wholly made of *the duſt of the ground*, or of the ſame ſubſtance with the earth itſelf. Now by what term has the earth, and all the ſubſtances that belong to it, been diſtinguiſhed, but that of *matter?* I ſuppoſe the ſentient principle in man to be the brain itſelf, and not any *inviſible ſubſtance* reſiding in the brain, and capable of ſubſiſting when the brain is deſtroyed. Now of what has the brain been always ſaid to conſiſt, but *matter*, another ſpecies indeed from that of the duſt of the ground, but ſtill compriſed under the ſame common appellation of matter? In what other manner than that which I have choſen, is it poſſible to rectify the miſtakes of men? To call matter by the name of *ſpirit* might tend to give them an idea that my opinions were, in fact, the ſame with theirs, though expreſſed in different words; and by this means, I might ſcreen myſelf from their cenſure,

cenſure; but I ſhould only *deceive*, and ſhould not *inſtruct* them at all.

In this manner too many chriſtian preachers, and writers, adopting the phraſeology of the Athanaſian ſyſtem, paſs for orthodox, without, as they think, any violation of truth. But what accrues from this conduct? No advantage to the *cauſe of truth*; nothing but the mere *ſafety of the preacher, or writer*;

This, Sir, is not my object. I have hitherto purſued a different plan, and have ſeen no reaſon to repent of it. Upon this general principle, I have choſen to ſay that *man is wholly material*, rather than *wholly ſpiritual*, though both the terms were in my option.

You muſt give me leave to cloſe this letter with ſome notice of a paſſage of yours to me, which is in the ſame ſtrain with many others, and of which we have but too many examples in ſuch writers as Voltaire and Mr. Hume. You ſay, p. 489, "As to your concern for the con-

"verſion

" verſion of infidels, I look upon it as " the cant of a philoſophical cruſader, and " am ſorry I cannot coincide with you in " your projected conciliation of the *ra-* " *tional truths* of philoſophy, with the " *myſterious truths* of chriſtianity. I am " apprehenſive that it is impoſſible, with- " out endangering the cauſe of both, to " bring them into too cloſe a contact." In a note, (*ib.*) you add, " It is a moot " point with me, whether the really think- " ing and intelligent philoſophers, whom " Dr. Prieſtley wiſhes to convert, are great- " er infidels, in their preſent ſtate of un- " belief, than they would be be, if con- " verted by him into rational chriſtians."

Now I muſt take it for granted, that a man of much leſs diſcernment than you, cannot but be ſenſible, that no propoſition can be *true* and *falſe* at the ſame time, or true with reſpect to philoſophy, and falſe with reſpect to theology, or *vice verſa*; ſo that if what is called a *myſtery in chriſtianity*, be really a *falſehood in philoſophy*, *i. e.* reducible to a contradiction, the belief of it

muſt be abandoned altogether, at any hazard; and the ſcheme of religion that neceſſarily ſuppoſes it to be true muſt be confeſſed to be ill founded, and an impoſition on mankind.

If, for example, *bread and wine*, philoſophically, *i. e.* ſtrictly and juſtly conſidered, cannot be *fleſh and blood*, the popiſh doctrine of *tranſubſtantiation* cannot be true. So alſo if *one* cannot be *three*, or *three*, *one*, mathematically conſidered, neither can the Athanaſian doctrine of the *Trinity* be true. It certainly, therefore, behoves every rational chriſtian to prove the conſiſtency of the articles of his faith with true philoſophy and the nature of things. This is the only method of effectually ſilencing ſuch unbelievers as, with the low view of impoſing on the weakeſt chriſtians, pretend to believe chriſtianity, at the ſame time that they maintain it is *not founded on argument*; thinking to loſe no character with men of ſenſe, like themſelves, who will eaſily perceive the deſign with which ſuch abſurd profeſſions are made, and will be ready to join

join in the laugh at the credulity of thoſe who are taken with them. If I were really an unbeliever, I think I ſhould not ſcruple to avow it, rather than debaſe my mind by ſuch paltry evaſions. But it muſt be owned, that an unbeliever has not the ſame cauſe for *a ſtrict attachment to truth*, that a chriſtian has.

I am, Sir,

Your very humble ſervant,

CALNE, June 1778. J. PRIESTLEY.

To Mr. WHITEHEAD.

SIR,

AN attack from a perſon of your religious perſuaſion is a thing that is new to me; and as I have frequently mentioned your people with reſpect, and have always had very agreeable connections with individuals of your body, it would have been a real ſatisfaction to me to have found that, even in their *oppoſition* to me, they were reſpectable; and therefore to have had it in my power to ſpeak as handſomely of you *all*, as I have hitherto done. However, though an individual has ſhewn that want of civility and candour, which I had thought inſeparable from all Quakers, and, alſo too little acquaintance with his ſubject, I ſhall by no means impute theſe faults to the whole body to which you belong; many of whom I know to be equally diſtinguiſhed for their candour and knowledge.

You know, Sir, I preſume, that I profeſs to believe in a *God*, a *providence*, and a *future ſtate*, in the *divine miſſion of Chriſt*, and the *authority of the ſcriptures*. I have written not a little in the direct defence of theſe principles, and I hope my general character and conduct does not give the lie to my profeſſion. Why then ſhould you ſuppoſe me not to be *ſincere*, and to be *ſecretly undermining* theſe great principles of of religion? Might not I, if I were ſo diſpoſed, retort the ſame ſurmiſes and calumnies reſpecting you? You are certainly at liberty to urge me with what you apprehend to be the real conſequences of my doctrine, but this you might do without intimating, as you frequently do, that I was *apprized* of the immoral and dangerous conſequences of my principles, and wiſhed to propagate them *on that account*.

"Materialiſm," you ſay, p. 163, "muſt "terminate in Atheiſm;" and p. 90, "The doctrine of materialiſm muſt be at- "tended with the moſt deſtructive and "fatal

" fatal conſequences. It ſuppoſes that this " life is our only place of exiſtence, and " by this means takes away all confidence " in God, all hope of future rewards, and " fear of puniſhment. It tears up all " religion by the very roots, and renders " all our moral powers and faculties wholly " uſeleſs, or ſuppoſes them to be mere " creatures of education and human policy. " In ſhort, its language is, *let us eat and* " *drink, for to-morrow we die.*" You are pleaſed to add, " I do not ſay that Dr. " Prieſtley will *directly* defend theſe prin- " ciples, or that he *altogether* believes " them to be the conſequences of his doc- " trine." This however, is an inſinuation, that, though not *altogether,* I do *in part* believe them to be the conſequences of my doctrine; and other paſſages in your work ſufficiently ſhew, that you think me capable of advancing and ſupporting theſe principles, even though I ſhould be altogether perſuaded of their horrid conſequences.

" It muſt be owned," you ſay, p. 108, " that our author ſhews no great delicacy

" reſpecting the character of the ſacred " penmen. He very freely, though in- " directly, beſpatters them with dirt; from " whence one might naturally ſuſpect, that " he owes them no very good will. Pro- " feſſions of this kind," you ſay, p. 110, " from one who profeſſes to believe the " goſpel, looks ſo much like a *feigned* " *friendſhip*, in order to deliver it more ſe- " curely into the hands of the deiſts, that " it will not fail to recall to memory the " treatment of our Lord by one of his " profeſſed diſciples, to which, with re- " ſpect to the goſpel revelation, it bears a " ſtriking reſemblance. There," you ſay, p. 112, " is an end of all ſcripture au- " thority at once, which perhaps would " not be very diſagreeable to this writer." Laſtly you ſcruple not to ſay, page 106, " I ſhould not wonder to hear this learned " gentleman, armed cap-a-pee, with logic " and philoſophy, repreſent his Lord and " Saviour as a greater deceiver than Ma- " homet. To ſuch miſerable and profane " ſhifts, may raſh reaſoning bring an un- " guarded man."

For

For the honour of the chriſtian name, and of the particular profeſſion to which you belong, I hope that, on reflection, yourſelf, or at leaſt your friends, will bluſh for theſe things. In the preceding quotation, I hope, Sir, you will be thought to have given a very unfair account of my *moral principles* and *views*; let us now ſee whether you be any better acquainted with the *profeſſed deſign* of my work, and the *nature of the argument*.

" The great object in view," you ſay, p. 171, " it ſeems, in contriving and mo-" delling theſe enquiries into matter and " ſpirit, was to lay a foundation for the " better ſupport of *Arianiſm*." Now, Sir, ſo much are you miſtaken, that the great object in view was the very reverſe of what you ſuppoſe, viz. the radical overturning of the ſyſtem of Arianiſm, by proving the abſurdity, and explaining the origin, of the doctrines of a *ſoul*, and of *pre-exiſtence*, which are neceſſarily ſuppoſed in the Arian ſyſtem; and a very great part of my work is, not indirectly, but *openly*, and both *really*, and

and *by name*, an attack upon Arianiſm, and both what is called the *high* and the *low Arian hypotheſis*, which I conſider ſeparately.

Let us now ſee the light in which my account of *the opinions of the chriſtian Fathers* has happened to ſtrike you; and in this you are no leſs unfortunate. "The thing "he propoſes to prove," you ſay, p. 140, "is that the chriſtian Fathers believed that "the ſoul can have no exiſtence ſeparate "from the body, that thought and con- "ſciouſneſs may be the reſult of an orga- "nized ſyſtem of matter. Conſequently," you ſay, p. 149, "our author's grand boaſt, "that the apoſtles and primitive fathers "thought with him, that the ſoul is ma- "terial and mortal, vaniſhes into air; "where, perhaps, this experimental phi- "loſopher may be able to make more of "it than we can do in theſe lower re- "gions."

Again, p. 148, after reciting the opinion of Cl. Mamertus, who ſays of the ſoul, that it is neither *extended*, nor *in place*, you

you ſay, " Theſe ſeem to me moſt ex-
" traordinary aſſertions, to prove that the
" ſoul is material, and dies with the body.
" It requires more ſkill in Logic than I
" am maſter of to find this concluſion in
" either of the premiſes."

A very extraordinary concluſion indeed, but, if that had been my idea, it would not have been more extraordinary than your miſtake of the whole drift of my argument in this buſineſs. I had aſſerted that the idea of *refined ſpirituality*, maintained, I find, by yourſelf, was unknown to all antiquity; and therefore I have ſhown, that though, according to the notion of the heathen philoſophers, the ſoul was conſidered as a ſubſtance diſtinct from the body, being a detached part of the great ſoul of the univerſe, it had the property of *extenſion*, and was, in reality, what we ſhould now call *a more refined kind of matter*; and that true *ſpiritualiſm* was introduced gradually; but, if any more diſtinct æra can be fixed on, it was that of this very Mamertus.

I farther prove, that, according to the true ſyſtem of revelation, though the ſentient and thinking principle may be ſpoken of as diſtinct from the other functions of the man, it was always ſuppoſed to reſide in ſome part of his body, and to be inſeparable from it. For the ſacred writers never ſpeak of the ſoul as in one place, and the body in another; and it was not till the introduction of the heathen philoſophy into chriſtianity, that it was imagined that the ſoul retained its perceptivity and activity while the body was in the grave. Of this, I preſume, I have given ſufficient proof.

You are pleaſed, indeed, to alledge, page 144, as a proof that the early chriſtians thought differently, a paſſage in the epiſtle of Polycarp, who ſays that "Paul, and "the reſt of the apoſtles, are in the place "appointed for them, παρα τω κυριω, with the "Lord." But if you had attended to the Greek, you would have perceived that this is not the *neceſſary* ſenſe of the paſſage, and Archbiſhop Wake renders it "the place "that was due to them, from the Lord."

Indeed,

Indeed, had you been ſufficiently converſant with *eccleſiaſtical hiſtory*, you would have known, that it was not till many centuries after the time of Polycarp, that any chriſtian thought that the ſeparate ſoul, whether ſentient or not, was in any other place than that which is diſtinguiſhed by the term *hades*. It was univerſally thought that good men were not *with God and Chriſt* till after the reſurrection, which is clearly the ſcripture doctrine.

In John xvi. 3. our Lord ſays, *I will come again, and receive you unto myſelf, that where I am, ye may be alſo*. Here is a plain limitation of the time when the diſciples of our Lord, and even the apoſtles themſelves, were to be admitted to his preſence, and live with him, viz. at his return to raiſe the dead, and not before.

What you ſay on the ſubject of the ſtate of the ſoul between death and the reſurrection, is too trifling to deſerve a particular notice. As you ſeem not to have given ſufficient attention to this ſubject, I would take the liberty to recommend to

your

your careful perusal, what the excellent Bishop of Carlisle has written on it, Archdeacon Blackburne's *Historical View of this Controversy*; the Dissertation prefixed to *Alexander's Commentary on* 1 *Cor.* xv. and a summary of the principal arguments in the third volume of my *Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion*.

It is upon this subject that you note, with great triumph, that I have quoted as one, two similar passages in the book of *Revelation*. Another person would have supposed this to have happened through *inadvertency*, and not, as you will have it, *with design*. It must have been infatuation to have done this in a work so inviting of criticism as mine is. A new edition of the work will shew you that my argument loses nothing by the rectification of that mistake.

I shall mention one more mistake of my meaning, though in a thing of no great consequence. "It is a great mistake," you say, p. 10, "to suppose with Dr. "Priestley, and some other philosophers, "that

"that there is ſome unknown ſubſtance "in material nature, diſtinct from the pro- "perties of ſolidity and extenſion." Now what I have ſaid, and repeated many times, is, that when all the properties of ſubſtance are taken away, the ſubſtance itſelf is gone; and that the terms *ſubſtance*, *eſſence*, &c. &c. are merely a convenience in ſpeech.

You triumph exceedingly in my ſpeaking of the *ſmalleſt particles of matter* being reſolved into others ſtill *ſmaller*. For an explanation of this, I refer you to my letter to Dr. Kenrick.

Your ſtrictures on the ſubject of *perſonal identity* I freely leave to have their full effect on the minds of our readers, without any apprehenſion of the conſequence.

Before I cloſe this letter, I ſhall briefly mention a few particulars, which ſhow that you are not ſufficiently acquainted with the *ſtate of opinions* for a controverſial writer on ſuch ſubjects as thoſe of the *Diſquiſitions*.

"Nor

" Nor do I preſume," you ſay, p. 25, " that any philoſopher will contend for an " earlier and earlier exiſtence of this world, " and the creatures in it, *ad infinitum*." Now, Sir, many philoſophers and divines maintain the very doctrine that you think not to exiſt. It was the opinion of the Platoniſts, it is aſſerted by Dr. Hartley, it is what I have given in my Inſtitutes, and I believe it is that of Dr. Price, who is far from thinking with me on the ſubject of the *Diſquiſitions*.

" Our learned author," you ſay, p. 81, " indeed, affects to diſbelieve the continual " flux of the particles of the human body; " but this I preſume no one will ſeriouſly " deny, who has a competent knowledge " of its ſtructure and œconomy."

Now many perſons, Sir, and even Dr. Watts, whom you quote with ſo much reſpect, ſeriouſly believed that there are parts of the body, ſome *ſtamina*, that never change.

There

There is another thing that you take for granted, in which I believe you are quite ſingular, and it is, indeed, ſufficiently curious. You ſay, p. 167, that "where body "is, ſpace is neceſſarily excluded," and from this extraordinary ſuppoſition you draw many curious inferences, in your reaſoning about the nature of ſpirit, and of the deity. Now I have heard of ſpace being *occupied*, but never of its being *excluded* before.

I muſt not quite conclude without acknowledging myſelf obliged to you for furniſhing me with a proof, which you will find, by Dr. Price's remarks, was in ſome meaſure wanting, of its being the *real opinion* of any perſon, that *ſpirit bears no relation to ſpace*. You do it in the ampleſt manner, and build upon it your argument againſt the materiality of the human ſoul. According to you Dr. Clarke, Dr. Price, and others, who maintain the *locality*, and conſequently the *extenſion* of ſpirit, are as much materialiſts as myſelf. I leave them and you to diſpute that point;

and you may imagine I ſhall not feel unpleaſantly in the ſituation of a *ſpectator*. It will give me ſome reſpite, and I ſhall expect to derive ſome advantage from the iſſue of the conteſt, in whoſe favour ſoever it may be.

"No corporeal ſubſtance," you ſay, p. 63, "whatever can poſſibly be the ſeat of ſen-"ſation; for all of them have extenſion, "and muſt be of ſome figure or form. "On the ſame principles," p. 128, "we "may explain the omnipreſence of God "not by extenſion through all bodies, as "this writer ſeems to believe, which is "an idea ſo groſs that it deſerves a name "which, for the ſake of the author, I ſhall "not beſtow upon it."

Now, as you have not ſcrupled to make uſe of the terms *materialiſt*, and *atheiſt* in this controverſy, I have really a good deal of curioſity to know what dread name it is, that, *out of regard to me*, you ſuppreſs the mention of. If it be too dreadful for the *public ear*, could you not favour me with the intimation of it in a private letter? I ſhall

ſhall communicate it to my friend Dr. Price, whom it concerns as much as it does myſelf. Dr. Clarke, you will alſo find, and in the opinion of Dr. Price, all the moſt diſtinguiſhed immaterialiſts, will fall under this dread cenſure. But, being ſo many of us, materialiſts and immaterialiſts, we ſhall bear it the better; for bodies, and large companies of men, we know, are not eaſily affected either by *ſhame* or *fear*.

I am, Sir,

Your very humble ſervant,

J. PRIESTLEY.

Calne, June 1778.

To Dr. HORSELEY.

DEAR SIR,

I THINK myſelf particularly happy that a perſon of your abilities, and mathematical and philoſophical knowledge, has vouchſafed to allude to my work, though only in a *ſermon*, as it gives me an opportunity of explaining myſelf more fully with reſpect to the ſtate of the queſtion concerning *liberty* and *neceſſity*, and likewiſe of ſhowing that the *ſect* of neceſſarians, though almoſt *every where ſpoken againſt*, is more numerous and reſpectable than is generally imagined; for that you, Sir, belong to it as much as I do; with this only difference, that you chuſe to make uſe of one ſet of phraſes, and I of another.

It is impoſſible for me to expreſs in ſtronger terms than you do, the abſolute certainty of every determination of the will of man, as depending upon the circumſtances he is in, and the motives preſented to him. "A moral motive and a "mechanical force," you ſay, p. 10, "are "equally certain cauſes, each of its proper "effect. A moral motive," you ſay, "is "what is more ſignificantly called the "final cauſe, and can have no influence "but with a being that propoſes to itſelf "an end, chuſes means, and thus puts it-"ſelf in action. It is true that while this "is my end, and while I conceive theſe "to be the means, a definite action will "as certainly follow that definite choice "and judgement of my mind, provided I "be free from all external reſtraint and im-"pediment, as a determinate motion will "be excited in a body by a force applied "in a given direction. There is, in both "caſes, an equal certainty of the effect."

Having granted this, it is not poſſible that you and I can have any difference that

is

is not merely *verbal*. Our *ideas* are preciſely the ſame; nor have I indeed any objection to your *language*, in any ſenſe in which it can be conſiſtent with the above aſſertions.

You are too good a mathematician to require being told, that, if every determination of the mind of man certainly depends upon preceding cauſes, whether the cauſes be moral, or phyſical, it is not poſſible that any determination, or conſequently that any event, in which men are concerned, could have been otherwiſe than it *has been*, *is*, or *is to be*; or that the Divine Being, who, as you juſtly ſay, "knows "things by their cauſes, as being himſelf "the firſt cauſe, the ſource of power and "activity to all other cauſes," ſhould not have *intended* every thing to be juſt as it is. On this ground only can you affirm, as you do, that "to him every thing that ſhall "ever be is at all times infinitely more "certain, than any thing, either paſt or "preſent, can be to any man," &c. This, I ſay, you need not be told. It is an im-

mediate and neceſſary inference from your own principle. Indeed, it is little more than repeating the ſame thing in other words.

You even apply theſe principles to a caſe of the greateſt virtue that was ever exerted by man, viz. the voluntary ſufferings and death of Chriſt, and likewiſe to a caſe of the greateſt wickedneſs, viz. that of his enemies in voluntarily inflicting thoſe ſufferings upon him. No perſon can expreſs this with more perſpicuity or energy than you have done.

"Now therefore," you ſay, p. 3, "he be-
"gins to ſhew them" (his diſciples) "that
"he *muſt* go to Jeruſalem, and, after much
"malicious perſecution from the leaders
"of the Jewiſh people, he *muſt* be killed.
"The form of expreſſion here is very re-
"markable in the original, and it is well
"preſerved in our Engliſh tranſlation. He
"*muſt* go, he *muſt* ſuffer, he *muſt* be kil-
"led, he *muſt* be raiſed again on the third
"day. All theſe things were fixed and
"determined—muſt inevitably be—no-
"thing

" thing could prevent them—and yet the
" greater part of them were of a kind that
" might *ſeem* to depend intirely upon man's
" free-agency. To go, or not to go to
" Jeruſalem, was in his own power, and
" the perſecution he met with there,
" ariſing from the folly and the malice of
" ignorant and wicked men, ſurely de-
" pended upon the human will; yet, by the
" form of the ſentence, theſe things are
" included under the ſame *Neceſſity of Event*
" as that which was evidently an immedi-
" ate effect of divine power, without the
" concurrence of any other cauſe, the re-
" ſurrection of Jeſus from the dead. The
" words which in the original expreſs the
" *going*, the *ſuffering*, the *being killed*, the
" *being raiſed again*, are equally ſubject to
" the verb which anſwers to the word
" *muſt* of our language, and in its proper
" meaning predicates *neceſſity*. As he *muſt*
" be raiſed on the third day, ſo he *muſt*
" go, he *muſt* ſuffer, he *muſt* be killed.
" Every one of theſe events, his going to
" Jeruſalem, his ſuffering, and his death
" there, and that theſe ſufferings, and that
" death

" death ſhould be brought about by the
" malice of the elders and chief prieſts
" and ſcribes; every one of theſe things
" is plainly announced, as no leſs unal-
" terably fixed, than the reſurrection of
" our ſaviour, or the time of his reſur-
" rection, that it was to happen on the
" third day."

If then the virtuous determinations of Chriſt, and the wicked determinations of his enemies, were equally neceſſary (for I have no other idea to the word *muſt be*, and indeed you yourſelf uſe them as ſynonymous) every other act of virtue, or act of vice, is equally neceſſary, or *muſt be*, and nothing but a miracle, or an arbitrary infringement of the laws of nature, can prevent its taking place. Though you do not chuſe to call this a *phyſical*, but a *moral* neceſſity, you allow it to be a *real* neceſſity, ariſing from the operation of the eſtabliſhed laws of nature, implying an impoſſibility of the thing being otherwiſe than it is, which is all that I wiſh you to grant.

For

For any man to have acted differently from what he did, in any given case, he must have been differently disposed at the time, or must have had different views of things present to his mind; neither of which, properly speaking, depends upon himself. For though it does so *immediately*, it does not do so *ultimately:* for since every particular determination depends upon his immediately preceding circumstances, it necessarily follows that the whole chain of his determinations and actions depends upon his *original make*, and *original circumstances*. And who is our maker but God? or who is it that disposes of us but the same God?

You could not, dear Sir, have written what you have done, if you had not felt, and enjoyed this most important truth. Let us do it freely and without reserve, let us not scruple to express it in its proper language, and let us openly acknowledge, and chearfully embrace, all the fair consequences of it. I need not with you, Sir, make any encomium on our common prin-

principles. The doctrine of neceſſity, (moral neceſſity, if you chuſe to call it ſo) contains, or implies, all that the heart of man can wiſh. It leads us to conſider ourſelves, and every thing elſe as at the uncontrolled diſpoſal of the greateſt and beſt of beings; that, ſtrictly ſpeaking, nothing does, or can, go wrong; that all *retrogade motions*, in the moral as well as in the natural world, are only *apparent*, not *real*. Being under this infallible guidance, our final deſtination is certain and glorious. In the language of Pope,

> All nature is but art, unknown to thee;
> All chance, direction, which thou canſt not ſee;
> All diſcord, harmony not underſtood;
> All partial evil, univerſal good:
> And, ſpite of pride, in erring reaſon's ſpite,
> One truth is clear, *whatever is, is right.*

Let us now conſider why it is that you object to the term *phyſical*, as applied to the cauſes of human actions. For I am ready to diſuſe it, if it imply any thing more than we both agree in maintaining. The word itſelf is derived from φυσις *nature*, and therefore, literally rendered, ſignifies *agreeable*

able to nature, or the *laws of nature*. A phyſical cauſe, therefore, is ſimply that which, according to the eſtabliſhed laws of nature, will produce a given effect; and of courſe reſpects the laws to which the mind is ſubject, as well as thoſe by which the external world is governed, both being equally within the compaſs of *nature*. I therefore apply it to both caſes indiſcriminately.

If you ſay the *operations*, and therefore the *laws*, are of a very different nature, I readily acknowledge it. For, with reſpect to this, it is impoſſible that we can really differ. The compaſs of nature is great, and comprizes very various things. *Chemiſtry*, for inſtance, and common *mechanics* are very different things; and accordingly we have different *kinds of laws*, or *rules*, by which to expreſs, and explain, their operations; but ſtill they are equally branches of *Phyſics*. So alſo though the *phenomena*, and conſequently the *laws of the mind*, are different from thoſe of the *body*, that is no ſufficient reaſon why we ſhould

ſhould not comprize them under the ſame general term of *phyſics*. However, if you diſlike the word, in the extenſive application in which I uſe it, I am very well content to uſe it in your more reſtrained ſenſe, and will call the things that influence the mind *moral*, and not phyſical cauſes. Only allow that there *are* laws, and cauſes, by which the mind is truly and properly *influenced*, producing certain definite effects in definite circumſtances, and I ſhall not quarrel with you for the ſake of a term.

You ſay, p. 10, that I confound moral and phyſical neceſſity, or, to uſe your own words, that "when I repreſent the influ- "ence of moral motives, as ariſing from "a phyſical neceſſity, the very ſame with "that which excites and governs the mo- "tions of the inanimate creation, I con- "found nature's diſtinctions, and contra- "dict the very principles I would ſeem to "have eſtabliſhed; and that the ſource of "the miſtake is, that I imagine a ſimili- "tude [illegible] things which admit of no "com[illegible]

Now,

Now, Sir, I will allow as much difference as you *can* ſuppoſe between moral and phyſical cauſes. Inanimate matter, as the pen that I write with, is not capable of being influenced by *motives*, nor is the *hand* that holds the pen, but the *mind* that directs both. I think I diſtinguiſh theſe things better by the terms *voluntary* and *involuntary*; but theſe are mere *words*, and I make no compariſon between them, or between moral and phyſical cauſes, but in that very reſpect in which you yourſelf acknowledge that they agree, *i. e.* the *certainty* with which they produce their reſpective effects. And this is the proper foundation of all the *neceſſity* that I aſcribe to human actions. My concluſion, that men could not, in any given caſe, act otherwiſe than they do, is not at all affected by the *terms* by which we diſtinguiſh the laws and cauſes that reſpect the mind from thoſe which reſpect the external world. That there are *any laws*, and that there are *any cauſes*, to which the mind is ſubject, is all that my argument requires.

Give

Give me the thing, and I will readily give you the name.

Again, you diſtinguiſh between *efficient* and *final* cauſes, and ſay that, by means of the latter, a perſon *puts himſelf in motion*. But ſtill, if it be true, as you allow, that, notwithſtanding this, a definite act will certainly follow a definite choice and judgment of the mind, there is, in no caſe, any more than *one way* in which the mind can put itſelf in motion, or only one direction that it can take, which is all the neceſſity that I contend for. I chuſe to ſay that *motives determine the mind*, whereas you ſay that the *mind determines itſelf according to the motives*; but, in both caſes, the determination itſelf is the very ſame, and we both agree that it *could not have been different*. Our difference, therefore is merely verbal, and cannot poſſibly be any thing more.

Turn over this ſubject, Sir, in your own mind as you pleaſe, you will find that one who controverts the doctrine of neceſſity, has

has the choice of no more than *two things*. He must either say that, in a given situation of mind, with respect to disposition and motives, the determination is *definite*, *i. e.* agreeable to some general rule, or that it is *indefinite*, *i. e.* subject to no rule at all. If the former be admitted, which is what you allow, you are, to all intents and purposes, a necessarian. You may (unknown to yourself) conceal your principles under the cover of some specious and ambiguous phraseology, but you certainly maintain the *thing*. If, on the other hand, you say, that the determination is *indefinite*, you are very sensible that you suppose *an effect without a cause*, which is impossible. This side of the dilemma, therefore, you carefully avoid. In short, Sir, there is no choice in the case, but of the doctrine of necessity (disguised, perhaps, under some other name) or absolute nonsense. There is no possibility of finding any medium.

Incidit in Scyllam qui vult vitare Charybdim.

You are pleaſed, Sir, to call philoſophical neceſſity the doctrine of the *ſubtle moderns*, and that of predeſtination that of their *more ſimple anceſtors*, ſaying, that we ſubtle moderns, are *deeply verſed in phyſics, and maintain the regular operation of ſecond cauſes*; and you candidly acknowledge that we are both actuated by the *ſame humble ſpirit of reſigned devotion*. This, Sir, is frank and generous, and I hope true. I only object to your characterizing us neceſſarians as *ſubtle*, when, in reality, Sir, our doctrine is the plaineſt thing in the world, and it requires no ſmall degree of ſubtlety to believe any thing elſe.

What are your diſtinctions between things *moral* and *phyſical*, *efficient* and *final*, *certain* and *neceſſary*, theſe relating to *ſelf-determination*, or *ſelf-motion*, &c. &c. &c. but *ſubtleties*, to which we have no recourſe. We are content to call all things by their common names. With us laws are laws, and cauſes cauſes. If the laws are invariable, and the cauſes certain in their operation (and without this they are, in reality

ality, *no laws*, and *no cauſes* at all) we ſay that all that follows is *neceſſary*, or what *could not but be*. What is there, Sir, of *ſubtlety* in all this?

As you are a man of undoubted ſenſe, and candour, and particularly well verſed in mathematical and philoſophical knowledge, I doubt not you will carefully attend to theſe few plain conſiderations; and I am confident that, with the honeſt mind that I believe you to be poſſeſſed of, you will henceforth avow yourſelf to be what, without hitherto knowing it, you really are, a believer in "the great and glorious, though "unpopular doctrine of *philoſophical neceſ-* "*ſity*."

I am,

With the greateſt reſpect,

Dear Sir,

Yours, very ſincerely,

J. PRIESTLEY.

CALNE, June 1778.

P. S. I ſhall take it as a particular favour, if you will oblige me and the public with your *ſecond thoughts* on this ſubject. I have had, and expect, ſo many weak and haſty anſwers, that, I own, I am eager to lay hold of a man who is equal to the diſcuſſion of the ſubject, and eſpecially one who is, at the ſame time, truly liberal and candid. The Doctrine of Neceſſity is very far from being well underſtood by the generality of ſcholars, and it is certainly of great conſequence to have their attention drawn to it. I ſhall be happy, likewiſe, to walk with you over *all* the ground marked out in the *Diſquiſitions*, with reſpect to which I perceive that you hold a ſyſtem very different from mine.

ILLUSTRATIONS

ILLUSTRATIONS

OF SOME PARTICULARS IN THE

DISQUISITIONS ON MATTER AND SPIRIT.

THAT I might not obtrude upon the public a crude and hafty performance on fubjects of fo much importance as thofe which I have ventured to difcufs in thefe *Difquifitions*, I put copies of the work, after it was completely printed off, into the hands of feveral of my friends, both well and ill affected to my general fyftem, that I might have the benefit of their remarks, and take advantage of them, in an additional fheet of *Illuftrations*, if that fhould appear to be neceffary.

Accordingly I have received, and confidered, with as much attention as I can,

various remarks that have been communicated to me, and have thought it might be of uſe to add ſome explanations in conſequence of them. I hope they will be the means of obviating ſome cavils, and ſerve to make my meaning better underſtood, whether they make the doctrine itſelf more or leſs acceptable to my readers in general.

I. *Of Bodies acting where they are not.*

It is objected to the doctrine of theſe papers, which ſuppoſes that the repulſion, aſcribed to bodies, takes place at ſome diſtance from their real ſurfaces; that bodies muſt then *act where they are not*, which is deemed to be an abſurdity. I acknowledge that there is a conſiderable difficulty in this caſe; but it does not in the leaſt affect the hypotheſis that I have adopted concerning matter, any more than that which is commonly received. According to Sir Iſaac Newton's Obſervations, rays of light begin to be reflected from all bodies at a certain diſtance from their ſurfaces;

faces; and yet he conſiders thoſe rays as reflected by thoſe bodies, that is, by powers inhering in and properly belonging to thoſe bodies. So alſo the gravitation of the earth and of the other planets to the ſun, he conſiders as produced by a power of attraction properly belonging to the ſun, which is at an immenſe diſtance from them,

If Sir Iſaac Newton would ſay that the impulſe, by which light is reflected from any body, and by which planets are driven towards the ſun, is really occaſioned by other *inviſible matter* in actual contact with thoſe bodies which are put in motion, I alſo am equally at liberty to relieve my hypotheſis by the ſame means. But the exiſtence of this inviſible ſubſtance, to the agency of which that great philoſopher aſcribes ſo very much, and which he calls *ether*, has not yet been proved, and is therefore generally ſuppoſed not to exiſt. And, indeed, if it did exiſt, I do not ſee how it could produce the effects that are aſcribed to it. For the particles of this

very ether could not impel any ſubſtance, if they were not themſelves impelled in the ſame direction; and muſt we provide a ſtill more ſubtle ether for the purpoſe of impelling the particles of the groſſer ether? If ſo, we muſt do the ſame for this other ether, and ſo on, *ad infinitum*, which is abſurd.

Alſo, if the parts of ſolid bodies, as, for inſtance, of gold (which by its expanſion when hot, and contraction when cold, appear not actually to touch one another) be kept aſunder by a ſubtle matter, viz. the ſame ether above-mentioned, the parts of this ether muſt be kept aſunder by a ſtill more ſubtle ether as before, and ſo on, till the whole ſpace, occupied by the dimenſions of the piece of gold, be abſolutely ſolid, and have no pores or vacuum whatever, which would be contrary to appearances, and make it impoſſible to contract by cold, or by any other means. I do not ſay that there is no difficulty in this caſe, but it is not a difficulty that affects my ſyſtem more than the common one; and

and therefore it is no particular buſineſs of mine to diſcuſs it.

If it be ſuppoſed that no kind of matter is concerned in producing the above-mentioned effects at a diſtance from the ſurfaces of bodies, but that the Deity himſelf cauſes theſe motions, exerting his influence according to certain laws, am not I at liberty to avail myſelf of the ſame aſſiſtance? And ſurely I muſt have leſs objection to this reſource than thoſe who believe that God is not the only proper agent in the univerſe. As a neceſſarian, I, in fact, aſcribe every thing to God, and, whether mediately or immediately, makes very little difference. But I believe that it is poſſible, though we cannot clearly anſwer every objection to it, that God may endue ſubſtances with powers, which, when communicated, produce effects in a manner different from his own immediate agency.

II. *Whether Matter be any thing, on this Hypotheſis.*

It is ſaid that, according to my definition of matter, it muſt be abſolutely *nothing*; becauſe,

becauſe, beſides extenſion, it conſiſts of nothing but the powers of attraction and repulſion, and becauſe I have ſometimes ſaid that it conſiſts of phyſical points only, poſſeſſed of thoſe powers. In this I may have expreſſed myſelf rather incautiouſly; but the *idea* that I meant to convey was evidently this, that, whatever other powers matter may be poſſeſſed of, it has not the property that has been called *impenetrability*, or *ſolidity*.

From the manner of expreſſing our ideas we cannot ſpeak of powers or properties, but as powers and properties of ſome *thing* or *ſubſtance*, though we know nothing at all of that thing or ſubſtance beſides the powers that we aſcribe to it; and, therefore, when the powers are ſuppoſed to be withdrawn, all idea of ſubſtance neceſſarily vaniſhes with them. I have, therefore, the ſame right to ſay that matter is a ſubſtance poſſeſſed of the properties of attraction and repulſion only, as another has to ſay, that it is a ſubſtance poſſeſſed of the property of impenetrability together with them, unleſs

it

it can be proved that the property of attraction or repulsion necessarily implies, and cannot exist without, that of impenetrability. Whether it be possessed of *any* of these properties must be determined by experiment only. If, upon my idea of matter, every thing vanishes upon taking away the powers of attraction and repulsion, in like manner every idea vanishes from the mind; if, upon the common hypothesis, solidity or impenetrability be taken away. I own that I can see no difference in this case; *impenetrability* being as much a property as *penetrability*, and its actual existence equally to be ascertained by experiment, which, in my opinion, is decisive in favour of penetrability.

They who suppose spirit to have proper *extension*, and the Divine Being to have a proper *ubiquity*, must believe the mutual penetrability of real substance; and by whatever names they may choose to call the substances, is of no consequence. If they say that, on my hypothesis, there is no such thing as matter, and that every thing is spirit, I have no objection, provided they make

make as great a difference in *ſpirits*, as they have hitherto made in *ſubſtances*. The world has been too long amuſed with mere names.

III. *Of the laws of Motion.*

It is ſaid, that if there is not what has been termed a *vis inertiæ* in matter, the foundation of the Newtonian Philoſphy is overturned: for that the *three laws of motion*, laid down by Sir Iſaac Newton, in the beginning of his *Principia*, have no meaning on any other ſuppoſition.

I anſwer, that theſe laws of motion are founded on certain *facts*, which reſult juſt as eaſily from my hypotheſis concerning matter, as from the common one. It is an undoubted fact that every body perſeveres in a ſtate of reſt or motion, till it be compelled to change that ſtate by ſome external force, which is the firſt of the three laws, and the foundation of the other two. But this will follow juſt as well upon the ſuppoſition of that mutual action between two bodies taking place at any given diſtance

tance from their ſurfaces. Newton himſelf ſhews, that rays of light are reflected by a power belonging to other bodies, without actually impinging upon them, and, conſequently, by a power which takes place at a certain diſtance from their ſurfaces, without ſuppoſing that any of his laws of motion were violated.

IV. *Of the Divine Eſſence.*

It is ſuſpected that, notwithſtanding I decline the term, it will be thought that I virtually make the Deity to be a material being. I anſwer that, ſince, according to my ideas, the divine eſſence, and other eſſences have quite different properties or powers, they ought, in ſtrictneſs, to be denoted by quite different names; and, therefore, I can have no other objection to the term *immaterial*, as applied to the Divine Being, but as it is apt to imply that the divine eſſence is incapable of any property whatever in common with other eſſences, ſuch as even relation to ſpace.

I will farther obſerve, that, notwithſtanding I *may* have expreſſed myſelf in an unguarded manner on this ſubject (though I am not at preſent aware of it) it will be found, by the candid and attentive, that I have not, in reality, any idea of the divine eſſence that is at all different from that of thoſe philoſophers and divines, who maintain the *proper omnipreſence*, or *ubiquity* of the Divine Being, which neceſſarily implies a real extenſion; and that he has a power of acting upon matter.

I will take this opportunity of ſaying, farther, that, upon no ſyſtem whatever, is the great Author of Nature more diſtinct from his productions, or his preſence with them, and agency upon them, more neceſſary. In fact, the ſyſtem now held forth to the public, taken in its full extent, makes the Divine Being to be of as much importance in the ſyſtem, as the apoſtle makes him, when he ſays, *In him we live, and move, and have our being*. The contemplation of it impreſſes the mind with ſentiments of the deepeſt reverence and humility,

mility, and it inculcates a degree of devotedneſs to God, both active and paſſive, that no other philoſophical ſyſtem can inſpire. Conſequently the obligation to all thoſe virtues that are more immediately derived from that great vital ſpring and principle of all virtue, *devotion*, thoſe which give a ſuperiority to the world, a fearleſs integrity, and a noble independence of mind in the practice of our duty, is more ſtrongly felt, and therefore may be ſuppoſed to take a deeper root in the mind, than upon any other ſyſtem whatever. In ſhort, it is that philoſophy which alone ſuits the doctrine of the *ſcriptures*, though the writers of them were not philoſophers, but had an inſtruction infinitely ſuperior to that of any philoſophical ſchool. Every other ſyſtem of philoſophy is diſcordant with the ſcriptures, and, as far as it lays any hold upon the mind, tends to counteract their influence.

In the laſt place, I think it may not be unuſeful to obſerve, that a diſtinction ought to be made with reſpect to the *relative importance*

portance and *mutual ſubordination* of the different poſitions contended for in this treatiſe. The principal object is, to prove the uniform compoſition of man, or that what we call *mind*, or the principle of perception and thought, is not a ſubſtance diſtinct from the body, but the reſult of corporeal organization; and what I have advanced preliminary to this, concerning the *nature of matter*, though ſubſervient to this argument, is by no means eſſential to it: for whatever matter be, I think I have ſufficiently proved that the human mind is nothing more than a modification of it.

Again, that man is wholly material is eminently ſubſervient to the doctrine of the *proper*, or *mere humanity* of Chriſt. For, if no man has a ſoul diſtinct from his body, Chriſt, who, in all other reſpects, appeared as a man, could not have had a ſoul which had exiſted before his body; and the whole doctrine of the *pre-exiſtence of ſouls* (of which the opinion of the pre-exiſtence of Chriſt was a branch) will be effectually overturned. But I apprehend that,

that, ſhould I have failed in the proof of the materiality of man, arguments enow remain, independent of this, to prove the non pre-exiſtence of Chriſt, and of this doctrine having been introduced into chriſtianity from the ſyſtem of Oriental philoſophy.

Laſtly, the doctrine of *neceſſity*, maintained in the Appendix, is the immediate reſult of the doctrine of the materiality of man; for mechaniſm is the undoubted conſequence of materialiſm. But whether man be wholly material or not, I apprehend that proof enough is advanced that every human volition is ſubject to certain fixed laws, and that the pretended *ſelf-determining power* is altogether imaginary and impoſſible.

In ſhort, it is my firm perſuaſion, that the three doctrines of *materialiſm*, of that which is commonly called *Socinianiſm*, and of philoſophical *neceſſity*, are equally parts of *one ſyſtem*, being equally founded on juſt obſervations of nature, and fair deductions from the ſcriptures; and that whoever ſhall

duly conſider their *connection*, and *dependence on one another*, will find no ſufficient conſiſtency in any general ſcheme of principles, that does not comprehend them all. At the ſame time each of theſe doctrines ſtands on its own independent foundation, and is capable of ſuch ſeparate demonſtration, as ſubjects of a moral nature require, or admit.

I have advanced what has occurred to me in ſupport of all the three parts of this ſyſtem; confident that, in due time, the truth will bear down before it every oppoſing prejudice, how inveterate ſoever, and gain a firm eſtabliſhment in the minds of all men.

ADDITIONAL

ADDITIONAL ILLUSTRATIONS.

I. *Of the Nature of Matter.*

SEVERAL of my friends have propoſed to me queries concerning the *phyſical indiviſible points*, of which I have ſometimes ſuppoſed matter to conſiſt. But I beg it may be conſidered, that the only mention I have made of ſuch *points* is in the extract from my *Hiſtory of Viſion*, &c. in which I gave an account of the hypotheſis of Father Boſcovich and Mr. Michell, adding only a ſingle obſervation of my own; and that, in what properly belongs to the *Diſquiſitions*, I have not, as far as I can recollect, encumbered my doctrine with any of the difficulties attending the conſideration of the *internal ſtructure of matter*; concerning which we know, indeed, very little; having few *data* to argue from.

In this *metaphyſical work*, I have confined myſelf to the excluſion of the property of *impenètrability*, which is generally conſidered as eſſential to all matter, and to the claim of the property of *attraction* or *repulſion*, as appearing to me not to be properly what is *imparted* to matter, but what really *makes is to be what it is*, in ſo much that, without it, it would be nothing at all; which is giving it the ſame rank and importance that has uſually been aſſigned to the property of *ſolidity* or *impenetrability*. By this means it is that I leave no room for the popular objection to the materiality of man founded on the idea of matter, as *ſolid* and *inert*, being incapable of the powers of ſenſation and thought.

This, I ſay, is all that my purpoſe in the *Diſquiſitions* requires; and ſo far I ſee no difficulty, that appears to me to be of much moment, and the argument lies in a very ſmall compaſs. I deny that matter is impenetrable to other matter, becauſe I know no one *fact*, to the explanation of which that ſuppoſition is neceſſary; all thoſe facts which

which led philoſophers to this ſuppoſition, later, and more accurate obſervations, having ſhewn to be owing to, *ſomething elſe* than ſolidity or impenetrability, viz. a *power of repulſion*, which, for that reaſon, I would ſubſtitute in its place. As other philoſophers have ſaid "Take away ſolidity, and "matter vaniſhes:" ſo, I ſay, "Take "away attraction and repulſion, and mat-"ter vaniſhes." Alſo, if any perſon aſks *what it is* that attracts and repels, or what is left when the powers of attraction and repulſion are taken away, I, in my turn, aſk, What is it that is ſolid, or what is left when the property of ſolidity is taken away. The immaterialiſt, whether his immaterial ſubſtance be extended, or not, cannot, with the leaſt reaſon, aſk ſuch a queſtion as this. If he do, he muſt be effectually ſilenced by being aſked, what will be left of *ſpirit*, when the powers of ſenſation and thought are taken from it. If the immaterial ſubſtance he contends for be extended, it muſt, in that caſe, be reduced to *mere ſpace*, and if it be not extended, it muſt be reduced to *nothing at all*.

It is, moreover, not a little remarkable, that, according to the common hypotheſis, ſpirit, though deſtitute of ſolidity, has the power of acting upon matter, or in other words, has the ſame property of attraction and repulſion with reſpect to matter, that I aſcribe to unſolid matter; ſo that it is with a very ill grace indeed that the abettors of that hypotheſis can object to mine, that nothing will remain when the powers of attraction and repulſion are withdrawn.

Farther than this, which I think very clear ground, it does not appear to me that I have any proper call, or buſineſs, to proceed. In what *manner* matter, penetrable or impenetrable, is formed, with what interſtices, &c. and how far the powers which we aſcribe to it may be ſaid to *inhere in*, or *belong to* it, or how far they are the effect of a *foreign power*, viz. that of the deity, concerns not my ſyſtem in particular. And whatever difficulties may be ſtarted as reſulting from theſe conſiderations, the very ſame, I think, or greater, may fairly be charged upon the oppoſite ſyſtem.

ſyſtem. If I have advanced beyond theſe narrow bounds, it has been inadvertently, and for the ſake of anſwering objections. The metaphyſician has no buſineſs to ſpeculate any farther, and the natural philoſopher will find, I imagine, but few *data* for farther ſpeculation.

In fact, what I have advanced above is all that I have aſcribed to that excellent and truly cautious philoſopher Mr. Michell. See *Diſquiſitions*, p. 21. I will venture, however, in order to give all the ſatisfaction I am able to the inquiſitive natural philoſopher, to go one ſtep farther in this ſpeculation, on the idea ſuggeſted at the concluſion of my account of that hypotheſis, p. 33. I am well aware that the generality of my readers will revolt at the ideas I am about to preſent to them; but I beg their patient attention, and I may perhaps convince them, that the common hypotheſis, when conſidered in connection with *facts*, is no leſs revolting.

Suppoſe then that the Divine Being, when he created *matter*, only fixed certain

centers of various attractions and repulſions extending indefinitely in all directions, the whole effect of them to be upon each other; theſe centers approaching to, or receding from each other, and conſequently carrying their peculiar ſpheres of attraction and repulſion along with them, according to certain definite circumſtances. It cannot be denied that theſe ſpheres may be diverſified infinitely, ſo as to correſpond to all the kinds of bodies that we are acquainted with, or that are poſſible. For all effects in which bodies are concerned, and of which we can be ſenſible by our eyes, touch, &c. may be reſolved into attraction or repulſion.

A compages of theſe centers, placed within the ſphere of each others attraction, will conſtitute a body that we term *compact*; and two of theſe bodies will, on their approach, meet with a repulſion or reſiſtance, ſufficient to prevent one of them from occupying the place of the other, without a much greater force than we are capable of employing, ſo that to us they will appear perfectly hard.

As in the conſtitution of all actual bodies that we are acquainted with, theſe centers are placed ſo near to each other, that, in every diviſion that we can make, we ſtill leave parts which contain many of theſe centers, we, reaſoning by analogy, ſuppoſe that every particle of matter is infinitely diviſible; and the *ſpace* it occupies is certainly ſo. But, ſtrictly ſpeaking, as theſe centers which conſtitute any body are not abſolutely infinite, it muſt be naturally poſſible to come, by diviſion, to one ſingle center, which could not be ſaid to be diviſible, or even to occupy any portion of ſpace, though its ſphere of action ſhould extend ever ſo far; and had only *one* ſuch center of attraction, &c. exiſted, its exiſtence could not have been known, becauſe there would have been nothing on which its action could have been exerted; and there being no *effect*, there could not have been any ground for ſuppoſing a *cauſe*.

Father Boſcovich ſuppoſes that no two of theſe centers can ever coincide, the reſiſtance at the point itſelf being infinite. But admitting

admitting their coincidence, they would only form *another center*, with different powers, thoſe belonging to one center modifying thoſe belonging to the other. Had their powers been *the very ſame* before ſuch coincidence, at the ſame diſtances, they would have been juſt doubled at thoſe diſtances. Alſo, though united by one cauſe, they might poſſibly be ſeparated by another.

To philoſophical people, and I am not now writing for the uſe of any other, I do not need to explain myſelf any farther. They will eaſily ſee, or F. Boſcovich, in his elaborate work will ſhew them, that this hypotheſis will account for all the phenomena of nature.

The principal objection to this hypotheſis is, that matter is, by this means, reſolved into nothing but the *divine agency*, exerted according to certain rules. But as, upon the common hypotheſis, it has been again and again admitted, that, notwithſtanding the exiſtence of ſolid matter, every thing is really *done* by the divine power, what material

terial objection can there be to every thing *being* the divine power. There is, at leaſt, this advantage in the ſcheme, that it ſuppoſes *nothing to be made in vain.*

Admitting that bodies conſiſt of ſolid atoms, there is no ſort of connection between the idea of them, and that of *attraction*; ſo that it is impoſſible to conceive that any one atom ſhould approach another without a *foreign power*, viz. that of the deity; and therefore bodies conſiſting of ſuch atoms could not hold together, ſo as to conſtitute *compact ſubſtances*, without this conſtant agency.

There is, again, as little connection between the idea of theſe ſolid atoms, and that of *repulſion at the leaſt diſtance from the point of contact.* So that, ſince the conſtituent particles of no ſubſtance actually touch one another, as is evident from the effects of cold (which brings them nearer together) their coherence cannot be accounted for without the conſtant agency of the ſame external power. And though mere *reſiſtance* (not repulſion) *at the place of contact* might be explained on the principle

ciple of ſolidity, it is remarkable, that in no *known caſe* of reſiſtance can it be proved, that real contact is concerned, and in moſt caſes of reſiſtance it is demonſtrable that there is no real contact; and therefore there can be no *reaſon from fact* to believe that there is any ſuch thing as real contact in nature; ſo that if there be ſuch a thing as ſolid matter, it is altogether *ſuperfluous*, being no way concerned in producing any effect whatever.

If I have bewildered myſelf, and my reader, with this ſpeculation, I can only ſay that I have been drawn into it, when I would willingly acquieſce in what I have obſerved concerning the ſimple *penetrability of matter*; confeſſing myſelf unable to proceed any farther on tolerably ſure ground, and my readineſs to abandon all this hypotheſis, whenever a better, that is, one more nearly correſponding to facts, ſhall be ſuggeſted to me: and I own that I ſhould much prefer an hypotheſis which ſhould make proviſion for the uſe of created matter without the neceſſity of ſuch a *particular*

ticular agency as the preceding hypotheſis requires; though, of the two, I ſhall certainly prefer one which admits of nothing being made in vain.

Being, however, engaged thus far, I muſt be permitted to advance one ſtep farther, for the ſake of obſerving, that there is nothing more approaching to *impiety* in my ſcheme than in the common one. On this hypotheſis every thing is the *divine power*; but ſtill, ſtrictly ſpeaking, every thing is not *the Deity himſelf*. The centers of attraction, &c. are fixed by him, and all action is his action; but ſtill theſe centers are no part of *himſelf*, any more than the ſolid matter ſuppoſed to be created by him. Nor, indeed, is making the deity to *be*, as well as to *do* every thing, *in this ſenſe*, any thing like the opinion of Spinoza; becauſe I ſuppoſe a ſource of infinite power, and ſuperior intelligence, from which all inferior beings are derived, that every inferior intelligent being has a conſciouſneſs diſtinct from that of the ſupreme intelligence, that they will for ever continue diſtinct,

tinct, and that their happineſs or miſery to endleſs ages will depend upon their conduct in this ſtate of probation and diſcipline.

On the other hand, the common hypotheſis is much leſs favourable to piety, in that it ſuppoſes ſomething to be *independent of the divine power*. Exclude the idea of deity on my hypotheſis, and every thing except *ſpace*, neceſſarily vaniſhes with it; ſo that the Divine Being, and his energy, are abſolutely neceſſary to that of every other being. His power is the very *life and ſoul* of every thing that exiſts; and, ſtrictly ſpeaking, *without him, we* ARE, as well as, *can* DO *nothing*. But exclude the idea of Deity on the common hypotheſis, and the idea of *ſolid matter* is no more excluded, than that of *ſpace*. It remains a problem, therefore, whether matter be at all dependent upon God, whether it be *in his power* either to *annihilate*, or to *create* it; a difficulty that has ſtaggered many, and on which the doctrine of *two original independent principles* was built. My hypotheſis, whatever other defects it may have, leaves

leaves no foundation for this *ſyſtem of impiety*; and in this reſpect it has, I think, a great and deſirable advantage.

I own that, for my part, I feel an inexpreſſible ſatisfaction in the idea of that moſt intimate connection which, on my hypotheſis, myſelf, and every thing in which I am concerned, have with the deity. On his will I am entirely dependent for my *being*, and all my *faculties*. My ſphere, and degree of influence on other beings and other things, is *his* influence. I am but an inſtrument in his hands for effecting a certain part of the greateſt and moſt glorious of purpoſes. I am happy in *ſeeing* a little of this purpoſe, happier in the *belief* that the operations in which I am concerned, are of infinitely greater moment than I am capable of comprehending, and in the perſuaſion that, in the continuance of my exiſtence, I ſhall ſee more and more of this great purpoſe, and of the relation that myſelf and my ſphere of influence bear to it. Let the abettors of the common hypotheſis ſay more than this

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if they can, or any thing different from this, that ſhall give them more ſatisfaction.

II. *Of the connection between ſenſation and organization.*

I have been aſked, whether I conſider the powers of ſenſation and thought as *neceſſarily reſulting* from the organization of the brain, or as ſomething independent of organization, but *ſuperadded* and *communicated* to the ſyſtem afterwards; having expreſſed myſelf doubtfully, and perhaps variouſly on the ſubject. *

I anſwer, that my idea *now* is, that ſenſation and thought do neceſſarily reſult from the organization of the brain, when the powers of mere *life* are given to the ſyſtem. For I can eaſily conceive a perfect man to be formed without life, that is, without reſpiration,

* In the *Eſſay* prefixed to my edition of Hartley, I expreſſed myſelf with abſolute uncertainty in this reſpect, "I "rather think that the whole man is of ſome uniform com- "poſition, and that the property of perception, as well as "the other powers that are termed mental, is the reſult "(whether neceſſary, or not) of ſuch an organical ſtructure "as that of the brain."

reſpiration, or the circulation of the blood, or whatever elſe it be in which life more properly conſiſts, and conſequently without every thing neceſſarily depending upon life; but I cannot imagine that a human body, completely organized, and having life, would want ſenſation and thought. This I ſuppoſe to follow *of courſe*, as much as the circulation of the blood follows reſpiration; and if there be any expreſſions in my work that intimate the contrary, I ſhall take care to alter them.

As to the *manner* in which the power of perception reſults from organization and life, I own I have no idea at all; but the *fact* of this connection does not appear to me to be, on that account, the leſs certain. Senſation and thought do always accompany ſuch an organization; and having never known them to be ſeparated, we have no reaſon to ſuppoſe that they *can* be ſeparated. When, therefore, God had made man of the *duſt of the earth*; nothing was wanting to make him all that he is, viz. a *living ſoul*, but ſimply the *breath of life*.

In all other cafes we deem it fufficient to fay that certain circumftances are the caufes, and the *neceffary caufes*, of certain appearances, if the appearances always accompany the circumftances. We are not, for example, in the leaft able to conceive how it is that a magnet attracts iron; but having obferved that it never fails to do it, we conclude that, though we do not fee the *proximate caufe*, or *how* the attraction is effected, the magnet nevertheleſs *has* that power, and muft ceafe to be a magnet before it can lofe it; fo that our reafoning with refpect to the refult of fenfation from organization is exactly fimilar to our reafoning concerning the attraction of iron by magnetifm.

Alfo, for the very fame reafon that it is faid that it is not the organized body that feels and thinks, but an *immaterial fubftance* refiding in the body, and that will remain when the body is deftroyed, we might fay that it is not the material magnet that attracts, but a peculiar immaterial fubftance within

within it, that produces the effect, and that will remain when the material magnet is deſtroyed. And, for the ſame reaſon, we may imagine *diſtinct immaterial ſubſtances* for every operation in nature, the proximate cauſe of which we are not able to perceive.

The manner in which the aſſociation of ideas is formed, or in which motives influence the mind, was equally unknown; but aſſociation of ideas was nevertheleſs known to be a *fact*, and the influence of motives was not, on that account, denied. But now that Dr. Hartley has ſhewn us what ideas probably are, we ſee much farther into the *mechaniſm of the mind*. We ſee *how* one idea is connected with another, and *the manner* in which motives (which are only trains of ideas) produce their effect. Now we are not more (or not much more) ignorant how ſenſation reſults from organization, than we were how the motion of the hand reſults from a volition, or how a volition is produced by a motive, which

are now no longer ſuch very difficult problems. It is not impoſſible but that in time we may ſee *how* it is that ſenſation reſults from organization.

III. *A general view of the origin and progreſs of opinions relating to the* ESSENCE OF THE SOUL, *with ſome conſiderations on the notion of its being an* EXTENDED, *though an* IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCE.

After the deduction that I have given of the hiſtory of opinions concerning the ſoul in the *Diſquiſitions*, it may be uſeful to give a ſummary view of the whole, that the ſeveral ſteps in the progreſs, and their natural connection, may more eaſily appear.

Man is a being poſſeſſed of various faculties, or powers. He can *ſee*, *hear*, *ſmell*, *feel*, *walk*, *think*, and *ſpeak*. He is alſo a very complex being, conſiſting of various diſtinct parts, ſome of which are evidently appropriated to ſome of theſe powers, and others to others of them. Thus it is the eye only that ſees, the ear that hears, the noſe

noſe that ſmells, the feet that walk, and the tongue is of principal uſe in modulating the voice. What it is in man that *thinks* is not ſo obvious, and the opinions concerning it have been various. I apprehend, however, that it was always ſuppoſed to be ſomething *within* a man, and not any part that was conſpicuous.

The writers of the Old Teſtament ſeem to have conceived of it variouſly, ſometimes referring it to the *heart*, perhaps as the moſt central part of man, as when the Pſalmiſt ſays, *My heart is inditing a good matter*, &c. but at other times to the *reins*, as *My reins inſtruct me in the night ſeaſon*. The *paſſions* are generally ſeated by them in the heart, but the ſentiments of pity and commiſeration are more frequently aſſigned to the *bowels*, which are ſaid to yearn over an object of diſtreſs. It is remarkable that the *head*, or *brain*, never ſeems to have been conſidered by them as having any thing to do in the buſineſs of thinking, or in any mental affection whatever. But the reaſon of it may be that ſtrong mental af-

fections were ſooner obſerved to affect the heart, reins and bowels, than the head.

In antient times the ſimple power of *life* was generally thought to be in the *breath*, or animal *heat*, becauſe breathing and warmth are the univerſal concomitants of life. I do not, however, recollect that the latter idea ever occurs in the ſcriptures, but there life is ſometimes ſaid to be in the *blood*.

When men reflected a little farther, and began to conceive that poſſibly both the property of *life*, and alſo all the powers that we term *mental*, might belong to the ſame thing, the breath (the ſuppoſed principle of life) was imagined to be competent to the whole; and then the idea of a *ſoul* was completely formed. Conſequently, it was firſt conceived to be an aerial, or an igneous ſubſtance, which animates the body during life, and makes its eſcape at death; after which it was ſuppoſed to be either detained near the place where the body was depoſited, being held by a kind of

of attraction, or an affection to its former companion, or to rise in the atmosphere to a region in which it was counterpoised by the surrounding elements.

We may smile at the ignorance of mankind in early ages, in supposing that the breath of life could be any thing more than part of the common air, which was first inspired, and then expired. But though this be a thing well known in the present age, I can easily conceive that, when the nature of air and respiration were little understood, men might not immediately conceive that the breath, though it mixed with the air, and was invisible, was therefore the very same thing with it. They might well enough imagine that it was something distinct from it, which was in part drawn in and out during the continuance of life, and wholly discharged and set loose at death. There are other instances of the ignorance of the antients in matters of philosophy, and even in tolerably enlightened ages, almost, if not altogether, as gross as this.

When, at length, it was discovered that the breath was nothing more than the air, still the idea of an *invisible principle of life and thought* being once fixed, would not be immediately exploded, but would be supposed to be a substance more attenuated, and refined; as being, for instance, of an *ethereal* or *fiery* nature, &c. still invisible, and more active.

Whatever was the invisible substance of which the human soul consisted, the *universal soul* of the heathen philosophers, or the *divine essence*, was supposed to be the very same; and all other souls were supposed to have been parts of it, to have been detached from it, and to be finally resumed into it again. In this state of opinions, therefore, the soul was supposed to be what we should now call *an attenuated kind of matter*, capable of division, as all other matter is.

This was the notion adopted by the christian Fathers from the Oriental and Platonic system of philosophy, and therefore many of these Fathers did not scruple

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to assert that the soul, though conceived to be a thing distinct from the body, was properly *corporeal*, and even *naturally mortal*. The opinion, however, of its being naturally immortal gained ground; and, *matter*, according to the philosophical system, being considered as a thing that was necessarily *perishable*, as well as *impure*, the doctrine of the immateriality as well as of the immortality of the soul was pretty firmly established; an immaterial substance being, however, still considered as only something more refined than gross matter.

The idea of the soul being immaterial soon led to the idea of its not having any property in common with gross matter, and in time with matter strictly considered; and being confounded with, and illustrated by, the idea of the *principle of life*, it was asserted to have no length, breadth, or thickness, which are properties peculiar to matter; to be *indivisible* also, and finally *not to exist in space*. This was the idea that generally prevailed after the time of Mamertus, though various other refinements occur

occur in the writings of the ſchoolmen upon the ſubject.

But the doctrine of *pure ſpiritualiſm* was not firmly eſtabliſhed before Deſcartes, who, conſidering extenſion as the eſſence of matter, made the want of extenſion the diſtinguiſhing property of mind or ſpirit. Upon this idea was built the immaterial ſyſtem in its ſtate of greateſt refinement, when the ſoul was defined to be *immaterial*, *indiviſible*, *indiſcerptible*, *unextended*, and to have nothing to do with *locality* or *motion*, but to be a ſubſtance poſſeſſed of the ſimple powers of thought, and to have nothing more than an arbitrary connection with an organized ſyſtem of matter.

This was the idea of mind or ſpirit that was prevalent about the time of Mr. Locke, who contributed greatly to lower it, by contending that whatever exiſts muſt exiſt *ſomewhere*, or in *ſome place*, and by ſhewing that, for any thing that we know to the contrary, the power of thought may be ſuperadded by the Divine Being to an organized ſyſtem of mere matter, though at the

ſame

ſame time declaring himſelf in favour of the notion of a ſeparate ſoul. From this time, the doctrine of the nature of the ſoul has been fluctuating and various; ſome ſtill maintaining that it has no property whatever in common with matter, and bears no relation to ſpace, whereas others ſay that it exiſts in ſpace, and occupies a portion of it, ſo as to be properly extended, but not to have ſolidity, which they make to be the property that diſtinguiſhes it from matter.

The object of my late work is to prove that the doctrine of a ſoul is altogether unphiloſophical, and unſcriptural; for that, judging from the phenomena, all the powers of *the ſame being*, viz. *man*, ought to be referred to *one ſubſtance*, which, therefore, muſt neceſſarily be *the body*, and that the refined and proper ſpiritualiſm above deſcribed is peculiarly chimerical and abſurd. Abſurd, however, as is the notion of a ſubſtance which has *no property in common with matter*, which bears *no relation to ſpace*, and yet both acts upon body, and is acted upon by it, it is the doctrine that, in the courſe of

of gradual refinement, philoſophers and divines were neceſſarily brought to, and is the only conſiſtent immaterialiſm. For every other opinion concerning ſpirit makes it to be, in fact, the ſame thing with matter; at leaſt every other opinion is liable to objections ſimilar to thoſe which lie againſt the notion of a ſoul properly material. Becauſe, however, I have not been thought to have given ſufficient attention to this idea of *extended ſpirit*, I ſhall here make a few animadverſions upon it.

1. The chief reaſon why the principle of thought has been ſuppoſed to be incompatible with matter, is that there is no *conceivable connection* between *thought* and *ſolidity*, that the two ideas are altogether different, and *diſſimilar*. But is there any more conceivable connection between thought and mere *extenſion*? Are ideas, according to the opinion of the perſons who hold this doctrine, extended things? Is the *judgment* extended, is the will *extended*, or have the *paſſions* extenſion? How, then, do they require an extended ſubſtance in which to inhere?

inhere? If there be ſome unknown reaſon why they *do* require an extended *ſubſtratum*, may not this ſubſtance have *ſolidity* added to its extenſion, the idea of ſolidity not being more foreign to the idea of thought, than that of extenſion, nor more diſſimilar to it.

2. The eſſence of the ſoul, it is ſaid, cannot be matter, becauſe it would then be *diviſible*; but is not every thing that is extended diviſible? It is not the ſolidity of bodies that makes them capable of diviſion ſo properly as their extenſion. It is this property that makes diviſion poſſible; and then all that is neceſſary to actual diviſion is *diſcerptibility*, or the poſſible ſeparation of one part of its ſubſtance from another. For wherever there is extenſion, there muſt be conceivable parts, viz. a half, a third, a fourth, &c. But till the ſubſtance of which the ſoul (excluſive of its power of thinking) conſiſts be more known to us, ſo that we can ſubject it to a rigorous examination, it is impoſſible to ſay whether it be more or leſs diſcerptible than any ſpecies of

of matter; for all that we know of it is that it is *extended*, and that it *thinks*. The firmneſs of its texture, is a thing of which we have no knowledge at all; and if it be any thing more than *mere ſpace*, it muſt have that which may be called *texture*, or *conſiſtence*, ſolid or fluid, elaſtic or non-elaſtic, &c. &c. Conſequently, it may, for any thing we know, be as corruptible, and periſhable, as the body. The boaſted *unity of conſciouſneſs*, and *ſimplicity of perception and thought*, can be no ſecurity againſt diviſion and diſſolution, unleſs they inhere in a ſubſtance naturally incapable of diviſion, and conſequently of diſſolution.

3. As diviſibility may always be predicated of any ſubſtance that is extended, and not infinite, I wiſh the advocates of this doctrine of extended ſpirit would conſider a little what would be the probable conſequence of an actual diviſion of it. Suppoſing the ſubſtance of a human ſoul to be divided into two equal parts (which to divine power muſt, at leaſt, be poſſible) would the power of thinking be neceſſarily deſtroyed,

deſtroyed, or would the reſult be *two ſpirits*, of inferior powers, as of ſmaller ſize? If ſo, would each of them retain the conſciouſneſs of the whole undivided ſoul, or would the ſtock of ideas be equally divided between them?

4. As every created being muſt *exiſt* before it can *act*, I wiſh the advocates of this doctrine would conſider what idea they can form of the extended ſubſtance of a ſpirit before it has acquired any ideas at all, and conſequently before it has begun to think. In what will it differ from mere ſpace? Whatever this ſtate be, in what does it differ from the ſtate of the ſoul whenever it ceaſes to think, as in a deep ſleep, a ſwoon, or the ſtate between death and the reſurrection!

5. I would alſo ſubmit it to the conſideration of the partiſans of *extended ſpiritualiſm*, what *ſize* or *ſhape* they would give to the human ſoul (for if it be extended, ſize and ſhape it muſt have) and whether ſome inconvenience may not ariſe to their ſyſtem

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in the diſcuſſion of the queſtion. If nothing can act but where it is, I ſhould think that the ſoul muſt have the ſize and form of the brain, if not of the whole nervous ſyſtem. For there is no region within the brain of leſs extent than the medullary part of it, that can be imagined to be the *ſenſorium*, or the immediate ſeat of ſenſation; and as the nerves conſiſt of the ſame ſubſtance with the medullary part of the brain, and are properly a production, or part of it, I do not ſee why the ſoul ſhould be confined to the ſize of the brain only, excluſive of the nerves; and then as the nerves are in every part of the body, the ſoul would, in fact, be of the ſame form and ſize with the body to which it belongs, though with more interſtices.

6. It is alſo a matter of ſome curioſity to the ſpeculatiſt to conſider whether the ſize and form of theſe extended ſouls be invariable, or whether, as we ſuppoſe the body to undergo ſome change at the reſurrection, in order to adapt it to its new mode of exiſtence, the ſoul may not undergo

a proportionable change, and be transformed together with it.

7. We are apt to impoſe upon ourſelves, and to confound our underſtandings, by the uſe of *general terms*. To gain clear perceptions of things we muſt inſpect them more cloſely, in order to diſcover what particular and more *definite ideas* are neceſſarily comprized in the more general ones. Thus while we content ourſelves with ſaying that man is a compound being, conſiſting of two ſubſtances, the one *corporeal* and the other *ſpiritual*, the one both extended and ſolid, and the other extended indeed, but deſtitute of ſolidity; and that an intimate union ſubſiſts between them, ſo that they always *accompany* and *affect* one another (an impreſſion upon the body cauſing a ſenſation in the mind, and a volition of the mind cauſing a motion of the body) we are ſatisfied. The hypotheſis ſeems to correſpond to the *firſt view* of the phenomena; and though we cannot help being ſtaggered when we conſider this intimate union of two ſuch *heterogeneous ſubſtances*,

we ſtill acquieſce in it, as an union effected by almighty power; and we are likewiſe repelled from a rigorous examination of it by the idea, however ill-founded, that our proſpects of a future life are materially affected by it.

But a future life being ſecured to us by the promiſes of the goſpel, upon *other and better principles*, we need not be afraid to conſider what this ſuppoſed union of body and ſoul really implies, and it appears to me to imply that the ſoul, having *locality*, and *extenſion*, muſt have *ſolidity* alſo.

That the mind ſhould move the body, and at the ſame time *move itſelf* along with the body, we may think a tolerable eaſy ſuppoſition; but what ſhall we ſay to the caſe of the body being moved during ſleep, or a ſwoon, to which removal the mind does not at all contribute. It will hardly be ſaid that, in this caſe, the ſoul is firſt of all left behind, in the place from which the body was taken, and that it aftewards *voluntarily* joins its former companion.

And,

And, if not, the motion of the mind muſt, in all caſes, *neceſſarily* accompany the motion of the living body, or, in other words, the mind muſt be *involuntarily dragged* along with it. But can this motion be communicated from *body* to *mind* without real *impulſe*, implying a *vis inertiæ*, and *ſolidity*, without which, it ſhould ſeem, that the one cannot lay hold of the other?

8. It will alſo, I think, be difficult to account for the ſeparation of the ſoul from the body after death, unleſs the ſpiritual ſubſtance be ſuppoſed to be a proper conſtituent part of the *ſolid maſs*, which, like fixed air in bodies, is ſet looſe when the reſt of the maſs is diſſolved by putrefaction, or otherwiſe. If putrefaction, or total diſſolution, be the phyſical cauſe of this ſeparation, is there not a good foundation for the practice of the Egyptians, who preſerved the bodies of their friends as long as they poſſibly could, probably with a view of retaining their ſouls in them, or near them?

If the ſoul be really inſeparable from the body, which is probably the opinion of thoſe who maintain that, during the death of the body, the ſoul is in a ſtate of inſenſibility until the reſurrection, what part of the body does it accompany? If it be indiſcerptible, it muſt be wholly in ſome one place; and as all the conſtitutent parts of every member of the body are completely diſſolved and diſperſed, it muſt, in fact, accompany ſome one of the *ultimate particles*, and which of them can that be?

If the extended ſpirit does *not* accompany any particle of the diſſolved body, and all ſouls be preſerved, during their dormant ſtate, in ſome *general repoſitory* (whether in the ſun, the earth, or ſome part of the intermediate ſpace) in what manner will the re-union of the ſouls and their reſpective bodies be effected at the reſurrection? Will it be by any thing like what is called *elective attraction* between them, or will it be effected by a new and expreſs *fiat* of the deity?

Theſe objections do not much, if at all, affect the doctrine of *ſpirit bearing no relation to*

to ſpace, or any ſpeculation concerning the divine eſſence, which fills all ſpace.

9. Many other queries will neceſſarily obtrude themſelves on any perſon who ſhall begin to ſpeculate on the nature of extended ſpiritual ſubſtances, which it will be impoſſible to diſmiſs without ſome degree of attention; and it appears to me that, let the advocates for this doctrine anſwer them in whatever manner they pleaſe, they muſt occaſion ſome degree of embarraſſment, ſo as to leave a ſuſpicion of the doctrine from which they ariſe, as wanting a ſufficient foundation in probability and truth; ſuch as, What is the origin, or commencement, of the extended ſpirit? Is every ſoul a ſeparate creation, or, are ſouls propagated from each other like bodies? Does it grow in ſize with the growth of the body and brain? Are theſe extended ſpirits mutually penetrable to each other? There can be no doubt but that they muſt occupy a portion of the ſame univerſal ſpace that is already occupied by the divine eſſence. Is the eſſence of theſe extended ſpirits ſimilar

to that of the deity, and will no impediment arise from this necessary mutual penetration?

Many more observations might be made on this notion of extended spirit, which appears to me not to have been sufficiently considered by those who hold it. They have concluded, or rather, have taken it for granted, that there is in man a soul distinct from his body, but they revolt at the idea of this soul having no extension, or relation to space, and therefore admit that it has these properties; but, being driven by mere necessity to admit thus much, they are unwilling to consider the subject any farther, and shut their eyes on all the concomitants and consequences of their concessions; though, if they would attend to them, they would find them such as would probably make them revolt at the whole system. Their arguments for a separate soul from the topics of thought being dissimilar to matter, from the unity of consciousness, indiscerptibility, &c. properly belong to the advocates for refined spiritualism, and

are

are impertinently and ineffectually alledged by thoſe, who, admitting a real extenſion, and conſequently real ſize and form in the ſoul, in vain imagine that they are advocates for the doctrine of proper immateriality. In fact, they are themſelves *ſemi-materialiſts*.

How eaſy is it to get rid of all the embarraſſment attending the doctrine of a ſoul, in every view of it, by admitting, agreeably to all the phenomena, that the power of thinking belongs to the *brain* of a man, as that of walking to his feet, or that of ſpeaking to his tongue; that, therefore, man, who is *one being*, is compoſed of *one kind of ſubſtance*, made of *the duſt of the earth*; that when he dies, he, of courſe, ceaſes to think; but when his *ſleeping duſt* ſhall be reanimated at the reſurrection, his power of thinking, and his conſciouſneſs, will be reſtored to him?

This ſyſtem gives a real value to the doctrine of *a reſurrection from the dead*, which is peculiar to revelation, on which

alone the ſacred writers build all our hope of a future life, and it explains the uniform language of the ſcriptures, which ſpeak of one day of judgment for all mankind, and repreſent all the rewards of virtue, and all the puniſhments of vice, as taking place at that awful day, and not before. This doctrine of a reſurrection was laughed at by the conceited Athenians, and will always be the ſubject of ridicule to perſons of a ſimilar turn of mind; but it is abundantly confirmed to us by the well atteſted reſurrection of Jeſus Chriſt, and the promiſes of the goſpel, eſtabliſhed on all the miraculous events by which the promulgation of chriſtianity was attended.

IV. *Of Conſciouſneſs.*

Since, in all metaphyſical ſubjects, there is a perpetual appeal made to *conſciouſneſs*, or *internal feeling*, that is, to what we certainly and intuitively know by reflecting on what paſſes within our own minds, and I have hitherto contented myſelf with noticing the particular inſtances in which I apprehended

apprehended ſome miſtake has been made with reſpect to it, as they occurred in the courſe of my argument; I ſhall here give a more general view of the ſubject, in order to acquaint my reader what things they are that, I apprehend, we *can* be conſcious of, and eſpecially to caution him againſt confounding them with thoſe things of which we are not properly conſcious, but which we only *infer* from them.

When we ſhut our eyes on the external world, and contemplate what we find within ourſelves, we firſt perceive the images, or the ideas of the objects by which our ſenſes have been impreſſed. Of theſe we are properly conſcious. They are what we immediately *obſerve*, and are not *deductions* from any prior obſervations.

In the next place, we know by intuition, or are conſcious, that theſe ideas appear, and re-appear, and that they are variouſly connected with each other, which is the foundation of *memory* or *recollection*. We alſo ſee that our ideas are variouſly *combined* and

and *divided*, and can perceive the other relations that they bear to each other, which is the foundation of *judgment*, and conſequently of *reaſoning*. And laſtly, we perceive that various bodily motions depend upon ideas and trains of ideas, from which ariſes what is called a *voluntary power* over our actions.

Theſe particulars, I apprehend, comprize all that we are properly conſcious of; and with reſpect to theſe it is hardly poſſible we can be miſtaken. But every thing that we pretend to know that is really more than theſe, muſt be by way of *inference* from them; and in drawing theſe inferences or concluſions, we are liable to miſtakes, as well as in other inferences. In fact, there is perhaps no ſubject whatever with reſpect to which we have more need of caution, from the danger we are in of imagining that our knowledge of things relating to ourſelves is *in the firſt inſtance*, when, in reality, it is in the *ſecond*, or perhaps the *third* or *fourth*.

If

If then, as I have obſerved, all that we are really conſcious of be our *ideas*, and the various *affections of our ideas*, which, when reduced to general heads, we call the *powers of thought*, as *memory*, *judgment*, and *will*, all our knowledge of the *ſubject of thought* within us, or what we call *ourſelves*, muſt be by way of *inference*. What we *feel*, and what we *do* we may be ſaid to know by intuition; but what we *are* we know only by deduction, or inference from intuitive obſervations. If, therefore, it be aſſerted, that the ſubject of thought is ſomething that is *ſimple*, *indiviſible*, *immaterial*, or *naturally immortal*, it can only be by way of concluſion from given premiſes. Conſequently, it is a deciſion for which no man's word is to be taken. We may *fancy* that it is ſomething that we feel, or are conſcious of, but, from the nature of the thing, it can only be that a man *reaſons* himſelf into that belief, and therefore he may, without having been aware of it, have impoſed upon himſelf by ſome fallacy in the argument.

Feeling

Feeling and *thinking* are allowed to be *properties*; and though all that we can know of any thing are its properties, we agree to ſay that all properties inhere in, or belong to, ſome *ſubject* or *ſubſtance*; but what this ſubſtance *is*, farther than its being poſſeſſed of thoſe very properties by which it is known to us, it is impoſſible for us to ſay, except we can prove that thoſe known properties neceſſarily imply others. If, therefore, any perſon ſay he is conſcious that his mind (by which we mean the ſubject of thought) is *ſimple*, or *indiviſible*, and if he ſpeak properly, he can only mean, that he is *one thinking perſon*, or *being*, and not *ſeveral*, which will be univerſally acknowledged. But if he means any thing more than this, as that the ſubſtance to which the property of thinking belongs is incapable of diviſion, either having no extenſion, or parts, or that thoſe parts cannot be removed from each other, I do not admit his aſſertion without hearing what *reaſons* he has to advance for it; being ſenſible that in this he goes beyond a proper conſciouſneſs. I may think it more probable, that

that every thing that exists must have extension, and that (except space, and the divine essence, which fills all space) whatever is extended may be divided, though that division might be attended with the loss of properties peculiar to the undivided substance.

Much farther must a man go beyond the bounds of proper *consciousness*, into those of *reasoning*, to say that the subject of his thinking powers is *immaterial*, or something different from the matter of which his body, and especially his brain, consists. For admitting all that he can know by *experience*, or *intuition*, I may think it more probable, that all the powers or properties of man inhere in *one kind* of substance; and since we are agreed that man consists, in part at least, of matter, I may conclude that he is wholly material, and may refuse to give up this opinion, till I be shown that the properties necessarily belonging to matter, and those of feeling and thinking, are incompatible. And before this can be determined, the *reasons for*, and *against* it must

muſt be attended to. It is a queſtion that cannot be decided by *ſimple feeling*.

Leſs ſtill can it be determined by conſciouſneſs that the ſubject of thought is *naturally immortal*, ſo that a man will continue to think and act after he has ceaſed to breathe and move. We are certainly conſcious of the ſame things with reſpect to ourſelves, but what one man may think to be very clear on this ſubject, another may think to be very doubtful, or exceedingly improbable; drawing different *concluſions* from the ſame premiſes.

Again, that man is an *agent*, meaning by it that he has a power of *beginning motion*, independently of any mechanical laws to which the author of his nature has ſubjected him, is a thing that is ſo far from being evident from conſciouſneſs, that, if we attend properly to what we really do feel, we ſhall, as I conceive, be ſatisfied that we have no ſuch power. What we really do feel, or may be ſenſible of, if we attend to our feelings, is that we never come

come to any reſolution, form any deliberate purpoſe, or determine upon any thing whatever, without ſome *motive*, ariſing from the ſtate of our minds, and the ideas preſent to them; and therefore we ought to conclude, that we have no power of reſolving, or determining upon any thing, without ſome motive. Conſequently, in the proper philoſophical language, motives ought to be denominated the *cauſes* of all our *determinations*, and therefore of all our *actions*.

All that men generally mean by a *conſciouſneſs of freedom*, is a conſciouſneſs of their having a power to do what they previouſly will, or pleaſe. This is allowed, and that it is a thing of which we are properly conſcious. But to will without a motive, or contrary to the influence of all motives preſented to the mind, is a thing of which no man *can* be conſcious. Nay every juſt obſervation concerning ourſelves, or others, appears to me very clearly to lead to the oppoſite concluſion, viz. that our *wills*, as well as our *judgments*, are determined by the *appearances of things* preſented

ſented to us; and therefore that the determinations of both are equally guided by certain invariable *laws*; and conſequently that every determination of the will or judgment is juſt what the being who made us ſubject to thoſe laws, and who always had, and ſtill has, the abſolute diſpoſal of us, muſt have intended that they ſhould be. If, however, this concluſion be denied, it muſt be controverted by *argument*, and the queſtion muſt not be decided by *conſciouſneſs*, or any pretended *feeling* of the contrary.

V. *An addition to ſection* II. *on the argument for the Doctrine of Neceſſity from the conſideration of* CAUSE AND EFFECT.

I do not think it at all neceſſary to add any thing to what I have advanced in my former treatiſe in illuſtration of the argument from the nature of *cauſe and effect*. But becauſe this is the great and moſt concluſive argument for the doctrine that I contend for, proving the contrary doctrine of *philoſophical liberty*, to be abſolutely *impoſſible*;

poſſible; and I find that ſeveral perſons, of excellent judgment in other reſpects, ſeem not to feel the force of it, I ſhall attempt a farther illuſtration of it, in order to remove, as far as I am able, the only remaining objection that I can imagine may be made to it; though I muſt aſk pardon of my other readers for writing what will appear to them ſo very obvious, and ſuperfluous.

It is univerſally acknowledged, that there can be no effect without an adequate cauſe. This is even the foundation on which the only proper argument for the being of a God reſts. And the neceſſarian aſſerts that if, in any given ſtate of mind, with reſpect both to *diſpoſition* and *motives*, two different determinations, or volitions, be poſſible, it can be ſo on no other principle, than that one of them ſhall come under the deſcription of *an effect without a cauſe*; juſt as if the beam of a balance might incline either way, though loaded with equal weights.

It is acknowledged that the mechaniſm of the balance is of one kind, and that of the mind of another, and therefore it may be convenient to denominate them by different words; as, for inſtance, that of the balance may be termed a *phyſical*, and that of the mind a *moral* mechaniſm. But ſtill, if there be a *real mechaniſm* in both caſes, ſo that there can be only one reſult from the ſame previous circumſtances, there will a *real neceſſity*, enforcing an abſolute certainty in the event. For it muſt be underſtood that all that is ever meant by *neceſſity in a cauſe*, is that which produces *certainty in the effect*.

If, however the term *neceſſity* give offence, I, for my part, have no objection to the diſuſe of it, provided we can expreſs, in any other manner, that property in cauſes, or the previous circumſtances of things, that leads to abſolute certainty in the effects that reſult from them; ſo that, without a miracle, or an over-ruling of the ſtated laws of nature, *i. e.* without the intervention of a higher cauſe, no determination

termination of the will could have been otherwiſe than it has been.

To evade the force of this argument from the nature of cauſe and effect, it is ſaid that, though, in a given ſtate of mind, two different determinations may take place, neither of them can be ſaid to be without a ſufficient cauſe; for that, in this caſe, the cauſe is *the mind itſelf*, which makes the determination in a manner independent of all influence of motives.

But to this I anſwer, that the mind itſelf, independent of the influence of every thing that comes under the deſcription of *motive*, bearing an equal relation to both the determinations, cannot poſſibly be conſidered as a cauſe with reſpect to either of them, in preference to the other. Becauſe, excluſive of what may properly be called motive, there is no imaginable difference in the circumſtances immediately preceding the determinations. Every thing tending to produce the leaſt degree of inclination to one of the determinations more

than to the other muſt make a difference in the *ſtate of mind* with reſpect to them, which, by the ſtating of the caſe, is expreſsly excluded. And I will venture to ſay, that no perſon, let his bias in favour of a ſyſtem be ever ſo great, will chuſe to ſay in ſupport of it, that the mind can poſſibly take one of two determinations, without having for it ſomething that may, at leaſt, be called an *inclination* for it, in preference to the other; and that inclination, or whatever elſe it be called, muſt have had a cauſe producing it, in ſome previous affection of the mind.

In ſhort, let ever ſo much ingenuity be ſhown in ſtating this caſe, it is impoſſible not to come at length to this concluſion, that, in no caſe whatever, can the mind be determined to action, *i. e.* to a volition, without ſomething that may as well be called a *motive* as be expreſſed in any other manner. For the reaſon, or proper cauſe, of every determination muſt neceſſarily be ſomething either in the ſtate of the mind itſelf, or in the ideas preſent to it, immediately

diately before the determination; and these ideas, as they impress the mind, may, strictly speaking, be comprehended in what we mean by the *state of mind*, including whatever there is in it that can lead to any determination whatever. Or, on the other hand, the state of mind may be included in the meaning of the term *motive*, comprehending in the signification of it whatever it be that can *move*, or *incline* the mind to any particular determination.

It appears to me that it may just as well be said that, in the case of the balance above-mentioned, the beam may be the cause why, though equal weights be suspended at the different ends of it, it may nevertheless incline one way or the other. For, exclusive of what necessarily comes under the description either of *motive*, or *state of mind*, the mind itself can no more be the cause of its own determination, than the beam of a balance can be the cause of its own inclination.

In the case of the beam it is immediately perceived that, bearing an equal relation to

both the weights, it cannot poſſibly favour one of them more than the other; and it is ſimply on account of its bearing an equal relation to them both that it cannot do this. Now, let the ſtructure of the mind be ever ſo different from that of the balance, it neceſſarily agrees with it in this, that, excluſive of motives, in the ſenſe explained above (viz. including both the ſtate of mind and the particular ideas preſent to it) it bears as equal a relation to any determination, as the beam of a balance bears to any particular inclination; ſo that as, on account of this circumſtance, the balance cannot, of itſelf incline one way or the other, ſo neither, on account of the ſame circumſtance, can the mind of itſelf incline, or determine, one way or the other.

In fact, an advocate for the doctrine of philoſophical liberty has the choice of no more than *two ſuppoſitions*, and neither of them can, in the leaſt degree, anſwer his purpoſe. For he muſt either aſſert that, in a given ſtate of mind, the determination will certainly be *a* and not *b*; or it may be either

either *a* or *b*. If he adopts the former, he may juſt as well ſay at once, that the determination will *neceſſarily* be *a*, and that without a miracle it cannot be *b*. For any other language that he can poſſibly uſe can do no more than ſerve to hide what might otherwiſe be obnoxious in the ſentiment, and will leave it ſtill true, that, without a miracle, or the intervention of ſome foreign cauſe, no volition, or action of any man could have been otherwiſe than it *has been*, *is*, or *is to be*, which is all that a neceſſarian contends for. And if, on the contrary, he chuſes to aſſert that, in the ſame ſtate of mind, the determinations *a* and *b* are equally poſſible, one of them muſt be *an effect without a cauſe*, a ſuppoſition which overturns all reaſoning concerning appearances in nature, and eſpecially the foundation of the only proper argument for the being of a God. For if any thing whatever, even a thought in the mind of man, could ariſe without an adequate cauſe, any thing elſe, the mind itſelf, or the whole univerſe, might likewiſe exiſt without a cauſe.

I own it is irkſome to me to enter into ſo minute a diſcuſſion of an objection that appears to me to be ſo little deſerving of an anſwer; and it is only with a view to obviate every thing that *has been*, or that I can foreſee *may be* urged, with the leaſt plauſibility, that I have conſidered it at all. If this do not give ſatisfaction, I own I do not think it will be in my power to give ſatisfaction with reſpect to this argument, or any other. There does not appear to me to be, in the whole compaſs of reaſoning, that I am acquainted with, a more concluſive argument, than that for the doctrine of neceſſity from the conſideration of the nature of *cauſe and effect*.

VI. *Of the nature of* REMORSE OF CONSCIENCE, *and of* PRAYING FOR THE PARDON OF SIN, *on the Doctrine of Neceſſity*.

Several perſons firmly perſuaded of the truth of the doctrine of neceſſity, yet ſay, that it is not poſſible to *act upon it*; and to put what they think a peculiarly difficult caſe,

caſe, they aſk how it is poſſible for a neceſſarian to pray for the pardon of ſin.

I anſwer, in general, that Dr. Hartley appears to me to have advanced what is quite ſufficient to obviate any difficulty that can ariſe from this view of the ſubject, when he admoniſhes us carefully to diſtinguiſh between the *popular* and *philoſophical language*, as correſponding to two very different views of human actions; according to one of which the bulk of mankind refer their actions to themſelves only, without having any diſtinct idea of the divine agency being, directly or indirectly, the cauſe of them: whereas, according to the other, we look beyond all ſecond cauſes, and conſider the agency of the firſt and proper cauſe, excluſive of every thing ſubordinate to it.

Theſe very different views of things muſt be attended with very different *feelings*; and, when ſeparated from each other, they will, in ſeveral reſpects, lead to a different *conduct*, as well as require a different *language*. Now, ſuch are the influences

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to which all mankind, without diſtinction, are expoſed, that they neceſſarily refer actions (I mean refer them ultimately) firſt of all to themſelves and others; and it is a long time before they begin to conſider themſelves and others as *inſtruments* in the hand of a ſuperior agent. Conſequently, the aſſociations which refer actions to themſelves get ſo confirmed, that they are never intirely obliterated; and therefore the common language, and the common feelings of mankind, will be adapted to the firſt, the limited and imperfect, or rather erroneous view of things.

The Divine Being could not be unapprized of this circumſtance, or unattentive to it; and he has wiſely adapted the ſyſtem of religion that he has preſcribed to us, the modes of our religious worſhip, and every thing belonging to it, to this imperfect view of things. It is a ſyſtem calculated for *the bulk of mankind*, and of philoſophers as partaking of the feelings of the bulk of mankind; and therefore, would, we may ſuppoſe, have been different if the bulk

bulk of mankind had been ſpeculatively and practically philoſophers; in ſome ſuch manner as the modes of worſhip varied in the Jewiſh and chriſtian churches.

But it is of prime conſequence in this buſineſs, that, in whatever *ſenſe*, or *degree*, any particular ſentiment or feeling is felt as improper by a neceſſarian, in the ſame ſenſe and degree his principles will make that ſentiment or feeling to be of no uſe to him. Thus, to apply this to the caſe in hand: if the ſentiments of ſelf-applauſe on the one hand, and of ſelf-reproach on the other be, in any ſenſe or degree, impoſſible to be felt by a neceſſarian, in the ſame ſenſe or degree (while he feels and acts like a neceſſarian) he will have no occaſion for thoſe ſentiments; his mind being poſſeſſed by a ſentiment of a much higher nature, that will intirely ſuperſede them, and anſwer their end in a much more effectual manner. And whenever his ſtrength of mind fails him, whenever he ceaſes to look to the firſt cauſe only, and reſts in ſecond cauſes, he will then neceſſarily feel the

the ſentiments of ſelf-applauſe and ſelf-reproach, which were originally ſuggeſted by that imperfect view of things into which he is relapſed.

Every man's feelings will neceſſarily be uniform. To be a neceſſarian in *ſpeculation*, and not in *practice*, is impoſſible, except in that ſenſe in which it is poſſible for a man to be a chriſtian in ſpeculation and a libertine in practice. In one ſenſe a ſpeculative chriſtian, or neceſſarian, may feel and act in a manner inconſiſtent with his principles; but if his faith be what Dr. Hartley calls a *practical* one, either in the doctrine of neceſſity, or the principles of chriſtianity, that is, if he really *feels* the principles, and if his affections and conduct be really directed by them, ſo that they have their natural influence on his mind, it will be impoſſible for him to be a bad man. What I mean, therefore, is that *a truly practical neceſſarian* will ſtand in no need of the ſentiments either of ſelf-applauſe, or ſelf-reproach. He will be under the influence of a much ſuperior principle,

loving

loving God and his fellow creatures (which is the ſum and object of all religion, and leading to every thing excellent in conduct) from motives altogether independent of any conſideration relating to himſelf. On this I need not enlarge in this place, if what I have advanced on the *moral influence of the doctrine of neceſſity*, in my Appendix, be conſidered.

It is acknowledged that a neceſſarian, who, as ſuch, believes that, ſtrictly ſpeaking, *nothing goes wrong*, but that every thing is under the beſt direction poſſible, himſelf, and his conduct, as part of an immenſe and *perfect whole*, included, cannot accuſe himſelf of having done wrong, in the ultimate ſenſe of the words. He has, therefore, in this ſtrict ſenſe, nothing to do with repentance, confeſſion, or pardon, which are all adapted to a different, imperfect, and fallacious view of things. But then, if he be really capable of ſteadily viewing the great ſyſtem, and his own conduct as a part of it, in this true light, his ſupreme regard to God, as the great, wiſe, and

and benevolent author of all things, his intimate communion with him, and devotedneſs to him, will neceſſarily be ſuch, that he can have no will but God's. In the ſublime, but accurate language of the apoſtle John, he will *dwell in love*, he will *dwell in God*, and *God in him*; ſo that, *not committing any ſin*, he will have nothing to repent of. He will be *perfect*, *as his heavenly father is perfect*.

But as no man is capable of this degree of perfection in the preſent ſtate, becauſe the influences to which we are all expoſed will prevent this conſtant referring of every thing to its primary cauſe, the ſpeculative neceſſarian, will, in a general way, refer actions to himſelf and others; and conſequently he will neceſſarily, let him uſe what efforts he will, feel the ſentiments of ſhame, remorſe, and repentance, which ariſe mechanically from his referring actions to himſelf. And, oppreſſed with a ſenſe of *guilt*, he will have recourſe to that *mercy* of which he will ſtand in need. Theſe things muſt neceſſarily accompany one another,

another, and there is no reaſon to be ſolicitous about their ſeparation.

It is, alas! only in occaſional ſeaſons of retirement from the world, in the happy hours of devout contemplation, that, I believe, the moſt perfect of our race can fully indulge the enlarged views, and lay himſelf open to the genuine feelings, of the neceſſarian principles; that is, that he can *ſee every thing in God, i. e.* in its relation to him. Habitually, and conſtantly, to realize theſe views, would be always to *live in the houſe of God,* and within the *gate of heaven,* ſeeing the plain finger of God in all events, and as if the angels of God were conſtantly deſcending to earth, and aſcending to heaven before our eyes. Such enlarged and exalted ſentiments are ſometimes apparent in the ſacred writers, and alſo in the hiſtories of chriſtian and proteſtant martyrs; but the beſt of men, in the general courſe of their lives, fall far ſhort of this ſtandard of perfection.

We

We are too apt to lose sight of God, and of his universal uncontrolled agency; and then, falling from a situation in which we were equally strangers to *vice*, and *solicitude*, from a state truly *paradisaical*, in which we were incapable of *knowing* or *feeling* any evil, as such, conversing daily with God, enjoying his presence, and contemplating his works, as all infinitely good and perfect, we look no higher than ourselves, or beings on a level with ourselves; and of course find ourselves involved in a thousand perplexities, follies and vices; and we now want, and ought to fly to, the proper remedy in our case, viz. self abasement, contrition, and supplication.

Moreover, well knowing what we generally are, how imperfect our *views*, and consequently how imperfect our *conduct*, it is our wisdom, and our interest, freely to indulge these feelings, till they have produced their proper effect; till the sense of guilt has been discharged by the feelings of contrition, and a humble trust in the Divine mercy. Thus, *gradually* attaining to

to purer intentions, and a more upright conduct, we shall find less obstruction in enlarging our views to comprehend the true plan of providence; when, having less to reflect upon ourselves for, the sentiment of reproach shall easily and naturally vanish; and we shall then fully conceive, and rejoice in, the belief that in all things we *are*, and *have been*, *fellow workers together with God*; and that *he works all his works in us, by us, and for us.*

The improvement of our natures, and consequently the advancement of our happiness, by enlarging the comprehension of our minds, chiefly by means of a more distinct view of the hand of God in all things, and all events, is, in its own nature, a gradual thing, and our attempts to accelerate this natural progress may possibly be attended with some inconvenience; though, I own, I apprehend but little danger from this quarter.

What we have most to dread, is the almost irrecoverable debasement of our minds by *looking off from God, living without him,*

without a due regard to his preſence, and providence, and *idolizing ourſelves and the world*; conſidering other things as *proper agents* and *cauſes*; whereas, ſtrictly ſpeaking, there is but *one cauſe*, but *one ſole agent* in univerſal nature. Thus (but I feel myſelf in danger of going beyond the bounds of the queſtion I am now diſcuſſing) all vice is reducible to *idolatry*; and we can only be completely virtuous and happy in the worſhip of the one only living and true God; the idea uſually annexed to the word *worſhip* but faintly ſhadowing out what the intelligent reader will perceive I *now* mean by it.

In all this it muſt be remembered that I am addreſſing myſelf to *profeſſed neceſſarians*; and I muſt inform them, that if they cannot accompany me in this ſpeculation, or find much difficulty in doing it, they are no more than *nominal* neceſſarians, and have no more feeling of the real *energy of their principles* than the merely nominal chriſtian has of thoſe of chriſtianity. It requires much reflection, meditation, and ſtrength

ſtrength of mind, to convert *ſpeculative* principles into *practical* ones; and till any principle be properly *felt*, it is not eaſy to judge of its real *tendency* and *power*. It is common with unbelievers to declaim on the ſubject of the miſchief that chriſtianity has done in the world, as it is with the opponents of the doctrine of neceſſity to dwell upon the dangerous tendency of it; but the real neceſſarian, and true chriſtian, know, and *feel*, that their principles tend to make them better men in all reſpects; and that it can only be ſomething that is very improperly called either *chriſtianity*, or *the doctrine of neceſſity*, that can tend to make them worſe.

I think, however, that a mere ſpeculatiſt may be ſatisfied, that the feeling of remorſe, and the practice of ſupplication for pardon, have ſtill leſs foundation on the doctrine of philoſophical liberty, than on that of neceſſity, as I preſume has been demonſtrated in my treatiſe. Indeed, what can a man have to blame himſelf for, when he acted *without motive*, and from *no fixed*

principle, good or bad; and what occaſion has he for pardon who never meant to give offence; and, as I have ſhewn at large, unleſs the mental determinations take place without regard to motive, there is no evidence whatever of the mind being free from its neceſſary influence. But it ſeems to be taken for granted, that whatever a neceſſarian cannot feel, or do, his opponent can; whereas, in fact, the doctrine of repentance, as defined by the advocates of liberty themſelves, has much leſs place on their principles than on ours.

The whole doctrine of *ſecond cauſes* being *primary* ones, is certainly a miſtake, though a miſtake that all imperfect beings *muſt* be ſubject to. Whatever, therefore, is built upon that miſtake can have no place in a truly philoſophical ſyſtem. But I will farther advance, that while men continue in this miſtake, and, conſequently, while their reflections on their own conduct, as well as on that of others, ſhall be modified by it, they will derive conſiderable advantage even from an imperfect view of the true philo-

ſophical

ſophical doctrine, viz. that of neceſſity; whereas a man, in the ſame circumſtances, muſt receive ſome injury from the oppoſite ſentiment of philoſophical liberty; ſo much may it be depended upon, that a knowledge of this truth can do no harm, but muſt do ſome good.

Remorſe for paſt miſconduct implies a deep ſenſe of depravity of heart, or a wrong bias of mind, by which temptations to ſin will have much more influence with us than they ought to have. This is the ſentiment that will be fully felt by what I now call the *imperfect neceſſarian* (a character which, as I obſerved before, applies to all mankind). As a neceſſarian he conſiders his bad conduct as neceſſarily ariſing from his bad diſpoſition. It is *bad fruit* growing from a *bad tree*. And, as he knows that, unleſs the tree be made good, it will be impoſſible to make the fruit good; ſo he is ſenſible that unleſs he can, by the uſe of proper diſcipline, bring his mind into a better ſtate, he can never depend upon himſelf for acting more pro-

perly on future occaſions. He, therefore, from that principle by which we univerſally ſeek our own happineſs and improvement, labours to correct his vicious diſpoſition; and, expecting no miraculous aſſiſtance, he applies to the proper remedies indicated by the conſideration of his caſe.

At the ſame time, his regard to God, as the author of all good, and who has appointed *meditation* and *prayer* as a means of attaining it, will make him conſtantly look up to him for his favour and bleſſing. And if, as he becomes more philoſophical, his devotions have in them leſs of *ſupplication*, and rather take the form of *praiſe*, *thankſgiving*, and a joyful firm *confidence* in the divine care and providence, reſpecting equally the things of time and eternity, it will not contribute the leſs to his moral improvement and happineſs. But the beſt of men will not, in fact, get beyond that ſtate of mind, in which direct and fervent *prayer*, properly ſo called, will be as *unavoidable* as it will be *uſeful* to them. What I now ſay will not be well underſtood

ſtood by all perſons, but I ſpeak to thoſe who have ſome experience in matters of religion, and who are accuſtomed to reflection on their natural feelings.

Let us now conſider what the doctrine of philoſophical liberty can do for a man in the circumſtances abovementioned. He, like the neceſſarian, finds himſelf involved in guilt, and he alſo begins to ſpeculate concerning the cauſes of it; but, overlooking the ſecret mechaniſm of his mind, he aſcribes the whole to the mere *obſtinacy of his will*, which, *of itſelf*, and not neceſſarily influenced by any motives, has turned a deaf ear to every thing that better principles could ſuggeſt. But, in what manner can ſuch mens *uncontrollable will* be rectified? As far as we have recourſe to *motives*, and *principles*, we depend upon the doctrine of *mechaniſm*; and without that we have nothing to do but ſit with folded hands, waiting the arbitrary deciſions of this ſame *ſovereign will*.

If he ſpeculates farther, and conſiders how little his real temper and character are

concerned in ſuch unaccountable motions of his ſelf-determined will, I ſhould think him in ſome danger of making himſelf very eaſy about his vices. And this would be the caſe, if men were not neceſſarily influenced by ſounder principles than they always diſtinctly perceive. Now, it appears to me, that if a man's ſpeculations take this turn, it would have been much better for him never to have ſpeculated at all, and that they only tend to bewilder, and hurt him.

Again, ſuppoſing a man to have attained to ſome degree of a virtuous character and conduct, his farther progreſs will be accelerated by the belief of the doctrine of neceſſity, and retarded by that of philoſophical liberty.

The conviction that God is the author of all *good* will always much more readily take firm hold of the mind than the idea of his being, likewiſe, the author of all *evil*, though all evil ultimately terminates in good; becauſe it requires more ſtrength of mind to ſee and believe this. A long time, therefore,

therefore, before we ſuſpect that our evil diſpoſitions come from God, as well as our good ones, and that all things that exiſt, ultimately conſidered, equally promote the divine purpoſes, we ſhall aſcribe all evil to ourſelves, and all good to God; and this perſuaſion will be ſo riveted, in a long courſe of time, that after we are convinced that God is really and truly the author of *all things*, without diſtinction, we ſhall aſcribe evil to him only in an unſteady and confuſed manner, while the perſuaſion that he is the ſole author of all good will have received a great acceſſion of ſtrength, from our new philoſophical principles coinciding with, and confirming, our former general notions.

Now no ſentiment whatever is ſo favourable to every thing amiable, good, and great, in the heart of man, as a ſpirit of *deep humility*, grounded on diſclaiming all our excellencies, and referring them to their proper ſource, that feeling which Dr. Hartley very expreſſively calls *ſelf-annihilation*, joined with that which naturally and neceſſarily accompanies it, *joy and confidence in God*,

God, as *working all our good works in us and for us*. This is the diſpoſition that inſpires all the writers of the books of ſcripture, and is obſervable in all truly ſerious and devout perſons to this day, whether their ſpeculative opinions be favourable to it or not. Nay, it has given ſuch a turn to the *eſtabliſhed language of devotion* in all countries, and all ages, that the contrary ſentiment, or that of claiming the merit of our good works to ourſelves, would have the appearance of ſomething abſolutely impious, and blaſphemous. Now it muſt be acknowledged that this diſpoſition of mind, viz. that of aſcribing every thing that is good in us to God, is greatly favoured and promoted by the belief of the doctrine of neceſſity. It may even operate this way, to the greateſt advantage, at the ſame time that, through our imperfect comprehenſion of things, we continue to aſcribe evil to ourſelves, and are affected with the deepeſt ſentiments of remorſe and contrition.

On the contrary, as far as the doctrine of philoſophical liberty operates, it tends

to

to check humility, and rather flatters the pride of man, by leading him to consider himself as being, independently of his maker, the primary author of his own good dispositions and good works. This opinon, which, without being able to perceive *why*, every truly pious person dreads, and cannot bring himself expressly to avow, is apprehended to be just, * according to the doctrine of philosophical liberty, which represents man as endued with the faculty of free will, acting independently of any control from without himself, even that of the Divine Being; and that just so far as any superior being, directly or indirectly, influences

* I say *apprehended* to be just, which is all that my argument requires, though, strictly speaking, as I have shewn at large, the claim of *merit*, or *demerit*, is equally ill-founded on the doctrine of philosophical liberty. The sentiments of merit and demerit are certainly *natural*, and found in all mankind; but they have not, therefore, any connection with the doctrine of philosophical liberty. On the contrary, I maintain that the *common opinion* is the doctrine of necessity, though not come to its proper extent. No man, for instance, has any idea but that *the will is always determined by some motive*, which is the great hinge on which the doctrine of necessity turns; nor has any man in common life any idea of *virtue*, but as something belonging to *character* and *fixed principle*, constantly *influencing the will*.

influences his will, he can pretend to no ſuch thing as real virtue, or goodneſs; though the virtue that anſwers to this deſcription is certainly not that which animated the prophets of the Old Teſtament, or our Saviour and the apoſtles in the New, but is mere heathen *Stoiciſm*.

When this temper is much indulged, it is even poſſible, contradictory as it ſeems, to aſcribe all moral good to a man's ſelf, and all moral evil to the inſtigation of the Devil, or ſome other wicked ſpirit that has acceſs to our minds: whereas, without the intervention of this doctrine of the *independency of the will*, and eſpecially with a little aid from the doctrine of *mechaniſm*, we ſhould rather, as was ſhewn before, though inconſiſtently ſtill, aſcribe all good to God, and all evil to ourſeves.

Conſtantly to aſcribe *all* to God is an attainment too great for humanity. To be able to do it *at intervals*, in the ſeaſons of retirement and meditation, but ſo as conſiderably to influence our general feelings, and conduct in life, is a happy and glorious advantage,

advantage. Sweet, indeed, are the moments in which theſe great and juſt views of the ſyſtem to which we belong can be fully indulged. But if we cannot habitually aſcribe *all* to God, but a part only, let it be (and ſo indeed it naturally will be) that which is *good*, and if we muſt aſcribe any thing to ourſelves, let it be that which is *evil*.

Thus have I given a frank and ingenuous account of my own ideas and impreſſions on this ſubject. How far they will give ſatisfaction to others I cannot tell.

ADDITIONAL

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS

BY

DR. PRICE,

ON A

REVIEW of the whole CONTROVERSY,

AND OF

Dr. PRIESTLEY's LETTERS and ILLUSTRATIONS,

As printed in the preceding Parts of this Work.

LETTER

TO

DR. PRIESTLEY.

NEWINGTON-GREEN, Sept. 19, 1778.

DEAR SIR,

THE desire you have expressed that I would give you my sentiments of the Controversy between us, *on a view of the whole of it as now printed*, has induced me once more to apply my thoughts to it. I have done this with care and attention; but am not sure that any thing which you will judge of great importance has occurred to me. It might, therefore, have been right to resolve to say no more; and indeed, I am so much afraid of perplexing by a multiplicity of words, and of giving disgust by too many repetitions, that this would have been my resolution, had I not

thought, that the *Additional Obſervations* which you will receive with this letter, contain ſome *new* matter; and place ſeveral of the arguments already inſiſted on, in a light that may render them to ſome perſons more intelligible and ſtriking. I have now ſaid the beſt I can; and I leave our readers to judge between us, hoping that whether they decide in your favour or mine, they will be candid, and believe that we are both of us governed alike by a ſincere love of truth and virtue. I feel deeply that I am in conſtant danger of being led into error by partial views, and of miſtaking the ſuggeſtions of prejudice for the deciſions of reaſon; and this, while it diſpoſes me to be candid to others, makes me ardently wiſh that others would be candid to me.

I am, in a particular manner, ſenſible of my own blindneſs with reſpect to the nature of matter and ſpirit, and the faculties of the human mind. As far as I have gone in this diſpute I am pretty well ſatisfied; but I cannot go much further. You have

aſked

aſked me ſome queſtions (and many more may be aſked me) which I am incapable of anſwering.

I cannot help taking this opportunity of repeating to you, that I diſlike more than I can eaſily expreſs, the malevolence expreſſed by moſt of the writers againſt you. I have myſelf, as you well know, been long an object of abuſe for a publication which I reckon one of the beſt actions of my life, and which events have fully juſtified. The conſciouſneſs of not deſerving abuſe has made me perfectly callous to it; and I doubt not but the ſame cauſe will render you ſo.

It is certain that, in the end, the intereſt of truth will be promoted by a free and open diſcuſſion of ſpeculative points. Whatever will not bear this muſt be ſuperſtition and impoſture. Inſtead, therefore, of being inclined to cenſure thoſe who, with honeſt views, contribute to bring about ſuch a diſcuſſion, we ought to thank and honour them, however miſtaken we may think them, and however ſacred the points of

diſcuſſion may be reckoned. I wiſh I could ſee more of this diſpoſition among the defenders of religion. I am particularly ſorry to find that even Mr. Whitehead does not perfectly poſſeſs this temper. Had he avoided all uncandid inſinuations, and treated you conſtantly with the ſame juſt reſpect that he does in general, his book in my opinion would have done him much honour.

Dr. Horſley is, I fancy, the only perſon who, in oppoſing your opinions, has diſcovered a juſt liberality. This is worthy of an able Philoſopher; and you have, therefore, very properly diſtinguiſhed him from your other antagoniſts, by addreſſing him, in your letter to him, with particular reſpect. His method of arguing agrees very much with mine. There is, likewiſe, an agreement between ſome of Mr. Whitehead's arguments and thoſe I have uſed. But this agreement has been accidental; for our correſpondence was begun and finiſhed long before I knew any thing of

of either Dr. Horſley's or Mr. Whitehead's publications.

Wiſhing you every poſſible bleſſing,

I am,

With the moſt affectionate reſpect,

Yours,

RICHARD PRICE.

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS

BY

DR. PRICE.

SECT. I. *Of the Human Soul.*

DR. PRIESTLEY acknowledges that the ſoul is a *ſingle* being or ſubſtance. But at the ſame time he ſpeaks of the *parts* of a ſoul; of its being a *ſyſtem*; and, in p. 119, of the *materials* of which Chriſt conſiſted before his birth. Has he yet proved this to be conſiſtent? (*) His

 doctrine

(*) Page 86, "I believe I am a *being* or *ſubſtance*; "alſo, that I am a *ſingle* being; and that my limbs and "ſenſes are not *myſelf*."—P. 279, "Man, who is *one* be- "ing, is compoſed of *one kind* of ſubſtance, made of the "duſt of the earth."—To the ſame purpoſe Dr. Prieſtley ſays in p. 284, "that the mind, the ſubject of thought, is "*one*

doctrine is, that, as a number of corporeal ſubſtances put together in a particular manner, become, when put into motion, that *meaſurer of time* which we call a *clock* or a *watch*; ſo a number of corporeal ſubſtances put together in a particular manner in the brain become *of courſe*, when circulation begins, that thinking being we call a *man*. And his doctrine further is, that both are alike machines, the operations of the one in meaſuring time, and of the other in thinking, perceiving, willing, &c. being equally brought about by mechanical laws, and the neceſſary reſult of particular motions and vibrations. This, I imagine, is as conciſe and juſt an account as can be given of his ſyſtem. See particularly, the ſecond

" *one* thinking perſon, or one being;" but afterwards (in the next page) he ſays, " that the ſubject of thought, is the " body, eſpecially the brain; and that its powers inhere in " *one kind* of ſubſtance."—Theſe paſſages compared lead me to ſuſpect, that when he ſays, in the firſt of them, that he is *one* being or ſubſtance; his meaning is, that he is *many* ſubſtances of *one kind*. I can think of no other method of making theſe paſſages conſiſtent. For I ſuppoſe he cannot poſſibly mean, that the mind, though one *being*, is many *ſubſtances*. This would imply, that a ſubſtance, numerically different from all others, is not a being

ſecond ſect. of his Additional Illuſtrations. P. 256, &c.

Not to ſay any thing at preſent of the latter part of this ſyſtem, I would beg leave again to remind him that, according to his own conceſſion, it is *one* ſubſtance that *thinks*; that, on the contrary, it is a number of ſubſtances that *meaſure time*; and that, conſequently, theſe caſes cannot be parallel,

I know not how to believe Dr. Prieſtley will adhere to the only obſervation he has made in anſwer to this objection; I mean, the obſervation (in p. 100) "that "a *number* of unthinking ſubſtances may "make *one* thinking ſubſtance." Would he not wonder were I to maintain that a number of *un*learned men may make one learned *ſociety?* But what would he think were I to maintain, that a number of *un*learned men may make one learned *man?*

But diſmiſſing this difficulty. According to Dr. Prieſtley, certain particles in the

the brain are the *ſubject* of thought and conſciouſneſs; and their arrangement, order and motion are *actual* thought and intelligence. Theſe particles, it ſhould be obſerved, muſt be ſome *definite* number: For were they an *indefinite* number, the *man*, or the *ſubject of thought*, could not continue always the ſame. Any particles added would *increaſe* the man, in proportion to the number added. Any taken away would *leſſen* him, in proportion to the number taken away. Or, in other words, the man would become ſo far *different*; and ſo many particles might be added or taken away, as would make him, in any given proportion, a *different* or *another* being.

All this is manifeſtly abſurd and contradictory. The ſoul we know, amidſt all changes and through every period of its exiſtence, maintains a preciſe and unvaryed ſameneſs and individuality. If, therefore, the ſoul is the brain, it muſt be, not that groſs and ever-varying maſs of ſubſtances commonly ſo called, but ſome certain *ſtaminal* parts of it which have exiſted from the

the firſt creation of matter, (*) but were put together at conception ſo as to form thought; and which continue without increaſe or diminution during the life of man; are only diſarranged at death; will be put together again at the reſurrection ſo as to form an improved conſciouſneſs; and will remain preciſely the ſame, except in their order and vibrations, through all eternity.

Can Dr. Prieſtley ſatisfy himſelf with ſuch a notion of the human ſoul? Is it poſſible this ſhould be a right account of that ſimple and indiviſible eſſence, which every

(*) When Dr. Prieſtley ſays (in p. 191) "*The ſentient principle* in man, I ſuppoſe to be the brain itſelf," he means probably not the whole brain, but (agreeably to what is above obſerved) ſome *ſtaminal* parts of it. He ſometimes, indeed, calls the *ſentient principle* "a *reſult* from the organization of the brain;" but his meaning muſt be, not that the ſoul itſelf is nothing but a *reſult* from the form and arrangement of the materials of the brain, for he has acknowledged it (p. 86) to be a *ſubſtance*; but that its conſciouſneſs and reaſon are ſuch a reſult. See the reaſoning from p. 113, to p. 116. It is not, he ſays (p. 76) *myſelf*, but my *power of thought*, that is the reſult of figure, motion, &c.

every man calls *himſelf*; and of thoſe faculties by which we inveſtigate truth, and are capable of growing for ever in knowledge and bliſs? Does he, in particular, feel no difficulty in conceiving that a number of particles, diſpoſed in *one* order and moved in *one* way, ſhould be nothing but torpid matter; but, diſpoſed in *another* order and moved in *another* way, ſhould become perception, judgment and reaſon? (†)

I

(†) Dr. Prieſtley (in p. 258) intimates, that the power of thinking may as well be the reſult of the organization of the brain, as the attraction of iron be the reſult of the ſtructure of a magnet. But the attraction of iron by a magnet is the action, not of the magnet itſelf, but of *another* cauſe. It would be ſtrange indeed if a maſs of matter could be ſo put together as to become capable of moving a body at a diſtance without touching it. The truth, in this caſe, ſeems to be, that there are cauſes or powers in nature operating according to ſtated laws which unite themſelves to ſubſtances formed as iron and a magnet are, and drive them towards one another. Perhaps, therefore, this fact might be mentioned as moſt ſimilar to the union of a ſoul to the brain in conſequence of its organization. Some aſſert that magnetiſm is cauſed by the emiſſion of *effluvia*, or the intervention of a ſubtle fluid; and if this is true, it is only an inſtance of the communication of motion by impulſe from matter to matter.

Dr. Prieſtley has obſerved, (ſee p. 124) that a compound may have properties which the component parts have

I muſt leave every one to make his own reflections on what Dr. Prieſtley ſays from page 268, to 270. I think it ſcarcely worthy of him. Why might I not ſay that ſpirit is not *extended?* He ſays ſo, if I underſtand him, of matter; and yet maintains (p. 248, 249,) that it exiſts in place, poſſeſſes a ſphere of action, and is moveable,

have not. This is true only of ſuch properties as denote merely an *order* or *relation* of parts. For inſtance. Though no *one* of the component parts of a circle is *circular*, the whole compound is ſo. What can be plainer?—A number of things may be ranged into the order of a circle, but one thing cannot. Does this warrant us to conclude, that, though no one of the particles in a maſs of matter is conſcious, yet all taken together may be ſo? As well might we conclude that though no one of the particles moves, yet the whole compound may move. Such, however, is the concluſion we are directed to draw by Dr. Prieſtley; and alſo by Mr. Collins in his diſpute with Dr. Clarke.

I will beg leave to remark further in this place, that Dr. Prieſtley's account of the ſoul has no ſuch tendency as hedeſcribes in the Introduction, from p. 16, to p. 19. If he is right, we ſhall, in the *future ſtate*, have no ſeparate ſouls. But this will give us no reaſon for *then* concluding, that we had not pre-exiſted in a conſcious and active ſtate. Juſt as little reaſon, in my opinion, does it give us *now* for drawing ſuch a concluſion. But this obſervation may be carried much farther.—Our exiſtence after death, according to Dr. Prieſtley, will be only the exiſtence of the materials, ſeparated and diſperſed,

able. But I have repeatedly acknowledged my ignorance on this ſubject. I pretend to know no more than that, whatever my ſoul is in reſpect of *locality*, it is *indiviſible*, the idea of a *part* of a ſelf, or of a *ſelf* divided into *two ſelves* being contradictory. Of this I think myſelf ſure. See p. 62, 96, and 106.

Sect. II. *Of the Nature of Matter.*

Dr. Prieſtley denies that matter is impenetrable, becauſe there is no experiment in which we are ſure that we have found it to be ſo. I have given a reply to this in p. 51. What I would obſerve here

diſperſed, of which we now conſiſt. But this is an exiſtence which belonged to us equally before we were born. Our *pre-exiſtence*, therefore, is no leſs certain than our *poſt-exiſtence*.—It is true, Dr. Prieſtley teaches, that ſome time after death our ſcattered parts are to be brought into union, and to be made again conſcious. But will he ſay ſuch an union might not have alſo taken place ſometime or other before we were born?—Little then certainly is the ſupport which *Socinianiſm* receives from *Materialiſm*.—See what is ſaid to this purpoſe in p. 125. The remembrance of pre-exiſtence cannot be neceſſary; or, if it is, Chriſt might have poſſeſſed it.

here is, that, according to Dr. Prieſtley's doctrine, there is alſo no experiment in which we have found that any one thing *cauſes* or *produces* another; the only proper cauſe in nature, as he aſſerts, being that power of the Deity which is not an object of our ſenſes. When a body in motion gives motion to another, all that we obſerve (and all that is true, if Dr. Prieſtley is right) is a *conjunction*, not a *connection* of two events; or one motion *going before* another, not one motion *producing* another; the body moved having really received its motion not from the *apparent*, but from an *inviſible* cauſe. This, if I underſtand Dr. Prieſtley, is the truth in every inſtance. Even the determinations of the will are the actions of the Deity; and motives are properly no more than certain perceptions that conſtantly *precede* them. Since then experiments do not furniſh us with the ideas of *cauſation* and *productive power*, how came we by theſe ideas? And how does Dr. Prieſtley know they have any exiſtence?

How

How, in particular, does he avoid the ſceptical ſyſtem which Mr. Hume has advanced in his Philoſophical Eſſays, and which he founds entirely on this obſervation? I have ſhewn how I avoid it in my *Review* of the Difficulties in Morals. P. 29, 30, &c.

In p. 245, Dr. Prieſtley repeats a former obſervation; namely, that "it is no leſs "proper to aſk what remains of matter after "ſolidity and extenſion are taken away, "than to aſk what remains of it after at-"traction and repulſion are taken away." I have anſwered, that ſolidity and extenſion are *inherent* properties; but that attraction and repulſion, ſignifying only *ſomething that is done to matter*, convey no idea of it. Were he to aſk me what *ſpirit* is, and I was to give him no other anſwer, than that it is *ſomething* that is moved, he would probably be much diſſatisfied.

In the firſt ſect. of the *Additional Illuſtrations*, Dr. Prieſtley has given a new account of matter, according to which it is only

only a number of centers of attraction and repulsion; or, more properly, of centers (not divisible, p. 249) to which divine agency is directed. I would here ask, wherein do such centers differ from mathematical points? Is not a mathematical point merely the *end* or *termination* of a line, as a line is the termination of a surface, and a surface of a solid? Can any one of these be conceived to subsist separately from the rest? What conception can be formed of a point or center which has no figure, nor is the termination of a line, but is capable of moving and being moved? Is the whole universe nothing but a collection of such points acted upon by divine power? Are these points *substances*? If not, can they be *matter*? Or can they be the *souls* of men? Does not divine agency require an object different from itself to act upon? What then can Dr. Priestley mean when he intimates that there is nothing in nature but God's agency?

At the beginning of this controversy Dr. Priestley denyed *solidity* to matter, but allowed

lowed it extenſion. He ſeems now inclined to deny it *both*, and to be for reducing it (and conſequently all ſentient beings) to nothing but points to which God's agency (in attracting and repelling I know not what) is directed.

In p. 250, &c. he obſerves, that ſince the conſtituent parts of matter do not touch one another, it can *do* nothing, (every thing being really done by divine power) and conſequently is of no uſe, and, if created, muſt have been created in vain. (‡) The obvious inference from hence is, that there is no ſuch thing as matter. And, accordingly, influenced by this reaſon, he ſays, that "it is nothing but the divine agency." The whole creation, then, being, matter

(‡) Dr. Prieſtley intimates (p. 252) that he ſhould prefer to his own hypotheſis, an hypotheſis, could he find it, which ſhould make proviſion for the uſe of created matter without reſolving it into the divine agency. I think I can inform him of ſuch an hypotheſis. *Solid* matter (that is, the matter hitherto believed in by all mankind) is capable of moving other matter by contact and impulſe. It can, therefore, *do* ſomewhat, and be of uſe. Why then ſhould he not admit it?

matter according to Dr. Prieſtley's doctrine, the whole creation is nothing but the divine agency; and conſequently it muſt be nothing at all. For what idea can be formed of the *creation* of the divine agency; or of an agency that acts upon itſelf?

But, perhaps, it is not proper to urge theſe objections, becauſe Dr. Prieſtley in the very paſſage (p. 253) which contains this account of matter, aſſerts that "though "every thing *is* the divine power, and all "action is his action," yet every thing is not the *Deity himſelf*; and becauſe, likewiſe, he has very candidly (p. 252) expreſſed a doubt whether he has not loſt himſelf on this ſubject. It will, however, be proper to put him in mind (and I wiſh I could preſs it on his attention) that he ought not to lay ſo much ſtreſs as he does on the doctrine of materialiſm, till he is better able to inform us what matter is.

SECT. III. *Of the Doctrine of Neceſſity.*

Dr. Prieſtley, in his letter to Dr. Horſeley, endeavours to prove, that there is no difference between him and the Neceſſarians. His reaſon for this aſſertion is, that Dr. Horſeley acknowledges a *certain*, and (in one ſenſe) a *neceſſary* influence of motives on the will. Now, it ſhould be recollected, that the whole controverſy has been reduced to this ſhort queſtion. "Has "man a power of *agency*, or *ſelf-determi-* "*nation?* Dr. Prieſtley has denyed this. He has maintained that ſuch a power is an impoſſibility; (p. 129 and 241) that we are miſtaken when we refer our actions to ourſelves; that our volitions are *perfectly mechanical things*; that motives influence *exactly as weights operate on a ſcale*; (§) and that

(§) See Treatiſe on Neceſſity, Dedication p. 12; and Illuſtrations, p. 30, 36, &c. See likewiſe this Volume, p. 306.

that there is only *one agent* in nature. (‖) It is only as far as he means to maintain ſuch aſſertions that he oppoſes the doctrine of liberty as explained by Dr. Clarke and others.

The influence of motives has never been denied. The point in diſpute is, the *nature* of that influence; and with reſpect to this, I have long ago obſerved, (ſee Review of Morals, p. 351, 2d edit.) that *no* influence of motives, which is ſhort of making them *phyſical efficients* or *agents*, can claſh with liberty. May I then aſk him whether he ſtill adheres to the aſſertions I have mentioned? If not, our controverſy is at an end. But if he does, then he and I (and

(‖) Dr. Prieſtley has ſometimes called man an *agent*. In p. 86, he ſays, that "man is a *voluntary agent*, though "not poſſeſſed of a ſelf-moving power." There ſeems to me an evident contradiction in theſe words. For an agent that does not put himſelf in motion, is an agent that is always acted upon, or an agent that never acts. In p. 178, he even allows that man may be called a *free* agent; but his meaning plainly is, that man is moved only by *internal* ſprings; and this no more makes him truly free than it makes a watch free.

probably alſo he and Dr. Horſeley) ſtill differ. He ſhould not ſay here, as he does p. 221, &c. that, provided the influence of motives is allowed, it makes no difference whether they influence in one way or in another; or whether we reckon them *phyſical cauſes* or *moral reaſons*. This has been already anſwered in p. 138, &c. That kind of influence which I allow to motives implies, that man is a *ſelf-moving* being. The other implies, that he is nothing but a machine. The one implies, that motives are only certain reaſons on the view of which, or certain rules and perceptions according to which, the mind *determines itſelf*. The other implies, that they are *ſubſtances* which operate mechanically on the mind, and leave it no dominion over its determination. In ſhort, the one is conſiſtent with *moral agency*. The other, deſtroying *all* agency, deſtroys of courſe all *moral* agency. Is it poſſible there ſhould be any greater difference? See p. 143.

I have in the courſe of this controverſy ſometimes appealed to common ſenſe. Dr. Prieſtley

Prieſtley will, I hope, allow me again to do this on the preſent occaſion. Let us ſuppoſe a common man, who knows nothing of thoſe refinements on plain points which have diſgraced human learning, and turned ſo much of it into rank folly; let us, I ſay, ſuppoſe ſuch a man aſked whether, in all his actions, he does not determine himſelf? He would certainly anſwer, without heſitation, in the affirmative. Suppoſe him told, that he was miſtaken; and that very wiſe men had diſcovered, that he no more determined himſelf in any of his actions than a ſtone determines itſelf when thrown from a hand. Would he not wonder greatly?

Suppoſe him farther aſked, whether there is not a *certainty* that he would accept a good eſtate if it was offered to him fairly? He would anſwer in the affirmative. Suppoſe it objected to him, that there could be no ſuch *certainty*, becauſe, being a ſelf-determiner, he would be free not to accept. Would there be a poſſibility of puzzleing him by ſuch an objection?

Dr. Prieſtley ſays, "that a determi-
"nation of the mind in caſes in which
"a regard to different motives is equal, is
"an impoſſibility." (*) The following caſe will prove the contrary, and may, I hope, help a little to illuſtrate this ſubject.

Suppoſe an *agreeable* propoſal made to a perſon which ſhocks his moral feelings, but which he muſt immediately reſolve, either to accept, or not. If he *accepts*, he gratifies his paſſions. If he does not accept, he follows his ſenſe of duty. This brings him into circumſtances in

(*) There are numberleſs caſes in which there is a reaſon for acting *in general*, but no reaſon for any preference of one way of acting to another. It appears to me very wrong to ſay, that in theſe caſes action becomes impoſſible. I may have a reaſon for going to a certain place, but it may be indifferent in which of two ways I go. Do I, in theſe circumſtances, loſe the power of going at all? Suppoſing the univerſe finite, it was indifferent where in infinite ſpace it was placed. But was it, on this account, impoſſible to place it any where? Suppoſing it to conſiſt of only two ſyſtems, there could have been no reaſon for placing one of them on *one* ſide of the other, rather than at an equal diſtance on the *oppoſite* ſide.

in which he must act upon a motive; and also upon *one* or *other* of two given motives. Nothing is more conceivable, than that these motives may be equal in their influence. In that case, would determination be (as Dr. Priestley says) impossible? To say this, would be to say, that a person, when tempted, may neither comply with the temptation, nor reject it. Without all doubt, his power in such a situation is to do *either*, not to do *neither*.

In general, I would observe here that, in circumstances of temptation, there are always two motives which influence the will;

side. But would it, on this account, have been impossible to create them?

In forming this earth, there could have been no reason against the transposition of any *similar* particles on its surface. Was it, therefore, impossible (as Mr. Leibnitz contended) that there should have been any such particles? See the beginning of Dr. Clarke's, 3d, 4th, and 5th Replies in the Collection of papers which passed between Dr. Clarke and Mr. Leibnitz.

When I say there are cases in which there can be no reason for any *preference* of one way of acting to another, I mean by *preference*,

will; and that the eſſence of moral merit and demerit conſiſts in the free reſolution of the will (or in its *ſelf-determination*) to act on one of them rather than on the other. Dr. Prieſtley, therefore, ſhould not have ſaid, that the doctrine of liberty implies that a man in acting wickedly or virtuouſly, acts without a motive. I cannot conceive of a more groundleſs aſſertion.

But let us again conſider the caſe I have put.

Paſſion and intereſt draw us one way. Conſcience and duty order us another. In theſe circumſtances, we may determine as we

preference, the judgment of the mind concerning the beſt way of acting. I mention this, becauſe there is a *preference* included in the idea of volition; and which ſignifies merely the determination to act in one way, and not in another. Preference in the former ſenſe, is a perception of the underſtanding, and, therefore, *paſſive*. In the latter ſenſe, it is the exertion of the ſelf-moving faculty, and therefore *active*. Theſe, though *commonly* united, are *often* ſeparated; and it is chiefly inattention to the difference between them, or the not diſtinguiſhing (as Dr. Clarke obſerves) between the *perceptive* and *active* faculties, that has produced the diſputes about liberty and neceſſity.

we *pleaſe*. Thus far Dr. Prieſtley and I would ſpeak the ſame language, but we ſhould mean differently. By determining *as we pleaſe*, he would mean our being ſubject, without the power of reſiſtance, to the mechanical influence of that motive which happens to be ſtrongeſt. But I ſhould mean, our poſſeſſing a power to make *either* of the motives the ſtrongeſt; that is, to make either of them the motive that *ſhall* prevail, and on which we *ſhall pleaſe* to determine. Unhappily for us, we are continually finding ourſelves in theſe circumſtances. Let every one examine himſelf, and conſider which of theſe accounts is right. Has a man, urged by contrary inclinations, (by paſſion on one hand and a regard to virtue on the other) no controuling power over his inclinations to make one of them, preferably to the other, the inclination that he will follow. Or is he then exactly in the condition of a body impelled by contrary forces, which muſt be carried along by the ſtrongeſt? If this is the truth, there is no *action* of the man, when a temptation overcomes him;

nor

nor conſequently, if there is any meaning in words, can there be any guilt, or ill-deſert. I intreat Dr. Prieſtley to remember, that this is the doctrine, and the *only* doctrine of neceſſity that I mean to oppoſe.

Dr. Prieſtley ſays, at the concluſion of his letter to Dr. Horſeley, that there is no medium between acknowledging the will to be ſubject to the influence of motives, and aſſerting an effect without a cauſe; and that conſequently, "there is no choice but "of the doctrine of neceſſity, or abſolute "nonſenſe." I am very ſenſible, that it is nonſenſe to deny the influence of motives, or to maintain that there are no fixt principles and ends by which the will is guided; but, at the ſame time, I muſt ſay, that this nonſenſe is ſcarcely equal to that of confounding *moral* with *phyſical* cauſes, making motives ſubſtances, aſſerting that we are not the cauſes of *our own* determinations, and denying that we are free merely becauſe we have reaſons for acting.

In

In Disquisitions, vol. II. p. 77, he says, "that in all cases where the principle of "freedom from the influence of motives "takes place, it is *exactly an equal chance* "whether rewards and punishments will "determine or not, the self-determining "power being not at all of the nature of "any mechanical influence, that may be "counteracted by influence equally me- "chanical." Does not this imply, that if the will is not subject to a *mechanical* influence, it can be subject to *no* influence; and that, if there is not a *certainty* of its following a particular motive in any case, there cannot be even a *probability?*

Dr. Priestley lays great stress on the observation "that self-determination implies "an effect without a cause." I have taken some notice of this objection in p. 136. It evidently implies that it is impossible a "self-moving power should be *itself* a "cause," and "that there must be an "endless progression of causes and effects "without

" without any firſt cauſe." (†) I cannot, therefore, but wonder at this objection; and I am diſpoſed the more to wonder at it, becauſe Dr. Prieſtley, though he urges it ſo repeatedly, has at the ſame time been ſo candid as to acknowledge that the Deity is a ſelf-determining being. But in anſwer to this he obſerves, that the Deity is alſo *ſelf-exiſtent*, and that it does not follow, becauſe he is ſo, that his creatures may be ſo. See what is ſaid to this in p. 102, and 157. Let the impartial reader judge here.

(†) Mr. Leibnitz maintained, that in all caſes of ſuch abſolute indifference as thoſe referred to in the note, p. 345, there could be *no* determination of the will; becauſe it would be a determination for which no reaſon could be given. Undoubtedly ſays Dr. Clarke in anſwering him, (ſee 3d Reply, ſect. 2d.) " Nothing is without a ſufficient reaſon why it *is* " rather than *not*, and why it is *thus* rather than otherwiſe. " But in things in their own nature indifferent, mere will, " without any thing external to influence it, is alone a ſuf- " ficient reaſon; as in the inſtance of God's creating or " placing a particle of matter in one place rather than in " another, when all places are originally alike."

" A balance (5th Reply, 1ſt ſect.) for want of having in " itſelf a principle of action, cannot move at all when the " weights are equal. But a free agent, when there appears " two or more perfectly alike reaſonable ways of acting, has " ſtill

here. Would not one think that if God is a self-moving being, self-motion cannot imply an effect without a cause? What analogy is there between saying "God is "self-existent, (that is, *underived*;) there- "fore, his creatures may be so," and saying, "God is an *agent*; therefore, his "creatures may be *agents*." Did God's self-existence mean, that he is the cause of his own existence, or that he produced himself, it would be no less absurd to apply

"still within itself, by virtue of its self-moving principle a "power of acting, and it may have very strong reasons for "not forbearing to act at all, when yet there may be no "possible reason to determine any particular way of doing the "thing to be better than another. To affirm, therefore, "that supposing two different ways of placing certain par- "ticles of matter were equally good and reasonable, God "could neither wisely nor possibly place them in either of "those ways for want of a sufficient weight to determine him "which way he should chuse, is making God not an active, "but a passive being, which is not to be a God or governor "at all." But the objection that liberty implies an effect without a cause, has been more particularly answered by Dr. Clarke, in his Remarks on Mr. Collins's *Philosophical Enquiry concerning Liberty*. It is indeed with some pain I reflect, that much of this discussion is little more than a repetition of Mr. Collins's objections on one side, and Dr. Clarke's Replies on the other.

ply this attribute to him than to any other being; but moſt certainly it has a very different meaning. It means, that being underived, he exiſts (as Dr. Clarke ſpeaks) "by an abſolute neceſſity in the nature of "the thing;" or (as I ſhould chuſe to ſpeak) that the *account* of his exiſtence is the ſame with the account of the exiſtence of ſpace and duration, of the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two right angles, or of any abſtract truth.

Dr. Prieſtley's arguments, in the 6th ſection of his *Additional Illuſtrations*, (p. 296) plainly lead to, and imply the following concluſions. That, ſince no action or event could poſſibly have been different from what it *has been*, *is*, or *will* be; and ſince there is but one cauſe, one will, one ſole agent in nature; our proneneſs to look off from this one cauſe, and to refer our actions to ourſelves, is an inſtance of vicious weakneſs in us, leading us to *idolize ourſelves and others*; (p. 305, 306) and that had we *fortitude* enough to conquer

quer this weakneſs, and *wiſdom* enough to lay aſide all fallacious views, or were perfect philoſophers and *neceſſarians*, we ſhould aſcribe to God our evil diſpoſitions no leſs than our good ones, (p. 313) and conſider ourſelves as fellow-workers with him in our vices as well as our virtues; and, therefore, ſhould never reproach ourſelves for having done wrong, never think we have need of repentance, and never pray to God for pardon and mercy, or addreſs him in any of the forms of confeſſion and ſupplication.

If this is a juſt account, and Dr. *Prieſtley* really means to acknowledge theſe to be proper inferences from his doctrine; I muſt ſay that he cannot be ſufficiently admired for his fairneſs in the purſuit of truth. He believes he has found it in the doctrine (the great and glorious doctrine, as he calls it) of neceſſity; and he follows it into all its conſequences, however frightful, without attempting to evade or palliate them. For my own part, I feel here my own weakneſs. I ſhudder at theſe

conſequences, and cannot help flying from them. I think it impoſſible a doctrine ſhould be true, from which ſuch an apology for vice can be fairly deduced; and which oppoſes ſo ſtrongly the conſtitution of nature and our neceſſary feelings, as not to be capable of being applied to practice, or even of being *believed* without particular fortitude. I am fully perſuaded, however, that ſo ſound is Dr. Prieſtley's conſtitution of mind, and ſo excellent his heart, that he can drink this deadly potion, and find it ſalutary. But ſuch powers and ſuch integrity are given to few.

I muſt farther confeſs to Dr. Prieſtley, that I am in ſome degree rendered averſe to his doctrine, by my pride. I had been uſed to think of my ſoul as ſo real and ſubſtantial, as to be the very principle that gives reality to the ſenſible qualities of bodies, and conſequently to the whole dreſs of the external world; as an eſſence of heavenly origin, incorporeal, uncom-

compounded, self-determining, immortal and indestructible except by the power that created it; possessed of faculties which (however the exercise of them may be subject to interruptions) make it an image of the Deity, and render it capable of acting by the same rule with him, of participating of his happiness, and of *living* for ever, and *improving* for ever under his eye and care. But if Dr. Priestley is right, my soul is literally the offspring of the earth; a composition of dust; incapable of all agency; a piece of machinery moved by mechanical springs, and chained to the foot of fate; all whose powers of thought, imagination, reflection, volition, and reason, are no more than a *result* from the arrangement and play of a set of atoms, all unthinking and senseless.——What can be more humiliating than this account?——How low does it bring the dignity of man?——I cannot help feeling myself degraded by it unspeakably?——Were it to be received universally, it would, I am afraid, operate like a dead

weight on the creation, breaking every aſpiring effort, and producing univerſal abjectneſs. The natural effect of believing (§) that nothing is left to depend on ourſelves, and that we can *do* nothing, muſt be concluding that we have *nothing to do*; and reſolving to leave every thing to that being who (as Dr. Prieſtley ſays, p. 303, 314) works *every thing in us, by us, and for us.*

That SELF-ANNIHILATION, therefore, which he mentions as one of the happy effects

(§) Dr. Prieſtley frequently ſpeaks of the dependence of events on *ourſelves*; but I cannot ſee the conſiſtency of ſuch language with his principles. Events, it is true, depend on our *determinations*; but our *determinations*, no more depending on *ourſelves*, than the motion of a wheel depends on *itſelf* when puſhed by another wheel, no events derived from ſuch determinations, can be properly ſaid to depend on *ourſelves*. Dr. Prieſtley's ſyſtem allows no one to be the maker of his own *volitions*. How then can it, as he ſays it does, (Diſquiſitions, vol. 2d. p. 99) allow every one to be the maker of his own *fortune?* In truth, the uſe which he finds unavoidable of ſuch expreſſions as theſe and many others implying liberty, is a ſtrong argument againſt him. For it proves, that ſo incompatible is his ſyſtem with the whole frame of *language* as well as *nature*, that it is impoſſible even to *ſpeak* agreeably to it.

effects of his doctrine, is no great recommendation of it. On the contrary. That SELF-REVERENCE, which is taught by the oppoſite doctrine, inſpiring high deſigns and a diſdain of mean paſſions and vicious purſuits, is, in my opinion, a far more uſeful and noble principle.

Dr. Prieſtley takes notice of the ſerenity and joy which the doctrine of neceſſity inſpires by cauſing us to view every thing in a favourable light, by ſhewing us the hand of God in all occurrences, and by teaching us that there is nothing wrong in nature. But theſe ſources of joy are by no means confined to the doctrine of neceſſity. The contrary doctrine ſupplies them on better ground, and with more ſafety and purity. There are no ideas of free agency which do not allow of ſuch a dependence of events on the circumſtances of beings and the views preſented to their minds as leaves room for *any* direction of events by ſuperior wiſdom. And though I believe that vice is an *abſolute evil* productive of infinite loſſes to the individuals who

who practice it; and that the permiſſion of it is to be accounted for chiefly by the impoſſibility of producing the greateſt good without giving *active powers*, (‡) and allowing ſcope for exerciſing them. Though, I ſay, I believe this; yet I believe at the ſame time, that no event comes to paſs which it would have been proper to exclude; and that, relatively to the divine plan and adminiſtration, *all is right*. Under this perſuaſion, I can view the courſe of events with ſatisfaction; and commit joyfully the diſpoſal of my lot to that ſelf-exiſtent reaſon which governs all things; not doubting but that the order of nature is in every inſtance wiſe and good beyond the poſſibility of amendment; that infinitely more takes place in the creation than my

(‡) See p. 174. The beſt that I can ſay on this ſubject, may be found in my Diſſertation on Providence, ſect. 4th.

Active powers, *ſelf-determining* powers, and *voluntary* powers, are, according to my ideas, the ſame. But according to Dr. Prieſtley, a *voluntary* power (or the power of willing) is a *paſſive* power. That is, it ſignifies only (like *moveableneſs* in bodies) the capacity of being acted upon, or the neceſſity of yielding to an impreſſed force.

my warmeſt benevolence can wiſh for; and that, if I practice righteouſneſs, I ſhall (according to the promiſe of God by Jeſus Chriſt) riſe again after ſinking in death; and, together with all the upright of all nations and opinions, be at laſt happy for ever.

POSTSCRIPT.

At the end of the ſecond paragraph of the note beginning in p. 332, add the following words.——In ſhort; conſciouſneſs, not being a mere order of parts, or an external denomination, but a quality *inhering* in its ſubject, it ſeems the plaineſt contradiction to ſay, that it can inhere in the *whole*, without inhering in the *parts*.

Alſo: After the words, *effect without a cauſe*, in p. 351, add—And that, if our acting with a view to ends and reaſons proves we do not begin motion in ourſelves, it muſt much more prove the ſame of the Deity; and, conſequently, that there can be no *beginner* of motion, or *firſt cauſe?*

In the laſt line of p. 330, add a reference to Dr. Prieſtley's words in p. 83.—"No particle of the man being loſt, *as* "*many as were eſſential to him*, will be collected and revivified "at the reſurrection."

To the reference in p. 341, add p. 85, 145, and 241.

For the words quoted in p. 344, ſee p. 160.

REPLIES

TO

DR. PRICE'S

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS,

WITH

A LETTER addreſſed to him

BY

DR. PRIESTLEY.

REPLIES

TO

DR. PRICE'S

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS.

SECT. I. *Of the Human Soul.*

P. 327, 328. I CANNOT see any real inconsistency between calling *the mind*, or *the man*, *one being*, or even *one substance*, and yet saying that this one substance, or being, consists of many parts, each of which, separately considered, may likewise be called a distinct being, or substance; * having again and again observed, what

* That all the *unity* or *simplicity* of which we can be conscious with respect to ourselves, is that each person is *one*, and not *two* conscious intelligent beings; but that consciousness can give us no information whatever concerning the *substance* to which these powers belong, as whether it be *simple* or *complex*, *divisible* or *indivisible*, &c. has, I presume, been sufficiently shown in the *Additional Illustrations* under the article of *Consciousness*, especially p. 284; and yet this seems to be the thing on which Dr. Price lays the greatest stress.

what I believe will be univerſally admitted, that by the words *being*, *ſubſtance*, or *thing*, we only mean the unknown, and perhaps imaginary *ſupport of properties*, ſome of which may belong to the parts, though others may be peculiar to the whole.

Dr. Price, indeed, ſays, (p. 333) that "this "is only true of ſuch properties as denote "merely *an order or relation of parts*, as "that no one of the component parts of "a circle is circular, though the whole "compound is ſo." But I ſee no reaſon for this limitation. It is well known that chemical compounds have powers and properties which we could not have deduced from thoſe of their component parts, or their new arrangement; as the power of *aqua regia* to diſſolve gold, when neither the ſpirit of nitre, nor the ſpirit of ſalt, of which it is compoſed, will do it. It may be ſaid that a being of competent knowledge of the nature of gold, and that of the two acids, ſeparately conſidered, might foretel that gold would be ſoluble in a mixture

ture of them. But I alſo may ſay that a being of ſufficient knowledge might have foretold, that when God had made a human body, even of the *duſt of the earth*, or *mere matter*, the reſult of the animation of this organized ſyſtem would have been his *feeling* and *thinking*, as well as his *breathing* and *walking*; or, in the words of Moſes, that when the mere *breath of life* was imparted, nothing more remained to be done to make a complete man. There was no *ſeparate ſoul* to be communicated.

Even Dr. Price's own example, viz. that of *a clock*, or *watch*, will ſuit my purpoſe tolerably well. A watch, as he properly ſays, is a *time-meaſuring machine*, as man is a *thinking machine*. But what connection is there between the ideas of the braſs, or ſteel, &c. of which the watch is made, or even of the ſeparate parts of which it conſiſts, as the wheels, pinions, ſpring, or chain, &c. and the idea of *meaſuring time?* Has not the whole, in this caſe, a property, or power, which does not, in the leaſt degree, belong to any of the parts.

Nay

Nay the whole machine, when properly put together, has no more power of meaſuring time than any of its ſeparate parts, or the rough materials of which they are made, till the ſpring is wound up; but then its power and office of meaſuring time takes place *of courſe*. Why then ſhould it be thought not to be within the compaſs of almighty power to form an organized body of mere matter, ſo that by ſimply giving it *life* the faculty of *thinking* ſhall be the neceſſary reſult.

It is of no conſequence, however, whether we be able to find any proper illuſtration of this caſe, or not, ſince, as I have ſhewn both in the *Diſquiſitions*, and in the courſe of this correſpondence, that it is as evident from fact, that the brain thinks, as that the magnet attracts iron. See p. 92, &c.

Dr. Price ſays, p. 330, "The ſoul, we "know, amidſt all changes, and through "every period of its exiſtence, maintains "a preciſe and unvaried ſameneſs and in-

"divi-

" dividuality; and, p. 334, he calls it a " *ſimple and indiviſible eſſence.*" Now I am ſatisfied that a man continues ſufficiently the ſame being through the whole courſe of his life, and will be ſo after the reſurrection; but I do not think that our imperfect knowledge of the nature of organized bodies will authorize the very ſtrong language above quoted. I conſider *man* as preſerving his individuality, or identity, in the ſame manner as a *tree* does; and if we conſider the loſs of memory, the change of diſpoſition and character, and the impairing of all the human faculties in old age, there will be no more argument from *fact* of his having continued the ſame from his birth to his death, than of an old, ſhattered, and diſmembered tree being the ſame that it was when firſt planted, and during its vigour.

Dr. Price thinks, (ſee p. 333) that what I have ſaid on the ſubject of *extended ſpirit* is *ſcarcely worthy of me.* Now I cannot help thinking that what I have advanced on that ſubject is both perfectly *juſt*, and likewiſe

likewiſe *proper*. In my *Diſquiſitions* I had conſidered principally the moſt refined and proper kind of ſpiritualiſm, if I may uſe that expreſſion, as appearing to me to be the only conſiſtent ſyſtem; according to which, ſpirit has neither extenſion nor relation to ſpace. This Dr. Price acknowledges (p. 25) to be *an abſurdity and contradiction that deſerves no regard*. He ſays, "That matter is incapable of conſciouſneſs and thought, not becauſe it is *extended*, but becauſe it is *ſolid*," p. 57, "That Dr. Clarke," whoſe ideas he ſeems to adopt, "was not for excluding "expanſion from the idea of immaterial "ſubſtances," p. 55, and together with myſelf, and Dr. Clarke, he always ſuppoſes the divine eſſence to have proper extenſion, filling all ſpace.

It certainly then behoved me to examine this opinion of *extended human ſouls*, and I think I have ſhewn it to be no leſs abſurd than the former. Dr. Price himſelf does not chuſe to defend it, but rather ſeems willing to adopt a new and middle opinion; ſup-

ſuppoſing the ſoul to have *locality*, without *extenſion*. But this idea I have noticed, and I think ſufficiently, in my *Diſquiſitions*, referring to Dr. Watts, who confutes it more at large. I preſume, therefore, that *in no form whatever* can the hypotheſis of a ſoul ſeparate from the body be maintained.

As to what I advanced in my random ſpeculation concerning the *centers of attraction and repulſion*, of which I ſuppoſed that what we call *matter* might poſſibly conſiſt, it was a mere voluntary excurſion into the regions of hypotheſis. I do not at preſent ſee any thing amiſs in it, but I am confident that had I been more in earneſt, and determined to abide by that hypotheſis, there is nothing in it of which Dr. Price could materially avail himſelf in ſupport of his doctrine of a ſeparate ſoul.

The fact of the exiſtence of *compound ideas* in the mind, ſtill appears to me deciſive againſt the opinion of ſuch an abſolute *ſimplicity* and *indiviſibility* of its eſſence,

as Dr. Price contends for. See *Diſquiſitions*, p. 37, and this Correſpondence, p. 51, 95.

Since I wrote the *Additional Illuſtrations*, I have had the curioſity to make ſome inquiry into the actual ſtate of opinions concerning the ſoul, and I ſee reaſon to think that, excepting Dr. Clarke, and perhaps a few others, the opinion that has moſt generally prevailed of late, is that which I have principally combated in my *Diſquiſitions*, viz. that it is a thing that has *no extenſion, or relation to ſpace*. Dr. Watts aſſerts this opinion, and defends it very largely and ably againſt Mr. Locke, and it is the opinion that is advanced and proved, in all the forms of geometrical demonſtration, by Dr. Doddridge in his *Lectures*. Theſe Lectures are now read in all our diſſenting academies, where perhaps one half of the metaphyſicians in the nation are formed; for the clergy of the eſtabliſhed church do not, in general, ſeem to have ſo much of this turn. Now I do not remember that any of my fellow ſtudents ever entertained a different idea,

and

and many of us were very much intent upon metaphyſical inquiries. We held very different opinions on other points, and were pretty eager diſputants. I have alſo inquired of many other perſons, and hitherto they have all told me, that their idea of ſpirit was that which I have conſidered. It will be obſerved, however, that all the arguments on which I lay the moſt ſtreſs reſpect the notion of a ſeparate ſoul *in general*, without regard to any particular hypotheſis about the nature of it.

Mr. Baxter, ſeems to deny extenſion to ſpirits, but not *locality*, ſo that probably neither Dr. Price nor myſelf have been exactly right in our idea of his opinion. It rather ſeems to have been that middle opinion to which Dr. Price now reverts. As to the doctrine of immaterial ſpirits having real *ſize*, and conſequently *form*, or *ſhape*, though I ought perhaps to have reſpected it more, as the opinion of ſo great a man as Dr. Clarke, I really conſidered it as an hypotheſis univerſally abandoned, till Dr. Price's ſeeming avowal of it made me

give it the degree of attention which I have done, and which produced what I have advanced on the ſubject in the *Additional Illuſtrations* to which he refers.

In his *Additional Obſervations*, (p. 332) Dr. Price ſuggeſts an idea of a ſoul, and of its union to the body, that I own I ſhould not have expected from his general ſyſtem; comparing it (as "that to which," he ſays, "it is perhaps the moſt ſimilar") to "thoſe cauſes and powers in nature, "operating according to ſtated laws, which "unite themſelves to ſubſtances formed "as iron and a magnet are."

Is then the ſoul nothing more than a *power* or *property*, neceſſarily reſulting from the organization of the brain? This has been *my* idea, and not *his*. I therefore ſuppoſe him to mean that whenever a body is completely organized, there is a general law in nature, by which, without any particular interpoſition of the Deity, a ſoul immediately attaches itſelf to it. But this ſuppoſes what Dr. Price will excuſe me for calling

calling *a magazine of ſouls* ready formed for that purpoſe, or the pre-exiſtence of all human ſouls; which, indeed, was the original doctrine of a ſoul, and what I think is neceſſary to make the ſyſtem complete, and conſiſtent.

Dr. Price ſays, *note* p. 334, "It is certainly very little ſupport that Socinianiſm "receives from Materialiſm," becauſe the reſurrection being nothing more than the re-arrangement of the ſame particles that compoſed a man before death, the ſame may have compoſed a man in a ſtate prior to his birth.

I anſwer, that this is certainly *poſſible*, and had I the ſame *authority* for believing it, that I have to believe the reſurrection, I ſhould have admitted it; but having no *evidence* at all for it, it is a notion ſo far within the region of mere poſſibility, that it is in the higheſt degree incredible. For none of the natural arguments for the future exiſtence of men, which are derived from the conſideration of the moral government of God, can be alledged in favour of

a pre-exiſtence of which we have no knowledge.

It is likewiſe poſſible that, in a former remote period, not only myſelf, but every thing with which I am connected, and the whole ſyſtem of things, may have been juſt as it now is, that Dr. Price then wrote remarks on my *Diſquiſitions*, &c. and that I replied to him in a joint publication, the very ſame as the preſent; that there have been infinite revolutions of the ſame ſyſtem, and that there is an infinity of them ſtill to come, which was the opinion of ſome of the antient philoſophers.

But it is not the mere *poſſibility* of ſuch a ſcheme that can entitle it to any degree of credit. If, therefore, the failure in the ſupport that the doctrine of Materialiſm gives to the doctrine of Socinianiſm be only in proportion to the probability of the pre-exiſtence of man on the ſyſtem of materialiſm (which excludes the notion of a ſeparate ſoul) I think it may be put down as an *evaneſcent quantity*, or nothing at all. In

other

other words, the doctrine of materialiſm is a ſufficient, and effectual ſupport of the Socinian hypotheſis.

So much confidence have I in the tendency that the doctrine of materialiſm has to favour Socinianiſm, that I doubt not but the moment it is believed that men in general have no ſouls ſeparate from their bodies, it will be immediately and univerſally concluded, that Chriſt had none. And as to the mere poſſibility of his, and our *bodies*, having had a pre-exiſtence in an organized and thinking ſtate, I ſhould entertain no ſort of apprehenſion about it. Or, if this odd opinion ſhould gain ground, it will have nothing in it contrary to the *proper principle* of Socinianiſm, which is, that Chriſt was a *mere man*, having no natural pre-eminence over other men; but that all his extraordinary powers were derived from divine communications after his birth, and chiefly, if not wholly, after his baptiſm, and the deſcent of the holy ſpirit upon him. This kind of pre-exiſtence can alſo afford no ſupport to any other of thoſe cor-

ruptions of chriſtianity which have been derived from the notion of a ſeparate ſoul, ſuch as the doctrine of *purgatory*, and the *worſhip of the dead*, &c. &c.

SECT. II. *Of the Nature of Matter.*

On what I advanced concerning the conſtitution of matter, as conſiſting of mere *centers of attraction and repulſion*, which I gave as a mere *random ſpeculation*, and not at all neceſſary to my purpoſe, but according to which it may be ſaid that every thing is the *divine agency*, Dr. Price aſks, (p. 337) "Does not the divine agency re-"quire a different object from itſelf to "act upon," and, (p. 338) "What idea "can we form of the creation of the di-"vine agency, or of an agency that acts "upon itſelf." I anſwer, that the difficulty conſiſts in *terms* only; for that on the random hypotheſis to which this argument refers, the *exertion of the divine agency* may properly enough be called *creation*, and the *modification* of that exertion, the *action* of the Deity upon that creation.

Dr.

Dr. Price ſays, in the note p. 338, that *ſolid matter can do ſomewhat*, and *be of uſe*. But is it not rather unfortunate for this hypotheſis, and thoſe who maintain it, that they are not able to ſay *what it does*, there being no *effect*, or *appearance* in nature, to the explication of which it is neceſſary; all that is *actually done*, where matter is concerned, being probably effected by ſomething to which ſolidity cannot be aſcribed. There is certainly no conceivable connection between *ſolidity* and *attraction*. Solidity, indeed, might account for *reſiſtance at the point of contact*, but I challenge any philoſopher to ſtand forth, and produce but one clear inſtance of actual *unqueſtionable contact*, where matter is concerned. In moſt caſes of repulſion it is undeniable that proper contact is not at all concerned, and therefore there can be no reaſon *from analogy* to lead us to conclude that it is, in *any caſe*, the proper cauſe of repulſion; but, on the contrary, that the true cauſe, as *certainly in moſt caſes*, ſo *probably in all*, is ſomething elſe. The caſe the moſt like

to

to real contact is that of the component parts of solid bodies, as gold, &c. but even this cannot be any thing more than a certain *near approach*, because they are brought *nearer* together by cold; and it will hardly be pretended that any body merely impinging against a piece of gold comes nearer to its substance than the distance at which its own component parts are placed from each other.

On this subject Dr. Price refers to what he has advanced p. 31. But all that he says there is that, in some cases, the reason why bodies cannot be brought into contact *may be* their *solidity*, at the same time allowing that, in other cases, it is *certainly* a *repulsive power*. In the same section he refers to his *Treatise on Morals* for another origin of the idea of solidity. But this I have fully considered in the third of the *Essays* prefixed to my edition of *Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind*. See particularly p. 37.

However,

However, the whole of what I have advanced concerning *the penetrability of matter*, is a thing on which I lay no great ſtreſs. I do not ſee any reaſon to be diſſatisfied with it; but admitting matter to have all the ſolidity that is uſually aſcribed to it, I have no doubt of its being compatible with the powers of thought; all the phenomena demonſtrating to me that man is a being compoſed of *one kind of ſubſtance*, and not of *two*, and theſe ſo heterogeneous to each other as has been generally ſuppoſed.

It is within the limits of this ſection that Dr. Price puts the following queſtion to me, (p. 335.) "Since experiments do "not furniſh us with the idea of *cauſation*, "and *productive power*, how came we by "thoſe ideas, and how does Dr. Prieſtley "know they have any exiſtence? How, "in particular, does he avoid the ſcep-"tical ſyſtem which Mr. Hume has ad-"vanced?"

I anſwer that my idea of *cauſation*, and of its *origin* in the mind, is, as far as I know;

know, the very ſame with that of other perſons; but we all diſtinguiſh between *primary* and *ſecondary cauſes*, though ſpeaking ſtrictly and philoſophically, we call ſecondary cauſes mere *effects*, and confine the term *cauſe* to the primary cauſe. Thus we ſay that the cauſe of moving iron is in the magnet, though the magnet is not the primary, but only the proximate, or ſecondary cauſe of that effect; deriving its power, and all that can be ſaid to belong to it from a higher cauſe, and ultimately from God, the original cauſe of all things. So alſo I formerly conſidered man as the original cauſe of his volitions and actions, till, on farther reflection, I ſaw reaſon to conclude that like the magnet, he is no more than the proximate, immediate, or ſecondary cauſe of them; himſelf, his conſtitution, and circumſtances, and conſequently his actions, having a prior cauſe, viz. the ſame firſt cauſe from which the powers of the magnet, and all the powers in nature, are derived.

SECT. III. *Of the Doctrine of Neceſſity.*

On this ſubject Dr. Price refers me, (p. 342) to the deciſions of what he calls *common ſenſe*, or the notions of the vulgar. Theſe I have obſerved, as far as they go, are uniformly in favour of the doctrine of neceſſity. For if men were properly interrogated, they would admit all that I require in order to a proper demonſtration of the doctrine; though, not being uſed to reflection, they do not *purſue* or even *apprehend* the conſequences. See my *Treatiſe on Neceſſity*, p. 103, &c.

As to the conſiſtency of the *popular language* with the doctrine of neceſſity, I have again and again made obſervations upon it, which I think it unneceſſary to repeat, in anſwer to the concluſion of Dr. Price's note, p. 356.

Dr. Price ſays, (p. 345) that he "can-
"not conceive a more groundleſs aſſertion,
"than that the doctrine of liberty implies
"that a man can act wickedly or virtuouſly
"without a motive." But after putting a caſe in which he ſuppoſes motives to be exactly

exactly equal, viz. the combination of *paſſion* and *intereſt* on one ſide, and of *conſcience* and *duty* on the other, he makes liberty to conſiſt in our poſſeſſing *a power of making either of them the motive that ſhall prevail.*

Now it appears to me to require very little power of analization to ſee that before the mind can decide to which of the motives it ſhall give this preference, it muſt form a previous real, and moſt ſerious *determination*, and that this previous determination requires a motive as much as the final determination itſelf, eſpecially as Dr. Price expreſsly acknowledges, (p. 348) that "it is nonſenſe to deny the influence of "motives, or that there are no fixed prin-"ciples or ends by which the will is "guided." In the caſe above mentioned I have the choice of two things, viz. either to give the preponderance to the *motives of intereſt*, or to *thoſe of duty*, which, being by ſuppoſition exactly equal, are themſelves out of the queſtion, and therefore cannot at all contribute to the deciſion. Now this being a real determination of the mind, it muſt,

muſt, by Dr. Price's own confeſſion, require ſome motive or other.

This argument I own is quite new to me, and therefore I preſume that it is, in part, the *new matter* which Dr. Price obſerves (p. 322,) is contained in theſe *Additional Obſervations*; but I know he will excuſe my frankneſs if I tell him that it appears to me to be the laſt retreat of the doctrine of philoſophical liberty, and not at all more tenable than any of thoſe out of which it has been already driven. For when *all argument* fails, he will hardly take refuge in the *common ſenſe* of my Scotch antagoniſts. I could ſay more on the ſubject of this new idea of *the mind chuſing the motive on which it will decide*, but I think what I have now ſaid may be ſufficient.

I would take this opportunity of obſerving that if the motives, in the caſe abovementioned, be not of a *moral* nature, (and ſince both the motive of *intereſt* on one ſide, and that of *duty* on the other, are expreſsly excluded, every thing elſe of a moral nature ſeems to be excluded along with

with them) the determination cannot with propriety be denominated *moral*, or be ſaid to be either *virtuous* or *vicious*.

Dr. Price, on this occaſion, ſuppoſes that a ſtrict equality of motives is a very common caſe. I anſwer that we are, indeed, ſometimes ſenſible of it, but that then the determination always remains in ſuſpence. For it appears to me that, if we give attention to the ſtate of our minds, we ſhall ſee reaſon enough to conclude that we never come to an actual determination without a ſufficient preponderance of motive. And if we conſider that the force of a motive depends upon *the ſtate of the mind* to which it is preſented, as well as upon what it is in itſelf, that the ſtate of mind is in perpetual fluctuation, and that the point of light in which we view the ſame thing is continually varying, we ſhall not be at all ſurpriſed that, in ordinary caſes, when nothing of much conſequence is depending, we determine with ſuch readineſs, and from motives ſo evaneſcent, that we are not able to trace the progreſs of our thoughts, ſo as diſtinctly

tinctly to recollect the real cauſes of our choice, after the ſhorteſt interval of time. If it were poſſible to make a balance which ſhould ſupport a thouſand pounds weight, and yet turn with one thouſandth part of a grain, would it be any wonder that a perſon ſhould not be able eaſily to bring it to an equipoiſe? But what is even this to the exquiſite ſtructure of the mind?

Dr. Price acknowledges, as above, that "it is nonſenſe to deny the influence of "motives, or to maintain that there are "no fixed principles by which the will is "guided;" but at the ſame time he ſays (p. 348) that "this nonſenſe is ſcarcely "equal to that of confounding *moral* and "*phyſical cauſes*." Now if what I have ſaid on this ſubject both in my *Treatiſe on Neceſſity*, and in my *Letter to Dr. Horſeley* be not ſatisfactory, I ſhall deſpair of ever being able to give ſatisfaction with reſpect to any thing. I will even grant moral and phyſical cauſes to be as different, in their nature and operation, as Dr. Price himſelf can poſſibly ſuppoſe them to be;

but if they be really *cauſes*, producing *certain effects*, that is, if we be ſo conſtituted, as that one definite determination ſhall always follow a definite ſtate of mind, it muſt be true that, without a miracle, no volition, or action, could have been otherwiſe than it *has been*, *is*, or *is to be*; and this is all that, as a neceſſarian, I contend for. If any perſon can pleaſe himſelf with calling this *liberty*, or the reſult of the *mind's determining itſelf*, I have no ſort of objection, becauſe theſe are mere *words* and *phraſes*.

Dr. Price calls the doctrine of neceſſity, according to which all events, moral as well as natural, are ultimately aſcribed to God, a *deadly potion* (p. 354) and yet he heſitates not to ſay (p. 358) that he believes "no event comes to paſs which "it would have been proper to exclude, "and that, relatively to the divine plan "and adminiſtration, all is right." Now, between this doctrine, and thoſe naked views of the doctrine of neceſſity at which Dr. Price is ſo much alarmed, I ſee no real

real difference. When a perſon can once bring himſelf to think that there is no wickedneſs of man which it would have been proper to exclude, and that the divine plan *requires* this wickedneſs, as well as every thing elſe that actually takes place (which is the purport of what Dr. Price advances, and very nearly his own words) I wonder much that he ſhould heſitate to admit that the Divine Being might expreſsly *appoint* what it would have been improper to exclude, what his plan abſolutely required, and that without which the ſcheme could not have been right, but muſt have been wrong.

May not this view of the ſubject, as given by Dr. Price, be repreſented as an *apology for vice*, and a *thing to be ſhuddered at*, and to be *fled from*, which is the language that he uſes (p. 354) with reſpect to the doctrine of neceſſity? If to make vice *neceſſary* be deadly poiſon, can that doctrine be innocent which conſiders it as a thing that is *proper*, and, relatively to the divine plan and adminiſtration, *right?* The

two opinions, if not the ſame, are certainly very near *akin*, and muſt have the ſame kind of operation and effect.

If Dr. Price will attend to *facts*, he may be ſatisfied that it *cannot* require that great *ſtrength* and *ſoundneſs of conſtitution* that he charitably aſcribes to me, to convert the doctrine of neceſſity, poiſon as he thinks it to be, into wholeſome nouriſhment, and that he muſt have ſeen it in ſome very unfair and injurious light. I am far from being ſingular in my belief of this doctrine. There are thouſands, I doubt not, who believe it as firmly as I do. A great majority of the more intelligent, ſerious, and virtuous of my acquaintance among men of letters, are neceſſarians, (as, with reſpect to ſeveral of them, Dr. Price himſelf very well knows) and we all think ourſelves the better for it. Can we *all* have this peculiar ſtrength of conſtitution? It cannot be ſurely deadly poiſon which ſo many perſons take, not only without injury, but with advantage, finding it to be, as Dr. Price acknowledges with

with reſpect to myſelf (p. 352) even *ſalutary*.

We are all, no doubt, conſtituted much alike, how different ſoever may be the opinions that we entertain concerning the principles of our common nature. I, therefore, infer that Dr. Price himſelf, if it were poſſible for him to become a neceſſarian, would think it not only a very harmleſs, but a great and glorious ſcheme, worthy of a chriſtian divine, and philoſopher, and that he would ſmile, as I myſelf now do, at the notions which we firſt entertained of it.

Dr. Price alſo imagines (p. 355 and 356) "that the belief of the doctrine of neceſſity "muſt operate like a dead weight upon "the creation, breaking every aſpiring ef- "fort, and producing univerſal abjectneſs. "The natural effect of believing that no- "thing is left to depend upon ourſelves, "and that we can *do* nothing, and *are* "nothing, muſt be concluding that we "have nothing to do."

But I have obſerved in my *Treatiſe on Neceſſity* (p. 96, &c.) that, in the only ſenſe in which the conſideration of it can operate as a motive of action, *every thing depends upon ourſelves*, much more ſo than upon any other ſcheme; and therefore that the neceſſarian muſt feel himſelf more ſtrongly impelled to an exertion of his faculties than any other man.

By a man's *making his own fortune*, I mean that his *ſucceſs* depends upon his *actions*, as theſe depend upon his *volitions*, and his volitions upon the *motives* preſented to him. Suppoſing a man, therefore, to have *propenſities* and *objects of purſuit*, as his own happineſs, &c. &c. of which no ſyſtem of faith can deprive him, he will neceſſarily be rouſed to exert himſelf in proportion to the ſtrength of his propenſity, and his belief of the neceſſary connection between his *end* and his *endeavours*; and nothing but ſuch an opinion as that of philoſophical liberty, which deſtroys that neceſſary connection, can poſſibly ſlacken his endeavours.

With

With reſpect to this alſo, let Dr. Price conſider whether his *theory* has any correſpondence with *facts*. Let him conſider thoſe of his acquaintance who are neceſſarians. To ſay nothing of myſelf, who certainly, however, am not the moſt torpid and lifeleſs of all animals; where will he find greater ardour of mind, a ſtronger and more unremitted exertion, or a more ſtrenuous and ſteady purſuit of the moſt important objects, than among thoſe of whom he knows to be neceſſarians? I can ſay with truth (and meaning no diſparagement to Dr. Price, and many others, who, I believe, unknown to themſelves, derive much of the excellence of their characters from principles very near akin to thoſe of the doctrine of neceſſity) that I generally find *chriſtian neceſſarians* the moſt diſtinguiſhed for active and ſublime virtues, and more ſo in proportion to their ſteady belief of the doctrine, and the attention they habitually give to it. I appeal to every perſon who has read *Dr. Hartley's Obſervations on Man*, whether he can avoid having the ſame conviction with reſpect to him.

It is at *names* more than *things* that people in general are moſt frightened. Dr. Horſeley is clearly a neceſſarian, in every thing but the name. He avows his belief that every determination of the mind certainly follows from previous circumſtances, ſo that without a miracle, no volition, or action, could have been otherwiſe than it *has been*, *is*, or *is to be*, and yet he diſclaims the doctrine of neceſſity. Dr. Price does not properly maintain the doctrine, but he ſtands on the very brink of that tremendous precipice; believing that the mind cannot act without a motive, but thinking to ſecure his liberty on the ſuppoſition that the mind (I ſuppoſe, without any motive whatever) has the power of chuſing what motive it will act from; and believing with the neceſſarian, that every thing is *as it ſhould be*, and *as the divine plan required it to be*.

Upon the whole, both he and Dr. Horſeley appear to me to want nothing more than what is called *courage* fully to adopt, and boldly defend, the doctrine of neceſſity

in

in *its proper terms*, and to *its full extent*. I well remember to have had the ſame fears and apprehenſions about the doctrine of neceſſity that they now expreſs; but being compelled, by mere *force of argument*, to believe it to be *true*, I was by degrees reconciled to it, and preſently found that there was nothing to be dreaded in it, but, on the contrary, every thing that can give the greateſt ſatisfaction to a well diſpoſed mind, capable of any degree of comprehenſion, or extent of view. I think it much better, however, to admit the doctrine of neceſſity explicitly, and with all its conſequences, than be compelled to admit the ſame conſequences, in other words, and in conjunction with principles that are quite diſcordant with it.

To take off the dark cloud that Dr. Price has in theſe laſt obſervations thrown over the doctrine of neceſſity, I ſhall not here repeat what I have on former occaſions advanced in its favour, but ſhall leave it to make whatever impreſſion it may on our readers.

What

What Dr. Price ſays of *the ſoul* (p. 355) that, "it is poſſeſſed of faculties which "make it an image of the deity, and ren- "der it capable of acting by the ſame rule "with him, of participating of his hap- "pineſs, and of living for ever, and im- "proving for ever under his eye and care," I can ſay of *man*. But I do not think that, for this purpoſe, it is at all neceſſary that the mind ſhould be *incorporeal, uncompounded* or *ſelf-determining*, arrogating to ourſelves the attributes of *little independent gods*. To whatever kind of ſubſtance, though it ſhould be the humbleſt *duſt of the earth*, that the truly noble prerogatives of man be imparted, it will appear to me equally reſpectable. For it is not the *ſubſtance*, but the *properties*, or *powers*, that make it ſo.

I alſo *reverence myſelf*, but not in the character of a being *ſelf-determined*, or *ſelf-exiſtent*, but as the rational offſpring of the firſt great and only proper cauſe of all things. By his power I am animated, by his wiſdom I am conducted, and by his bounty

bounty I am made happy. It is only from the idea I have of my near relation to this great and glorious being, and of my intimate connection with him, that my exultation arises; far from founding it upon the idea that I have a will that is not ultimately his, or a single thought that he cannot controul. *Of him, and through him, and to him, are all things. To him, therefore, and not to ourselves, be glory.*

Dr. Price lays great stress on the consideration of God being a *self-determining*, and *self-moving* being, as a proof that man *may* be so too (p. 349 & 350) and considering *self-determining* as equivalent to *self-moving*, and this as equivalent to what we mean by *a self-existent*, or *first cause*, I have not objected to applying that appellation to the Divine Being; but I would observe that in this I mean nothing more than to express my total want of conception concerning the *cause*, or *reason*, of the *existence*, and if I may so say, of the *original action*, of the Deity. For, considering the Divine Being as *actually existing*, I have no more idea of the

the poſſibility of his acting without a motive (if there be any analogy between the divine mind and ours) than of any created being doing ſo; and to aſcribe this ſelf-determining power to the Divine Being, meaning by it that *he acts without a motive*, or *reaſon*, is certainly ſo far from exalting the Deity, that we cannot form any idea of him more degrading. It is to diveſt him at once of all his moral perfections. For to act invariably from good principles, or motives (in whatever it be that we make goodneſs, or virtue, to conſiſt) is eſſential to moral excellence.

As to the *cauſe*, or *account*, as Dr. Price expreſſes it, of the divine exiſtence, I profeſs to have no idea at all. That there muſt be a neceſſarily exiſting being, or a firſt cauſe, follows undeniably from the exiſtence of other things; but the ſame diſpoſition to inquire into the cauſes of things would lead us on *ad infinitum*, were it not that we ſee a manifeſt abſurdity in it; ſo that, confounding as it is to the imagination, we are under an abſolute neceſſity of

acqui-

acquieſcing in the idea of a *ſelf-exiſtent being*.

Every thing that I have yet ſeen advanced with reſpect to the proper *cauſe*, or *reaſon* of the divine exiſtence appears to me either to ſuggeſt no ideas at all, or to give falſe ones. Dr. Clarke ſays, that *the Deity exiſts by an abſolute neceſſity in the nature of things*, but this expreſſion gives me no proper idea; for, excluſive of that neceſſity by which we are compelled to admit that ſuch a being exiſts, which may be called neceſſity *a poſteriori*, I am ſatisfied that no man, let his reaſoning faculties be what they will, can have the leaſt idea of any neceſſity. Of neceſſity *a priori* it is impoſſible we ſhould know any thing. Let any perſon only exclude all idea of creation, which is not difficult, and conſider whether, in thoſe circumſtances, he can diſcover a cauſe of any exiſtence at all. To talk of *the nature of things*, in this caſe, is, to my underſtanding mere jargon, or a cloak for abſolute ignorance.

Dr.

Dr. Price himſelf does not ſeem to be ſatisfied with this explanation of the cauſe of the divine exiſtence, and therefore ſuggeſts a different idea; ſaying (p. 351) that "the account of the divine exiſtence "is the ſame with the account of the ex- "iſtence of ſpace, and duration, of the "equality of the three angles of a triangle "to two right angles, or of any abſtract "truth." Now, as Dr. Clarke's language gives me no idea at all, this account appears to me to ſuggeſt a falſe one.

The reaſon, or the account, of the exiſtence of the *divine being* cannot be the ſame with that of the exiſtence of *ſpace*, or *duration*, for this plain reaſon. I can, in any caſe, form an idea of the non-exiſtence both of all *effects*, and of all *cauſes*, and conſequently both of the creation, and of the creator, and of the non-exiſtence of the latter, juſt as eaſily as of that of the former; but ſtill the ideas of *ſpace* and *duration* remain in the mind, and cannot be excluded from it. To ſay that ſpace is an *attribute of the deity*, or that it neceſſarily implies,

implies, and draws after it, the idea of his exiſtence, appears to me to have no foundation whatever, and to have been aſſumed without the leaſt face of probability. For this I appeal to what paſſes in any perſon's mind.

Again, the reaſon of the divine exiſtence, and that of an abſtract truth, as that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, appear to me to have no ſort of analogy. They agree in nothing but that both of them are true, but with reſpect to the *reaſon*, or *cauſe of their being true*, no two things, in my opinion, can be more unlike.

An abſtract truth is no *being*, *ſubſtance*, or *reality* whatever. It implies nothing more than the agreement of two ideas, whether the archetypes of thoſe ideas have any exiſtence or not, and of this agreement we have the moſt perfect comprehenſion. Nothing can be more intelligible. Now, if our perſuaſion of this abſtract truth was of the ſame nature with our perſuaſion concerning the exiſtence of God, we ſhould have

have the ſame perfect comprehenſion of the latter that we have of the former. But can any perſon ſeriouſly ſay this, when of the former we know *every thing*, and of the latter abſolutely *nothing?* Let any perſon exclude from his mind all idea of the creation, and conſider whether there be any thing left that will compel him to believe the exiſtence of any *thing*, *being*, or *ſubſtance* whatever. A *creation* neceſſarily implies a *creator*, but if there be no creation, the only proof of the exiſtence of a creator is cut off.

The cauſe of the exiſtence of a *thing*, *ſubſtance*, or *being*, cannot, in the nature of things, be the ſame with that of a mere abſtract hypothetical truth. The cauſe of a being, or ſubſtance, muſt be a being or ſubſtance alſo, and therefore, with reſpect to the divine being we are obliged to ſay that he has *no proper cauſe whatever*. The agreement of two ideas is a thing ſo very different in its nature from this, that the term *cauſe* is not even applicable to it; as, on the other hand, I ſee no meaning what-

whatever in the word *account* as applicable to the divine exiſtence. In this caſe there muſt either be *a cauſe*, or *no cauſe*. *Account*, here, is to me a word without meaning.

If by the word *account*, we mean the ſame with *reaſon*, the caſes are clearly the fartheſt in the world from being parallel. If I be aſked the reaſon why the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, I anſwer, that the quantity of the three, and that of the two, is the ſame, or that the ideas, when rightly underſtood, exactly *coincide*. But if I be aſked why the divine being exiſts (I ſay *why he exiſts*, not why I *believe* him to exiſt) can I ſatisfy any body, or myſelf, by ſaying that the two ideas in the propoſition *God exiſts* are the ſame, or coincide? Is the idea of *God*, and that of mere *exiſtence* the ſame idea? The two caſes, therefore, have nothing in them at all parallel. How then can the *reaſon*, *account*, or *cauſe* of an *abſtract truth*, be of *the ſame nature* with that of the reaſon, account, or cauſe of the *divine exiſtence?*

I ſhall now conclude the whole controverſy with mentioning what appear to me to be the things on which the principal arguments in each part of it turn, and the miſconceptions that Dr. Price ſeems to me to have laboured under.

On the ſubject of the *penetrability of matter*, he has never produced what I have repeatedly called for, viz. *one caſe of real unqueſtionable contact*, without which the doctrine of proper impenetrability cannot be ſupported. And till this be produced, I am obliged to conclude, from analogy, that *all* reſiſtance is owing to ſuch cauſes as we both agree that, in *many*, if not in *moſt caſes*, it does certainly ariſe from, and this is *not ſolidity*, or impenetrability, but ſomething very different from it.

With reſpect to the doctrine of *a ſoul*, Dr. Price appears to me to have been miſled principally by his notion of the *abſolute ſimplicity* or *individuality* of the mind, or the thinking principle in man, as if it

was

was a thing of which we could be *conſcious*; whereas I think I have ſhown ſufficiently that we cannot be conſcious of any thing relating to the *eſſence of the mind*; that we are properly conſcious of nothing but what we *perceive*, and what we *do*. As to what we *are*, it is a thing that we muſt learn by way of *inference*, and *deduction* from obſervations, or conſciouſneſs; and I think the *arguments* are deciſively againſt ſuch a ſimplicity and indiviſibility as Dr. Price ſuppoſes.

On the ſubject of the doctrine of *neceſſity*, Dr. Price agrees with Dr. Horſeley in admitting that our volitions *certainly*, and invariably depend upon the preceding ſtate of mind; ſo that, without a miracle, there was a real neceſſity of every thing being as it *has been*, *is*, or *is to be*; and imagines that the controverſy depends on what I think to be the mere verbal diſtinction, of motives being the *moral*, and not the *phyſical cauſes* of our volitions and actions; or, as he ſometimes expreſſes himſelf, that it is not the motives that determine the

mind, but that the mind determines itſelf according to the motives; which I maintain to be the doctrine of neceſſity, only diſguiſed in other words. Indeed, how any man can boaſt of his liberty, merely becauſe he has a power of determining himſelf, when, at the ſame time, he knows that he cannot do it in any other than *in one preciſe and definite manner*, ſtrictly depending upon the circumſtances in which he is placed, and when he believes that, in no one action of his life, he could have determined otherwiſe than he has done, is to me a little difficult of comprehenſion.

As to *real liberty*, or the power of acting independently of motives, he expreſsly confines it to thoſe caſes in which the motives for and againſt any particular choice are *exactly equal*. Such caſes, I think, ſeldom, or never, occur; ſo that a man could have but few opportunities of ſhewing ſuch a liberty as this. If they ſhould occur, and any determination take place in thoſe circumſtances, it appears to me to be attended with the *abſurdity* (as Dr. Price himſelf

himſelf calls it) of determining without a motive; and I ſhould think that after ſuppoſing it poſſible that the mind might determine *without* a motive, it might alſo determine *contrary* to all motive. For the ſame conſtitution of mind that could enable it to do the one, would enable it to do the other.

A

LETTER

TO

DR. PRICE.

DEAR SIR,

WITH this letter you will receive a few remarks on your *Additional Obſervations*, which I have read with that *attention* which every thing from you demands. That it has not been with *conviction*, your candour, I know, will not impute to any peculiar *obſtinacy*, but to my unavoidably ſeeing the ſubjects of our diſcuſſion in a light different from that in which you ſee them. We have not the ſame idea of the nature of the human

mind, or of the laws to which it is ſubject, but we are both ſufficiently aware of the force of *prejudice*, and that this may equally throw a biaſs on the ſide of *long eſtabliſhed*, or of *novel* opinions. Alſo, equally reſpecting the chriſtian maxim of *doing to others as we would that others ſhould do to us*, we are each of us ready to give to others that liberty which we claim ourſelves; while we equally reprobate thoſe raſh ſentiments which proceed from a deciſion without a previous diſcuſſion of the reaſons for and againſt a queſtion in debate.

I am not a little proud of your commendation of me for my "fairneſs in the "purſuit of truth, and following it in all "its conſequences, however frightful, with"out attempting to evade or palliate "them" (p. 352.) It is a conduct that I hope I ſhall always purſue, as the firſt of duties to that God who has given me whatever *faculties* I poſſeſs, and whatever *opportunity of inquiry* I have been favoured with; and I truſt I ſhall continue to purſue this con-

conduct at all risks. As he is properly no christian, who does not *confess Christ before men*, or who is *ashamed* of his religion in an unbelieving age, like the present; this maxim, which the author of our religion inculcates with respect to christianity in general, the reason of the thing requires that we extend to every thing that essentially affects christianity.

So long, therefore, as I conceive the doctrine of a *separate soul* to have been the true source of the grossest corruptions in the christian system, of that very *antichristian system* which sprung up in the times of the apostles, concerning which they entertained the strongest apprehensions, and delivered, and left upon record, the most solemn warnings, I must think myself a very lukewarm and disaffected christian if I do not bear my feeble testimony against it.

With respect to the private conduct of individuals, as affecting our happiness after death, I do not lay any stress upon this,

or

or upon *any opinion whatever*, and there is no perſon of whoſe chriſtian temper and conduct I think more highly than I do of yours, though you hold opinions the very reverſe of mine, and defend them with ſo much zeal; a zeal which, while you maintain the opinions at all, is certainly commendable. But with reſpect to the *general plan of chriſtianity*, the importance of the doctrines I contend for can hardly, in my opinion, be rated too high. What I contend for leaves nothing for the manifold corruptions and abuſes of popery to faſten on. Other doctrinal reformations are partial things, while this goes to the very root of almoſt all the miſchief we complain of; and, for my part, I ſhall not date the proper and complete downfal of what is called *antichriſt*, but from the general prevalence of the doctrine of materialiſm.

This I cannot help ſaying appears to me to be that fundamental principle in true philoſophy which is alone perfectly conſonant to the doctrine of the ſcriptures; and being

being at the ſame time the only proper deduction from natural appearances, it muſt, in the progreſs of inquiry ſoon *appear to be ſo*; and then, ſhould it be found that an unqueſtionably true philoſophy teaches one thing, and revelation another, the latter could not ſtand its ground, but muſt inevitably be exploded, as contrary to *truth and fact*. I therefore deem it to be of particular conſequence, that philoſophical unbelievers ſhould be apprized in time, that there are chriſtians, who conſider the *doctrine of a ſoul* as a tenet that is ſo far from being *eſſential* to the chriſtian ſcheme, that it is a thing quite *foreign* to it, derived originally from heatheniſm, diſcordant with the genuine principles of revealed religion, and ultimately ſubverſive of them.

As to the doctrine of *neceſſity*, I cannot, after all our diſcuſſion, help conſidering it as *demonſtrably true*, and the only poſſible foundation for the doctrines of a *providence*, and the *moral government of God*.

Con-

Continuing to ſee things in this light, after the cloſeſt attention that I have been able to give to them, before, or in the courſe of our friendly debate (and you will pardon me, if I add, ſeeing this in a ſtronger light than ever) you will not be diſpleaſed with the *zeal* that I have occaſionally ſhewn; as I, on my part, intirely approve of yours, who conſider yourſelf as defending important and long received truth, againſt fundamental and moſt dangerous innovations.

We are neither of us ſo far blinded by prejudice as not to ſee, and acknowledge, the wiſdom of conſtituting us in ſuch a manner, as that every thing *new* reſpecting a ſubject of ſo much conſequence as *religion*, ſhould excite a great alarm, and meet with great difficulty in eſtabliſhing itſelf. This furniſhes an occaſion of a thorough examination, and diſcuſſion of all new doctrines, in conſequence of which they are either totally exploded, or more firmly eſtabliſhed. The ſlow and gradual

progreſs

progreſs of chriſtianity, and alſo that of the reformation, is a circumſtance that bids fairer for their perpetuity, than if they had met with a much readier reception in the world. You will allow me to indulge the hope of a ſimilar advantage from the oppoſition that I expect to this article of reformation in the chriſtian ſyſtem, and that the truth I contend for will be the more valued for being dearly bought, and ſlowly acquired.

As to the *odium* that I may bring upon myſelf by the malevolence of my oppoſers, of which, in your letter to me, you make ſuch obliging mention, I hope the ſame conſciouſneſs of not having deſerved it, will ſupport me as it has done you, when much worſe treated than I have yet been, on an occaſion on which you deſerved the warmeſt gratitude of your country, whoſe intereſts you ſtudied and watched over, whoſe calamities you foreſaw, and faithfully pointed out; and which might have derived, in various reſpects, the moſt ſolid

and

and durable advantages from your labours. But we are no chriſtians, if we have not ſo far imbibed the principles and ſpirit of our religion, as even to *rejoice that we are counted worthy of ſuffering* in any good cauſe.

Here it is that, ſuppoſing me to be a defender of *chriſtian truth*, my object gives me an advantage that your excellent *political writings* cannot give you. All your obſervations may be juſt, and your advice moſt excellent, and yet your country, the ſafety and happineſs of which you have at heart, being in the hands of infatuated men, may go to ruin; whereas chriſtian truth is a cauſe *founded upon a rock*, and though it may be overborne for a time, we are aſſured that the *gates of death ſhall not prevail againſt it*.

Having now, each of us, defended, in the beſt manner that we can, what we deem to be this important truth, we are, I doubt not, equally ſatisfied with ourſelves, and ſhall chearfully ſubmit the reſult

ſult of our diſcuſſion to the judgment of our friends, and of the public; and to the final and infallible determination of the *God of all truth*.

I am, notwithſtanding this, and every other poſſible difference in *mere opinion*, with the moſt perfect eſteem,

Dear Sir,

Yours moſt affectionately,

J. PRIESTLEY.

Calne, Oct. 2, 1778.

A NOTE

NOTE to Dr. PRIESTLEY.

Dr. Price desires Dr. Priestley's acceptance of his gratitude for the expressions of his kindness and regard in the preceding letter; and assures him in return of his best wishes and ardent esteem. The controversy between them having grown much too tedious, he thinks there is a necessity of now dropping it. He cannot therefore persuade himself to enter farther into it; or to say any more than that his sentiments are undesignedly misrepresented, when in page 387, Dr. Priestley suggests, that he considers wickedness as *a thing that is proper*, and thinks the *plan of the Deity absolutely required it*. He has never meant to say more, than that the PERMISSION of wickedness is *proper*; and that (for the reasons mentioned in p. 173, 174, and 358) the divine plan required the communication of powers rendering beings capable of perversely *making themselves* wicked, by acting, not as the divine plan requires, (for this, he thinks, would be too good an excuse for wickedness) but, by acting in a manner that opposes the divine plan and will, and that would subvert the order of nature; and to which, on this account, punishment has been annexed.

ANSWER

Answer by Dr. PRIESTLEY.

Dr. Priestley will always think himſelf happy in having an opportunity of expreſſing the very high and affectionate regard he entertains for Dr. Price, notwithſtanding their difference of opinion on ſubjects of ſo much moment as thoſe diſcuſſed in the preſent Correſpondence. He is confident that Dr. Price needs no aſſurance on the part of Dr. Prieſtley, that his ſentiments have not been *knowingly* miſrepreſented; but muſt take the liberty to ſay, that he cannot help conſidering the voluntary *permiſſion* of evil, or the *certain cauſe* of it, by a being who foreſees it, and has ſufficient power to prevent it, as equivalent to the expreſs *appointment* of it.

AN

ALPHABETICAL INDEX

TO THE

DISQUISITIONS ON MATTER AND SPIRIT, the TREATISE ON NECESSITY, and this CORRESPONDENCE, which is here considered as the third volume in the Set.

N. B. Where no Roman numeral is used, the first volume, or the *Disquisitions*, is understood.

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